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Abstract 
 
This thesis concerns evolution and how it is explained. The ambition here is to identify clearly the many 
aspects of evolution, and to evaluate past and present explanations of evolution for their coherence and 
validity. Historically natural selection has been taken to be the central and main explanans, with other 
explanations playing lesser roles. Here it will be argued that the sheer complexity and diversity within nature 
cannot be accounted for by any single explanatory mechanism and that a plurality of explanatory 
mechanisms is required. Loading natural selection with the main weight of explanation is an overburden 
which, far from strengthening its explanatory powers, actually renders it vacuous. A critical historical and 
philosophical examination of the concept of natural selection reveals that it has never received a formal 
scientific definition that commands universal respect. This has created a problem of demarcation between 
that which natural selection can legitimately be said to explain and that which it cannot. In fact, the ontology 
of natural selection is equivocal, giving rise to the many controversies that have plagued evolutionary 
biology. The disambiguation of the concept of natural selection is the principle aim of this thesis and 
guidelines on how this should be accomplished are provided. However, should these reforming guidelines 
fail to achieve a consensus then a more radical alternative is proposed. It is recommended that the selective 
terminology is replaced with the less anomalous and demanding principle of ‘meeting the conditions of 
existence’. Moreover, talk of the evolution and origins by means of natural selection is to be replaced by talk 
of evolution and origins by means of natural processes. Finally, drawing from a ‘Structuralist’ alternative, it 
will be demonstrated that biological evolution should not be divorced from general or cosmological 
evolution. Rather, elucidation should be drawn more deeply from the fields of physics, chemistry, 
mathematics and topology, without the use of selection-tinted spectacles.  
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Introduction 
 
Within evolutionary biology and the accompanying theoretical and philosophical literature, there are several 
unresolved and contentious issues, none more so than those that arise from the use of the concept of natural 
selection. The main issue here is that the term covers too many different relationships and that little, if 
anything, is ruled out. Natural Selection was seen originally as an important distinction to theological 
explanation but it is identified here that we have outgrown the early concept. There are today so many uses 
ranging from early ‘Malthusian natural selection’, to ‘positive selection’, to ‘negative selection’ to ‘balancing 
selection’ and, far from least but most anomalously, to ‘lifted or relaxed selection’. With such wide 
contrariness one must question the heuristic value of the concept and whether the application of natural 
selection or ‘selection’ is little more than a linguistic tick. Boundaries and parameters do matter and not 
exclusively for scientific purposes. During the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s natural selection was inappropriately 
applied to justify some obnoxious eugenic and socially racialist politics. It is justifiable and easy to condemn 
these applications as they transcended the intended usage. Unfortunately it is far less easy to provide clear 
barriers to indicate the proper application of natural selection.  I will argue here, in the context of science, 
that if the concept of natural selection cannot be clearly defined with appropriate parameters then it is 
advisable to talk directly and more specifically of natural processes.   The purpose of this thesis is to 
demonstrate that these issues can be resolved by some fairly simple changes to both the terminology 
currently employed and the expectations of the theorist. These changes will enable evolutionary theory to be 
perceived with more clarity, avoiding many of the philosophical pitfalls. To achieve this, the issues will be 
identified and examined critically but with a view to resolution that does not compromise evolutionary 
theory. 
 
Arguably, natural selection has been perceived as the classical explanation of evolutionary change, with other 
explanations playing lesser roles. However, this is not without problem. My original ambition was to provide 
natural selection with a definition that was clear and precise, thus avoiding many of the controversies, 
paradoxes and problems that have afflicted evolutionary theory. This has proved elusive. The main problem 
is that if one tightens the definition of natural selection then one loses a great deal of explanatory power. On 
the other hand, if one generalises the definition then one has the spectre of tautology, untestability and 
vacuity, with natural selection looking synonymous with evolution. And yet, all is not lost. There is a 
solution to the dilemma: there are many underlying naturalistic processes that can explain why evolution 
occurs. These will be explored and argued for. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that this approach is easy 
to articulate and follow in principle, avoiding many of the controversies and problems that emanate from the 
application of natural selection.  
 
In short the thesis will proceed in the following manner: 
 
First, I will demonstrate that there is a range of serious problems relating to Natural Selection. Then I will 
disambiguate the concept of Natural Selection, historically and ontologically. I will then consider 
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‘Structuralism’ as an alternative source of explanatory mechanisms. In the light of the foregoing I will then 
make two recommendations.  
 
Namely, one ought either to   
 
a) Recognise that there are no less than six distinct senses of Natural Selection to be found in the literature, 
and that each sense has it explanatory strengths and weaknesses. 
 
or if failing then 
 
b)  
Replace the terminology of Natural Selection altogether with the terminology of ‘Natural processes’, and 
‘conditions of existence’.  
 
I call the first recommendation ‘reform’ and the second, stronger, recommendation ‘radical revision’. 
 
 
 
 
The Main Problems with Natural Selection 
 
Since Darwin coined the term ‘natural selection’ in 1858, there has been continued controversy up to the 
present day. The originators, Darwin and Wallace, could not agree over the concept’s explanatory scope and 
the teleology implicit in the term ‘selection’ (See Ch.1). The problem of the relationship between ‘drift’ and 
‘natural selection’ is still present and as controversial as it was when Nageli first identified it almost 150 
years ago (See Ch.1 & Ch.2). The problems of vacuity, circularity and testability surface frequently in the 
literature and still require resolution. An unseemly and bitter dispute reared its ugly head during the 1970s 
concerning the application of natural selection, referred to as the ‘levels or units of selection debate’ (Rose & 
Rose 2000, Segerstrale 2000, Sterelny 2007). The ferocity of this debate has dampened somewhat but the 
issues remain unresolved. The aforesaid are the internal debates of the paradigm concerning natural selection 
but these are not the only problems. External to the paradigm, other evolutionists are concerned with issues 
of constraints, convergence and tensegrity and postulate a more deterministic structuralist approach that is 
seemingly not easy to reconcile with natural selection (Bejan and Lorente 2010, Goodwin and Webster 2011, 
Ingber 2011, Scarr 2012). This is not a new consideration but it has a growing number of adherents, also 
reflected in the recent literature. Finally, one must not forget the inappropriate use of natural selection to 
justify some rather suspicious eugenic, economic and socio-political agendas (Gasman 1971, Gillette, 2007). 
Dennett’s (1995) approving description of natural selection as a universal acid is, arguably, also of deep 
concern to many who perceive such an export as undesirable.  
 
Ambiguity 
 
It will be argued here that much of the confusion emanates from the fact there is no clear and precise 
scientific definition of natural selection. For example, physicists achieve such a definition for the 
electromagnetic strong and weak forces (or more precisely interactions), which can be understood using clear 
parameters (Close et al 1986). If there is a comparison with natural selection then the second law of 
thermodynamics is more akin, with over 20 different definitions in current usage (Lockwood 2005). What 
began as a metaphor, as Darwin admitted, later translated into a scientific principle, or one should say a 
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variety of principles, not all of them pertaining to science. It is often difficult to ascertain which species of 
‘natural selection’ is being alluded to by proponents. Part of the key to this problem is an appreciation not 
only of how the concept has evolved into new variations but also that the old concepts of natural selection are 
retained and routinely employed. It is not simply that natural selection has changed meaning; it is that new 
meanings have been added. The term ‘selection’ now has so many contrary connotations that without reform 
or guiding criteria forthcoming it can be charged as meaningless. This is the most serious problem facing 
neo-Darwinism and the philosophers who endorse it. It will be argued here that unless terms such as ‘natural 
selection’ and ‘selection’ can be disambiguated then the terms should be replaced.  
 
The historical explication discloses that the concept of natural selection had its origins prior to the coining of 
the term by Darwin and the formalisation of the evolutionary theory together with Wallace in 1858. What is 
of interest here is that the concept of advantaged traits spreading gradually through and increasing in number 
in a population was considered by several naturalists and was thought to be uncontroversial. It was widely 
accepted that members of species could manifest diverse morphologies, but it was not perceived that 
continuous diversification would eventually result in transmutation. It was Darwin and Wallace who 
extended this early concept of natural selection to account for speciation, breaking the chains of Linnaean 
fixity. Both men came to the same conclusion that Malthusian principles of competition for resources would 
identify the process of evolutionary change that resulted not only in such morphological diversity but also in 
the arrival of new species and the extinction of old. It was the latter two conjectures that proved 
controversial. 
 
After the ‘eclipse of Darwinism’, (Huxley 1942) another variant to natural selection was added by the 
architects of the modern synthesis. The term ‘survival of the fittest’ was dropped for its perceived crudity, in 
favour of a more generalised concept of fitness. This, too, added not only plurality but also another layer of 
ambiguity, for now the fitness concept seemed to lack a scientific definition with any consensus. Further, it is 
unclear whether natural selection in the Malthusian sense was replaced by the new concept of fitness or 
whether both enjoy separate identities.  Another ambiguity, which largely arises from the aforesaid, is 
whether natural selection is a positive causal process or whether it is a filter that is causally negative, merely 
conserving and eliminating.  Then again, could natural selection be biologically omnipotent – causal, 
conservative and eliminative? Each of these alternatives carries a cost, all of which will be explored more 
fully.  
 
The problem of finding an appropriate and acceptable singular definition of natural selection has produced a 
further problem, one of address. Which aspects of evolution is natural selection addressing? This problem 
can be most easily perceived through the historical exposition. Darwin had very clear views upon this: 
natural selection was one process amongst many, albeit the main process of evolutionary change. All 
processes, whether sexual selection, Lamarckian use, disuse and habit, correlation of growth, or the direct 
impact of the environment, were independent of natural selection (Appendix 1). Wallace, on the other hand, 
considered natural selection sufficient (Ch.1). Both men thought natural selection addressed the gradual 
accumulating diversity of life but also, most importantly and most controversially at the time, the advent of 
new species. Many twentieth-century biologists and philosophers, however, arguably shifted emphasis and 
focused attention upon the explanation of biological adaptation, with speciation a subject of secondary 
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consideration. The most curious spectacle now emerging is that evolutionary change is said by some to be 
most likely to occur when natural selection is ‘relaxed’ or ‘lifted’ (Bell 2008,  Deacon 2008), a perspective in 
direct opposition and contrast to the perspective of Darwin and Wallace. The underlying threat is apparent: 
such an assortment of contrary and contradictory explanations devalues what was originally a genuine 
attempt to afford a naturalistic account of evolution.  
 
Overextension 
 
The generalisation of the principle of natural selection to one of reproductive success by whatever means has 
facilitated the logical extension of the principle to other disciplines. The universal acid, welcomed by Dennett 
(1995), is not entirely well received. Applying principles of generalised natural selection to such fields as 
cosmology, mineralogy and evolutionary psychology, it will be argued, does nothing to aid explanation in 
these fields and ignites the familiar charges of vacuity, circularity and untestability (Ch.5).  
 
Natural Selection and Evolution: The Differences 
 
It will be argued that natural selection was originally conceived to explain how evolutionary changes or 
transmutations came about. The problem today is that natural selection has slowly transformed into 
‘anomalous selection’. By this it is meant that the term ‘natural selection’ has over the years deviated from its 
original conceptions, increasing in ambiguity. Anomalous selection in turn has facilitated, in some quarters, 
the idea that natural selection is synonymous with evolution (See Ch.3). This again raises the charge of 
vacuity and hollowness to the theory. It will be argued that this can be resolved if one accepts that natural 
selection is only one aspect of evolutionary change amongst many. Clear parameters will therefore be sought 
and the distinction between the explanandum (evolution) and the proposed explanans (natural selection) fully 
identified (Ch.11).  
 
The Problem of Causality and Emergence 
 
There is no agreement over the aetiology of natural selection. This will be fleshed out in chapter 4. The 
pertinent problem is that if natural selection is said by the theory to act only on variation then how does one 
account for the initial variation? Further, if one has an account of initial variation then cannot one explain the 
great diversity of life with those same principles and without recourse to natural selection? The challenge 
therefore is that natural selection by its own definitions cannot explain the sources of variation; recourse to 
random mutation and modification through descent is insufficient. The implication is that there must already 
be in existence some body or form that can randomly mutate or descend with modifications, and therefore a 
theory of emergence is required to explain this. As Reid (2007) said, his students would claim that ‘if it 
existed then it was selected’, which he countered by saying, ‘to be selected it must first exist’. Reid has 
further argued that the causal chain of neo-Darwinism is in fact an inversion of what actually happens: 
differential reproduction is not the cause of evolution but the effect. 
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The Levels of Selection 
 
One issue that has perplexed the concept of natural selection since the term was originally coined has been 
the ‘levels’ or ‘units’ of selection debate. This has been a source of continuing contention for very many 
biologists and philosophers (see Lloyd 2010 for an excellent philosophical overview, also Okasha 2006, 
2008). The issue is that if natural selection is a ‘force’ or ‘pressure’ that is responsible for evolutionary 
change, then at what biological level does it ‘act’? For instance, does natural selection ‘operate’ on the 
individual organism, the gene, the group or all of these? Moreover, is natural selection ‘dynamic’, fluctuating 
between the different phenomena, sometimes ‘acting’ on the gene and sometimes ‘acting’ on the group, for 
example? One hundred and fifty years on and still there is little consensus. Much of the problem here, it will 
be argued, stems from anomalous selection and the excessive use of metaphoric language. Perceiving natural 
selection as a force or pressure that can act upon objects is not justified, at least if one intends to be scientific. 
Further, if there is a presumption   that natural selection is either the only explanation of evolutionary change 
or at least the main explanation, then it will be argued any such presumption has still to be established.  
 
The Problem of Language and Teleology 
 
Evolutionary biology, it must be conceded, is rife with anthropomorphic language, metaphor and obtuse 
teleology; much more so than any other science. The use of metaphor, for instance, adds a further layer of 
ambiguity to an already overambiguous field. This is particularly so when commentators are describing 
natural selection, which can be commonly a ‘force’, a ‘pressure’, a ‘filter’, but also as a ‘driving engine’ 
(Ridley 2003), both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ (Neander 1995), as ‘sorting’ and as a ‘mistress’ (Gould 2002), 
as both strong and weak (Reiss 2009) a ‘whip hand’ (Sober 1993), as ‘creative’ (Gould 1977,  Neander 1988, 
Godfrey – Smith 2009) as a ‘tracker’ (Lewontin 1978), a ‘stabiliser’(Hull 2001) or an ‘arbitrator’(Lovtrup 
1974), a crane or as acid (Dennet 1995) and last but far from least, as a ‘Blind Watchmaker’(Dawkins 1986). 
Metaphor can be employed as a legitimate tool of explanation, but only where more precise scientific 
vocabulary is unavailable, and it should certainly not be used in a willy-nilly manner. Examination will 
establish whether such terms as ‘force’ and ‘pressure’ in this context have scientific credentials or are merely 
metaphors masking vacuity. Charges of teleology have recently re-emerged; Reiss has argued that natural 
selection was devised to answer questions that accept the premise of design, ‘that adaptedness is a problem 
crying out for explanation’ (2009 p353). Cummins (2009) has further argued that functional explanations can 
also be guilty of what he calls ‘neo-teleology’. However, it should be noted that Cummins is not critical of 
use of the term natural selection. Both Cummins and Reiss advance some vocabulary that will help reduce 
the charge of teleology; this deserves consideration and some additional suggestions will be delineated 
(Ch.12). 
 
The Problem of Adaptation 
 
Issues concerning the nature of ‘adaptation’ have a vast and controversial literature in both theoretical 
biology and the philosophy of biology. Although this topic is not the main focus of this thesis, recent events 
have brought it alive, especially in regard to the role of natural selection. Reflection upon the famous 
‘Spandrels’ paper (Gould and Lewontin 1979) has given rise to a new interpretation by Fodor and Piattelli-
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Palmarini (2010). These two have argued that one can only distinguish counterfactually between adaptive 
traits and traits that ‘piggyback’. If this is the case, they argue, then natural selection becomes superfluous as 
it cannot ‘act’ upon counterfactuals. This interpretation has been challenged by Block and Kitcher (2010), 
who represent a wide body of opinion within the circles of neo-Darwinism. The debate raises issues of 
explanation alongside the problem of teleology already mentioned.  
 
Research Programmes and Censorship  
 
The danger of confining one’s understanding of evolutionary change merely to factors of natural selection 
and adaptive reasoning is that other avenues of insightful research may be precluded. Arguably,  evolution by 
means of natural selection is regarded by some of its supporters to be beyond that which should be 
questioned, and regretfully sometimes defended with a passion that spills over to almost religious 
fundamentalism (Stove 1995, Midgley 2003). It will be further argued that dissent is received with hostility 
or completely ignored, papers are rejected, grants are withheld, positions denied and, in one case, a sacking 
implemented for advancing the ideas of Lamarck. It is hardly surprising researchers impose self-censorship 
and that an unpleasant atmosphere ensues. It could be argued that much of this is fuelled by a great fear of 
creationist ‘science’ or the movement that advocates ‘intelligent design’. Moreover, the fear has resulted in a 
move to conformity that stultifies research rather than emancipating it. Examples of this narrowing 
perspective will be considered in the light of important omissions that arguably can strengthen evolutionary 
theory (Ch.13).  
 
Limitations to the Explanans and the Issue of Constraints 
 
Contrary to Dennett, one persistent line of criticism that has been levelled against natural selection since the 
theory was formalised by Darwin and Wallace is that its explanatory power is overburdened. By taking on 
more than it can possibly hope to explain, the theory reduces with generalisations that are little more than 
platitudes and simplistic truisms. This charge, it will be argued, holds true if one adopts a fully selectionist 
explanans but not if one accepts evolutionary pluralism. Popper (1977) was one of the first to appreciate that 
many of the vexing problems of circularity and untestability could be avoided if one accepted there were 
other evolutionary processes at work beside natural selection. This observation was consistent with the 
pluralism of Darwin but inconsistent with the views of Wallace and the definition of natural selection 
formulated by the architects of the modern synthesis. The following questions now arise and require address. 
What are these alternative evolutionary processes? Are there just a few supplementary processes or does each 
explanation have its own identity, as Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini argue, forming a collection of natural 
histories? It will be argued here that although Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini are correct to identify the 
constraints imposed upon evolutionary mechanisms and morphological form, they cannot conclude that there 
are no recognisable evolutionary processes. Illustrations will be provided to demonstrate what types of 
biological phenomena lie beyond the explanation of natural selection, but following this critical appraisal is 
the requirement to examine the alternative processes that are proposed to fill the explanatory gap. One such 
alternative process is termed, for the sake of this work, ‘structuralism’, but this should not be confused with 
the ‘structuralism’ of continental philosophy.  
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One of the difficulties here is that the structuralist alternative is composed of a disparate group of individuals 
spread over many years.1 However, to evaluate their arguments it is necessary to identify the core themes and 
principles that unite them. It is one thing to criticise freely the prevailing views on evolutionary theory; it is 
another to provide a coherent alternative. Some time will therefore be devoted to understanding the 
fundamental arguments of the structuralists, pulling the strands together, before the emerging model of 
explanation can be evaluated alongside the model(s) of explanation provided by natural selection.  
 
An examination of the constraints that effectively outline the parameters to morphological form, the 
necessary relationships between parts and the allometric nature of growth will be included. Furthermore, 
consideration will be given to the structuralist claim that much of evolutionary understanding resides outside 
the province of genetics; persistent regularities pervade both the inanimate and animate and can be witnessed 
in symmetries and order. The structuralist argues that, to appreciate these fully, one must engage in a wide 
range of disciplines, such as physics, mathematics, geometry, topology and chemistry. It will be suggested 
that structuralism does have more to contribute than has previously been appreciated and will strengthen our 
evolutionary theory, offering explanation that has historically proved problematic for natural selection.  
 
Natural Selection versus Structuralism 
 
There is then a tension between advocates of natural selection on the one hand and advocates of structuralism 
on the other. To gauge and clarify this dichotomy, it is suggested that one needs to be clear as to 1) what the 
explanandum actually is and 2) what form of explanation should be taken. For instance, within evolutionary 
theory there are several issues demanding an appropriate explanation: how life emerged from a single 
ancestor to such diverse forms; how and why major transitions occurred; how individuals and populations 
adapt to environments; why some forms are more common than others; and so forth. It will be demonstrated 
why clarity here is of fundamental importance. The second issue touches on finding an appropriate method of 
explanation that might allow one to examine the explanandum at hand and then adjudicate between the 
conflicting explanantia of the selectionist and the structuralist. However, caution is required here, for the 
biological world is not recognised as conforming to any easy philosophical account of explanation. Also one 
is wary not to be presumptuous about the vexing issue of the ‘explanation of explanation’, for this issue itself 
is unresolved, controversial and demanding of consideration that would occupy another thesis. However, 
having said this, a method may be available that has some heuristic value whilst recognising that any 
universal application is unlikely.  
 
It seems without controversy that biological explanation is mostly of a causal nature. The tool that one might 
employ to settle some issues can be derived from Schaffer’s proposal of ‘contrastive causation’, which takes 
the form: c rather than c* causes e rather than e*. Before one can consider applying ‘contrastive causation’, 
however, one must determine what natural selection actually is. To answer the ontological question, one must 
unpack c rather than c*. This looks on the surface to be fairly straightforward, but it will be demonstrated that 
it is anything but. The task will begin with the historical explication of natural selection, followed by a 
                                                 
1 The principal figures include St George J. Mivart, D’Arcy Thompson, Antonio Lima-de-Faria and Robert Reid. (There is also another 
grouping that does not fit easily into any camp, which might include Ron Amundson, Noam Chomsky, Michael Denton, Jerry Fodor, 
Brian Goodwin, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Ian Stewart, Stuart Kauffman, Mary Midgley, Simon Conway Morris, John O. Reiss and 
Alan Turing.) It should be noted that not all these would subscribe to the label ‘structuralist’; Lima-de-Faria, for instance, sees himself as 
an ‘autoevolutionist’. 
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conceptual analysis. Having determined what kind of animal natural selection is, one is in a position to see 
what work it can do. 
 
13 
Natural Selection 
 
Chapter 1: The Historical Exposition 
 
To fully understand the concept of ‘natural selection’, it is necessary to examine the origins, not only of the 
term itself but also of the ideas it represents. Such an examination is prerequisite to any solution or 
clarification to the manifold questions demanded. What is natural selection: is it a force, is it a process, is it a 
variety of different processes, is it a mechanism, is it a cause or is it merely of descriptive value, mapping 
changes as they occur?  Seemingly simple questions such as these are in fact extremely complex and difficult 
to answer. However, one should address these before going on to face further questions concerning any 
possible explanatory power of the concept. Another set of questions will arise. For example, can natural 
selection account for all evolutionary change; does it explain speciation, variation and extinction, and 
adaptation? Moreover, does it ‘operate’ at the level of the gene, the genome, the individual, the group, the 
species or at all levels? Is it compatible with sexual selection and how far is it constrained within general 
evolution and natural law? Should the principle of natural selection apply to sciences other than biology? 
Awareness of the historical origins of the concept is necessary for such an understanding; for what one finds 
is that the term ‘natural selection’ undergoes changes and additions in meaning, leading to difficulties of 
ambiguity. 
A fresh interpretation of the historical literature will establish that- 
1. A primitive concept of natural selection existed prior to Darwin and Wallace. 
2. Darwin and Wallace differed over the explanatory power of natural selection. 
3. The ‘Eclipse of Darwinism’ is an incorrect interpretation of the history.  
 
A primitive concept of natural selection existed prior to Darwin and Wallace 
 
There are several important thinkers who preceded Darwin and Wallace in appreciation that favourable traits 
were most likely to be preserved and passed on to future generations. This was the first inkling of a 
naturalistic explanation for how organisms might become adapted, multiply their numbers or conversely 
suffer extinction. There will follow a brief outline of the historical figures and the views they represent, 
Quotations from these thinkers can be accessed in Appendix 1. Within Appendix 1 there is included a quote 
from Darwin (1.5) that demonstrates the similarities of all included. 
 
Hutton (1726–97) was a Scottish farmer with an interest in chemistry and natural history who might be called 
the father of modern geology. There is the early recognition here that members of a particular race may 
become better adapted, as favourable traits will be preserved through heredity (Appendix 1.1).   Wells (1757–
1817) expressed similar sentiments about the ‘race problem’ in a  paper to the Royal Society in 1813, Wells 
recognises that nature, albeit with a longer time span, may be able to achieve the same results of phenotypic 
change as breeders might achieve through artificial selection (Appendix 1.2). Lawrence (1783–1867), a 
surgeon, began a series of lectures entitled ‘Lectures on Comparative Anatomy, Physiology, Zoology and the 
Natural History of Man’ (1819), which he hoped would be the basis of a book. The content of the lectures 
was well-advanced and included discussion of such concepts as mutation, selective breeding, sexual 
selection, adaptation and the dangers of inbreeding. 
 
14 
 
Matthew (1790–1874) discussed the ideas of natural selection in an obscure book, On Naval Timber and 
Arboriculture (1831). Without calling them such, he boldly introduces the processes of natural selection, with 
a possible explanation of the arrival of new species. He recognises the importance of heredity and 
reproduction, suggesting that evolution follows a progressive path toward ‘perfection’ (Appendix 1.3). What 
is unknown today is how widely his ideas and those of others of similar persuasion were read and discussed. 
Blyth (1810–73) has been the source of much controversy long after his death, championed by some 
creationists as the originator of natural selection but seen as relatively unimportant by most of the scientific 
community. Eiseley (1979) created a storm when he suggested that Blyth was a major contributor to 
Darwin’s thought but not properly recognised as such.  To Blyth, ‘natural selection’ was seen to restore the 
‘balance of nature’, ensuring that species always returned to ‘type’. Artificial breeding by man had an 
adverse effect on the creatures in question; when they were returned to reproduce in the wild, future 
generations would lose the attributes selected by man. This Platonic inheritance of ‘type’ or ‘form’ or the 
‘essentialism’ of Aristotle was regarded as given in pre-Victorian times (Richards 2005). It is not clear that 
Blyth stopped short of admitting speciation. He does talk of deviations, such as the ‘ancons or otter sheep’ 
that will never revert to ‘form’, unless forcibly bred so by man (Appendix 1.4).  And what did Blyth have in 
mind when he talked of ‘breeds’? Does the gradual accumulation of characters, generation by generation, that 
he mentions result in a new species? Unfortunately, all of Blyth’s letters, including the correspondence with 
Darwin before and after the publication of the Origin, have been lost. Without them, we are reduced to 
speculation, and it is probably wisest not to go there. 
 
Darwin and Wallace differed over the explanatory power of natural selection. 
 
We could today be discussing ‘Wallacism’ rather than ‘Darwinism’ if Wallace had arrived at his views on 
natural selection just a few years earlier. As it was, Wallace sent his famous letter to Darwin from the Malay 
Archipelago, where he was working as a naturalist. It was quite a shock to Darwin to receive this letter, 
because Wallace had concisely outlined almost the same views on natural selection that Darwin had been 
working on for the past ten years but had been reluctant to publish. The following is a concise summary of 
the shared views, taken from Darwin (1859 & 1900) and Wallace (1870, 1886 & 1889). Both men effectively 
saw the end of the old paradigm and ushered in what one might reasonably call the ‘laissez-faire’ or 
‘Malthusian’ perspective of evolution. Both men arrived at the concept of ‘struggle for existence’ after 
reading the works of Thomas Malthus. That is that population increases would outstrip any increases in food 
production or resources, resulting in fierce competition.  Both accepted that favourable characters would be 
preserved and passed on through the generations. Accumulation of such favourable traits would lead to 
further variation, even to new species. Equally, unfavourable characteristics would gradually be eliminated in 
the struggle for existence. Furthermore, both agreed that climatic changes could intensify the struggle for 
existence, leading in some instances to extinction. Gradualism, following from Lyell’s ‘uniformitarianism’,2 
was the shared assessment, but Darwin emphasised more strongly that very many generations were required 
to effect change. The term ‘evolution’ was not used by either man. There are, however, differences and it is 
instructive to examine the opinions that each extended to explain the forces that shaped evolution.  
                                                 
2 See, Desmond and Moore (1992) for an excellent description of the development of Darwin’s views on transformations. Also Wallace 
(1870) outlines his own perception on those formative years. Berry (2002) gives a very readable overview of Wallace, his life, his ideas 
and the relationship with Darwin. 
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The following summarises Kutschera (2003) –  
 
• Wallace never used the term natural selection in his submission.  
• Wallace never accepted any role for Lamarckian acquired characteristics. 
• Darwin extended the ‘struggle for existence’ to the Plantae, whereas Wallace refers only to 
Animalia. Wallace argues that the struggle for existence would be influenced by competition 
between members of different species, the ‘predator–prey’ concept.  
• Darwin saw the struggle as being between members within the same species.  
• Wallace introduced the terms ‘adaptation’ and ‘population’ in the same sense as biologists might use 
them today.  
• Darwin also included his grandfather’s idea of ‘sexual selection’. (Darwin, E 1792). 
The last point of divergence was over artificial selection: Darwin used this as an analogous argument for 
natural selection but Wallace did not see domesticated animals as representative of what happened in nature. 
(Berry 2002)  
 
Forces Other than Natural Selection 
 
As indicated above, Wallace and Darwin disagreed over the scope and limits of natural selection. Darwin was 
pluralistic concerning the number of factors that would influence evolution. Appendix 2 is provided with 
quotations illustrating evolutionary processes that Darwin considered distinct from natural selection. 
 
The influence of Lamarck was incorporated in Darwin’s early writings and remained so throughout his life. If 
one is to argue that Darwin only sought recourse to Lamarckian ideas in later life, after the Origin had been 
criticised for failing to provide a mechanism for adaptations, then one would be incorrect.  If one checks the 
first edition of the Origin, one can see that Lamarckian principles are invoked. Darwin recognises the ‘effects 
of use and disuse’ and makes some observations on the effect of habit (Appendix 2.2). On one occasion, 
Darwin sees a compatible action to explain the loss of wings on beetles from Madeira: ‘these several 
considerations have made me believe that the wingless condition of so many Madeira beetles is mainly due to 
the action of natural selection, but combined probably with disuse.’ (Darwin,1859 p154.) Returning to the 
sixth edition of the Origin, Darwin devotes a chapter to answer the criticisms (mostly those from Mivart, 
1871) of natural selection. To explain how the giraffe came to have such a long and unusual neck, Darwin 
combines the factors of natural selection and use: ‘it is almost equally certain that this one kind alone could 
have its neck elongated for this purpose, through natural selection and the effects of increased use.’(Darwin 
1900 p279). (See also Appendix 2.1). 
 
In The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (1868), Darwin extends his views on 
evolutionary processes supplementing natural selection. For example, he considers the ‘correlation of 
growth’ (Appendix 2.3), the direct impact of diet (Appendix 2.4) and that of the climate (Appendix 2.5). 
When one reads the Variation, one almost gains the impression that natural selection is playing second fiddle 
to a host of evolutionary explanations even though Darwin does maintain within the text on occasion that 
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natural selection is the primary evolutionary process. Oddly, only two chapters extol natural selection, 
whereas the rest of the text is given over to many other considerations. There is also recognition by Darwin, 
of developmental biology, atavism and the fact that ‘changes in the conditions of life cause variability’ 
(Appendix 2.6). However, this pluralism and the Lamarckian influence on Darwin were never accepted by 
Wallace, and the invocation of ‘use and disuse’ was subsequently dropped by Weismann and, later, the neo-
Darwinists of the twentieth century. Darwin also devotes a chapter in the Origin to hybridism. Although he 
recognises the formation of new species, he does not discuss, as far as one can see, any relationship there 
may be with natural selection. 
 
The new ‘laissez-faire’ paradigm was fractured over the scope and efficacy of natural selection. Darwin 
presented a more pluralistic account of evolutionary change, which included factors divorced from natural 
selection, such as sexual selection and Lamarckian mechanics. Darwin did not, it seems, become that much 
more pluralistic in the light of criticism after the publication of the Origin, he already was a pluralist. 
Wallace, on the other hand, presented a more singular explanation, advocating natural selection and rejecting 
nearly all additional explanations (Ch.1). This divergence, which has remained a controversial topic, leaves 
one in an uncomfortable philosophical position, as clearly the standpoints cannot both be true. Unfortunately, 
this ambiguity is never resolved, and as shall be demonstrated, this undesirable confusion is later 
compounded.  
 
The ‘Eclipse of Darwinism’ is an incorrect interpretation of the history.  
 
It is somewhat ironic that, following the famous publication of 1859, evolution (transmutation) would 
become almost universally accepted amongst naturalists but natural selection almost universally rejected as 
its cause. It is instructive to understand the demise of natural selection prior to its rehabilitation with the ‘new 
synthesis’. Criticisms came in many forms, but what is of particular interest is that many of the issues that 
were hotly debated can be seen to re-surface in the 21st century (See Ch.2). Mivart (1871 & 1876) harboured 
serious doubts over natural selection as the primary explanation of evolutionary change.3 Although he 
recognised natural selection as a factor, his field experience presented many counter examples; he thought 
natural selection could only be a secondary factor, with the causes of evolution unknown. (Appendix 3 is 
provided to illustrate quotations from Mivart).  Mivart (1871) saw convergent properties as good examples of 
evolution in action but he thought that it was implausible that natural selection could explain such analogous 
forms (Appendix 3.1). The regularities that he recognised in nature could be distinct geographically and 
chronologically, and yet the same forms at different times and locations were recurrent and widespread.  
 
Darwin and Wallace explained the beneficial features of organisms through a gradual progressive honing by 
natural selection, replacing the less beneficial forms in the Malthusian struggle for existence. Mivart (1871) 
argued that if the proposed process was a gradual one, then how could one account for the early incipient 
stages of an organ? (Appendix 3.2). For an organ to be beneficial, it had to be fully developed and functional; 
a partly formed organ was of no survival value and therefore outside the scope of natural selection. 4 Mivart 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed account of the relationship between Darwin and Mivart see Desmond and Moore (1992), also Peter Bowler (2003). 
4 This problem is discussed by Gould and Vrba (1982) and led to their conjecture of ‘exaptation’. 
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(1871) contended that the fossil record did not support evolution by gradual transformations (Appendix 3.3). 
The argument follows from his previous problem of incipient organs. 
 
Kropotkin (1842–1921) was one of the first supporters of Darwin and Wallace to recognise the problems 
with the Malthusian premises. This led him to the view that natural selection could have a broader 
application, extended to the group, and one could argue anticipating not just Wynne-Edwards (1962, 1986) 
and group selection, but also the twentieth-century interpretation of natural selection as one of ‘fitness’. 
Kropotkin travelled to Siberia and Manchuria at this time and to the glacial regions of Finland and Sweden 
later. During these trips, he observed the immense struggle for life in face of the most severe climatic 
conditions. The struggle for existence between individuals was not to be found; rather, there was mutual aid 
between individuals struggling against the climatic conditions (Appendix 3.4 & 3.8). Kropotkin identifies the 
‘struggle for existence’ as an ambiguous term. It has a narrow sense and a wider sense (Appendix 3.5 & 3.6). 
Darwin, he argues, began with the narrow sense but later moved to incorporate a wider sense. The former is 
‘that of a struggle between separate individuals for the sheer means of existence’ and the wider sense 
Kropotkin (1902 p11) quotes Darwin explaining the term in its ‘“large and metaphorical sense including 
(which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny”.’ Kropotkin 
observes that Darwin has illustrated this move by the time of the Descent of Man (1871). The fittest are then 
not merely the strongest or the most cunning; they are the ones that are best organised at bringing their young 
into the world. This will include those that are sympathetic, supportive and cooperative. Kropotkin says that 
under this new sense of ‘struggle for existence’, the old and narrow Malthusian sense is now discarded.  
 
Kropotkin never denies that struggle exists in nature but argues that mutual aid is a more important factor in 
evolution and lists many examples of mutual aid among the invertebrates as well as the vertebrates. In one 
example, he cites natural selection as working against ‘individuals endowed with predatory inclinations’ 
(p13). Solidarity is favoured over the ‘cunningest and the shrewdest’ (p21). ‘Selection’ to Kropotkin works 
on the species on many occasions, the interests of the individual being secondary, for without mutual support 
there will be no chance of successful reproduction (Appendix 3.7). Observations of aquatic life on the lakes 
in the Russian and Siberian Steppes gave Kropotkin glimpses of cross-species mutual aid. Different species 
of birds resting on the shores would cooperate to fight off predators that continually lurked in the vicinity or 
in the air. Warning calls were mutually beneficial and, in one example, gulls and terns joined forces to chase 
away potential robbers.  
 
Kropotkin questions the Malthusian idea of overpopulation leading to competition as a general rule. In 
nature, it is more uncommon than common, he continues and furthermore it is more the case that species 
struggle directly against changing climate than against each other. Moreover, competition plays only a minor 
role in providing checks against overpopulation. It is the natural checks – the sudden storms, the dramatic 
change in temperature, the drought – that suppress population growth. Other factors might involve the spread 
of disease or parasitic fungi (in one instance). Kropotkin considers the Darwinian counterargument that it is 
during periods of hardship, battling against the rigours of climate or disease, that the fittest survive and pass 
on their qualities. He then goes on to dismiss this on empirical grounds. Any areas ravaged by such 
calamities leave the surviving populations weakened, not strengthened: ‘If natural selection were limited in 
its actions to periods of exceptional drought, or sudden changes of temperature, or inundations, retrogression 
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would be the rule in the animal world’. (ibid. p58) Further, and perhaps not without irony, Kropotkin says 
that natural selection favours those ant colonies that avoid competition with its deleterious consequences. To 
Kropotkin, then, the best chances of survival are enhanced by avoiding competition and instead practising 
cooperation and mutual aid.5  
 
Butler (1882) was originally a supporter of Darwin but became disillusioned with the concept of natural 
selection and arrived independently at a critique not that dissimilar to that of his contemporary Mivart. Butler 
claims that Darwin has a problem. If natural selection only accounts for preservation then it loses its status as 
a cause and hence its raison d’être (Appendix 3.9). To Butler, the Origin explains little and should be 
compared to Paley’s Natural Theology (1802). Furthermore, Darwin has committed a sleight of hand when 
he says of the eye ‘variation will cause the slight alterations’, when of course the slight alterations are the 
variations. Later, according to Butler, Darwin contradicts himself by maintaining that natural selection only 
preserves and accumulates small inherited modifications; it has no role in inducing or causing these 
modifications. Butler therefore draws a distinction concerning natural selection; its role seems to be one of 
preservation and not of cause. Darwin argues that the advantageous modification would be preserved by 
natural selection in the struggle for existence. Butler, however, considers the term ‘struggle for existence’ and 
asks whether it is necessary for evolutionary change. As long as a plant or organism fulfils the conditions 
required for existence, then it can continue to reproduce. He concludes that ‘the conditions for existence’ is a 
less misleading term than ‘natural selection’: ‘I have said that there is a practical identity of meaning between 
‘natural selection’ and the ‘conditions of existence’ when both expressions are fully extended’. (1882 p9) 
 
Butler maintains that the latter term is more accurate and calculated to keep the thread of the argument. He 
also argues that descent with modification by means of natural selection is not synonymous with the theory 
of evolution or with the theory of descent with modification. The ‘conditions of existence’ and ‘natural 
selection’ are in effect the same thing, but natural selection is a misleading term because it implies some 
force or agency whereas ‘conditions of existence’ does not (Appendix 3.10). Butler concludes that the 
principle of natural selection is not really a theory at all but an observation of facts. Darwin gives us the 
Origin of Species but with the origin cut out (chapter XX1, p17). Butler thinks that if ‘struggle for existence’ 
had been employed to the exclusion of natural selection, then one would realise that the theory does not 
identify the cause of modification (Appendix 3.11). Butler says that “means” is a dangerous word; it slips too 
easily into “cause”, implying perhaps that Darwin gets his causal chain in the wrong order. The issue of 
natural selection as causal or not remains live and will be considered in more detail later. 
 
Scepticism at the Turn of the Century 
 
It can be argued that by the 1900s, biologists and naturalists had embraced the concept of transmutation, 
which was now universally discussed as evolution. One must recognise that evolution is a wider term than 
                                                 
5 Kropotkin submitted several articles and commentaries on the evolutionary debates to Science. These were collected together and 
reprinted in 1995, edited by Woodcock. What is of interest here is that Kropotkin discusses the issue of the direct impact of the 
environment upon individuals and populations. Nowadays, this phenomenon has resurfaced in the literature of the evolutionary 
developmental biologists and ecologists and is referred to as ‘polyphenism’. The issue is important, because polyphenism when 
discussed in Kropotkin’s time was seen to run contrary to natural selection but today some biologists see polyphenism as being 
embraced or subsumed within a framework of natural selection. 
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transmutation. Transmutation was almost exclusively seen in Victorian times as what one would call today 
‘speciation’. Of course, evolutionary considerations could embrace adaptationism and speciation. There was, 
however, a widespread scepticism over the ability of natural selection to explain either of these phenomena. 
The recurring theme in the criticism was that if natural selection only preserved or eliminated any changes 
that might occur, then it could not account for the causes of the changes. The study of variation and how 
variations arose was seen as the key to understanding the ‘driving force’ of evolution. Bateson (1861–1926) 
suggested: 
 
Perhaps the causes of evolutionary change are in variation itself and not in a superimposed external sorting 
as the more complex Darwinian mechanism proposed: variation, in fact, is evolution. The readiest way 
then of solving the problem of evolution is to study the facts of variation. (Bateson 1894 p6) 
 
De Vries (1848–1935), most famous for his rediscovery of Mendelian genetics, was also sceptical about the 
aetiology of natural selection. Rather prophetically, he considers thus: 
 
Natural selection is a sieve. It creates nothing as is so often assumed; it only sifts. It retains only what 
variability puts into the sieve. Whence the material comes that is put into it, should be kept separate from 
the theory of its selection. (De Vries 1909 p609) 
  
De Vries, as far as one can see, gives the first rendering of natural selection as a sieve or filter, and also 
recognises an important distinction here between two separate processes, the source of the variations and any 
subsequent action ascribed to natural selection. This is something to be considered in more detail later.  
According to Kropotkin, at the beginning of the twentieth century the key debate focused on two perspectives 
of evolutionary change; one was the direct impact of the environment (direct adaptations) and the other, 
natural selection: 
 
The great question which now above all others interests the biologists and divides them into two camps is 
the question of the relative importance of natural selection on the one side, and the Direct Action of the 
environment on the other side, in the process of new species. (Kropotkin 1995 p139) 
 
This debate was effectively buried for fifty years with the advent of the new synthetic theory, the explanatory 
focus being adaptation by natural selection. However, in recent years the debate has reopened and the direct 
impact of the environment is given consideration with our improved understanding of developmental biology 
and epigenomics. 
 
Conclusions 
 
By the end of the 19th century the idea of Evolution was established, with a naturalist account based on the 
principles of heredity and change. The radical shift from the earlier advocates of a proto-natural selection was 
that speciation would result and this could be understood if the ideas of Malthus were applied. Both Darwin 
and Wallace sought to explain the ‘modification’ part in ‘modification by descent’ as a process of Malthusian 
struggle, but disagreed over the explanatory power of natural selection. This issue is however only the 
beginning of a problem that is to persist and complicate until the present. Wallace saw natural selection as a 
singular sufficient explanation, but Darwin disagreed: Malthusian struggle was primary but sexual selection 
and other factors independent of natural selection also contributed. Nevertheless, this Malthusian explanation 
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was severely questioned by naturalists and biologists. Mivart (1871 & 1876) saw the pace of evolutionary 
change as being irregular and challenged the gradualist account. Butler and others thought that natural 
selection failed to provide any explanation in any detail or to provide an aetiology. Lyell, one of Darwin’s 
inner circle of friends, finally accepted evolution in later life but rejected that natural selection could provide 
the causes. Even De Vries, the staunchest of Darwinians, saw that natural selection as formulated could only 
preserve or eliminate but never create. Bateson argued that a science of variation would explain evolution, 
without recourse to natural selection. Kropotkin observed that the struggle between individuals was not a 
universal phenomenon and that successful descent could be achieved best by mutualism. Fitness under these 
circumstances demanded a new perspective. All of these considerations were to be taken on board and were 
instructive to a more refined view.  In would be wrong however to describe this period of scepticism as the 
‘eclipse of Darwinism’ (Bowler 2003, Huxley 1942). Darwin’s pluralistic face was alive and thriving; it was 
the causal power of natural selection that received such scepticism and therefore one should really refer to the 
period as the ‘eclipse of natural selection’. In the following chapters it will be observed that natural selection 
was reprieved, revised and seen central to evolutionary explanation. Unfortunately, none of the historical 
problems are resolved and the problems caused by ambiguity are compounded. 
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Chapter 2: Problems with the Concept of Fitness 
 
Fitness Replaces Survival of the Fittest 
 
In the preceding chapter, it has been seen that there were disagreements between Darwin and Wallace 
concerning the term ‘natural selection’. These included issues over the scope of the explanatory power of the 
concept. Moreover, criticisms from other evolutionists, such as Mivart and Butler, ushered in what has 
become known as the ‘Eclipse of Darwinism’ (Huxley 1942) and the revival of interest in the ideas of 
Lamarck. This period lasted until the 1930s, when the architects of the ‘modern synthesis’ reintroduced 
natural selection. Superficially, the modern synthesis looks to be a fairly precise body of scientific opinion, 
but the characters involved all gave their own interpretations of what constituted neo-Darwinism.  Arguably,  
there was strong consensus on what should be purged, largely the Lamarckian elements contained within 
Darwin’s pluralism. In addition, any references to the direct impact of the environment were thought 
inapplicable and therefore embryonic studies were largely perceived as non-evolutionary. However, there 
was controversy over which elements should provide the core principles of this intrinsic genetic perspective.  
 
The classic debate to illustrate this point was between population geneticists Fisher and Wright.6 Both men 
wanted to give evolutionary biology a mathematical basis, but whereas Fisher (1930) looked exclusively to 
natural selection, Wright (1932) saw drift playing a major role. But when the term ‘natural selection’ was 
reintroduced to biology, what did it signify? To Fisher, natural selection was an agent; to Wright, it was a 
mathematical factor; to Haldane (1932), a causal factor; to Dobzhansky (1937) and Huxley (1932 & 1942), a 
mechanism. Huxley, however, would also see natural selection as an agent. Smocovitis (1992) provides an 
interesting discussion of this period, perceiving an important reversal in the aetiology of natural selection. 
Whereas De Vries and Bateson (Ch.1) had confined natural selection as eliminative or preserving, 
Dobzhansky and others increasingly perceived natural selection as causo-mechanical. In the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, Mendelian genetics and mutation were seen as evolutionary factors in their 
own right, independent of natural selection. However, these factors were now incorporated within theories of 
natural selection. The emphasis was firmly directed toward genes or alleles and not species. Subsuming these 
previously independent factors of evolution was a radical departure from the Malthusian selection theories of 
Darwin and Wallace. One person who appreciated the departure from Darwin’s concept of natural selection 
was Simpson: 
 
[Darwin] recognised the fact that natural selection operated by differential reproduction, but he did not 
equate the two. In the modern theory natural selection is differential reproduction plus the complex 
interplay in such reproduction of heredity, genetic variation, and all the other factors that affect selection 
and determine its results. (Simpson 1949 p268) 
 
This was not an orchestrated plan, where the great men of the time sat down and ironed out a new and precise 
understanding of natural selection. It was more a gradual evolution of the concept, which carried with it all 
the ambiguities one still sees today and which never formally divorced from Malthusian natural selection. 
This issue of neo-Darwinism incorporating factors that were at one stage seen as antagonistic to natural 
selection was repeated throughout the twentieth century. One example is the inclusion in neo-Darwinism by 
Mayr (1942) of the concept of allopatric speciation. Mayr had demonstrated how a single species could split 
                                                 
6 For an excellent discussion on the issues here see Reiss (2009)  
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and populations become geographically isolated from each other. Over long periods of time, the eventual 
genetic changes to both populations would result in two new species. Mayr’s work became famously 
embedded as the main factor of speciation within neo-Darwinian theory. The curious thing was that allopatric 
speciation was not a new concept; in fact, in the previous century, it was perceived as an argument against 
natural selection. Wagner (1868) published his work on the effects of isolation on generating new species and 
this was seen at the time as an evolutionary mechanism independent of natural selection. Wagner and Darwin 
had corresponded over the issue and Kropotkin some years afterwards appraised the correspondence and said 
‘Darwin frankly recognised that this was a factor which removed many difficulties unexplained by natural 
selection’ (Kropotkin 1995 p134). In the same vein, Dixon published Evolution without Natural Selection: 
Or the Segregation of Species without the Darwinian Hypothesis in 1885. The title of this work embraces the 
sentiment expressed within and endorses much of Wagner’s perspective. Both men realised the potential of 
isolated populations or the allopatric situation to explain speciation without recourse to natural selection. 
Mayr, however, subsumed ‘isolation’, ‘segregation’ and ‘allopatry’ under natural selection. This inversion of 
fortunes for natural selection is not without cost, for natural selection must take on a new meaning.7 This 
proliferation and generalisation of the term ‘natural selection’ will be discussed in chapter 4.  
 
Meanwhile, Spencer’s synonym for natural selection, ‘survival of the fittest’, was deemed to be a crude 
caricature of the concept and gradually preference was given to the term ‘fitness’, which denoted any 
characters and behaviours that were likely to secure successful reproduction. This follows from Kropotkin’s 
observations concerning the ‘wider’ meaning of the ‘struggle for existence’ (Ch.1). The language also 
altered, and the terminology included terms such as ‘differential reproduction’ and ‘differential survival’. 
However, this reformulation did not escape the notice of philosophers, and the charge of tautology was again 
alleged by eminent figures, such as Peters (1976), Popper (1977) and Smart (1963). Concentration here will 
be directed to the views of Popper, as these are fairly representative of the criticisms but also because he later 
gives an interesting insight into how the problem of circularity can be avoided. There will also be some 
contemporary discussion of the problems, which includes the reservations of evolutionary biologist Dawkins 
concerning the term ‘fitness’. What is also of interest is that the ‘fitness’ concept evolved from the concept of 
‘survival of the fittest’, which itself was recommended to replace ‘natural selection’. However, it will be seen 
that all three terms have retained separate identities but are often conflated. 
 
Before examining Popper’s views on evolutionary theory and its place in science, one or two 
misrepresentations should be clarified. Popper was not anti-Darwinist, nor did he doubt the existence or the 
importance of biological evolution. He was, however, very concerned about the ‘demarcation problem’, 
sifting pseudo-science from genuine science and attempting to maintain science as a rational pursuit. 
Evolutionary biology was never considered to be pseudo-scientific by Popper, but he did perceive that it was 
different in nature from physics or chemistry. Controversially, Popper introduced the term ‘Metaphysical 
Research Programme’. However, he did not use the term ‘metaphysical’ in a derogatory manner that suggests 
something akin to the supernatural or the pseudo scientific. Rather, he saw metaphysical, in this instance, as 
something non-scientific but still worthy of intellectual pursuit. Darwinism is a Metaphysical Research 
Programme because it is not testable. Further, it ‘does not really predict the evolution of variety’; it therefore 
cannot explain it (Popper 2002 p199). The best one can hope to achieve is the prediction of variety under 
                                                 
7 Mayr and later Coyne also remove the problem of convergence by addressing it in selectionist terms; see Coyne (2010). 
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‘favourable conditions’. However, favourable conditions are problematic because they are difficult to 
describe without falling back on a tautology, i.e. ‘in their presence, a variety of forms will emerge’. Popper is 
also dubious about adaptations: 
 
Take ‘adaptations’. At first sight natural selection appears to explain it, and in a way it does, but hardly in 
a scientific way. To say that a species now living is adapted to its environment is, in fact, almost 
tautological. Indeed, we use the terms ‘adaptation’ and ‘selection’ in such a way that we can say that, if 
the species were not adapted, it would have been eliminated by natural selection. Similarly, if a species 
has been eliminated it must have been ill adapted to the conditions. Adaptation or fitness is defined by 
modern evolutionists as survival value, and can be measured by actual success in survival: there is hardly 
any possibility of testing a theory as feeble as this. (Popper 2002 p199) 
 
(It is important to remember here that the Darwin/Wallace account of adaptation by means of natural 
selection based on Malthusian principles is testable.) However, despite this apparent feebleness, the theory is 
still indispensable; it illuminates ‘very concrete and very practical researches’ (ibid. p200). Popper gives the 
example of the research into bacteria that become adapted to newly infested penicillin environments. Only 
this theory can explain the mechanisms at play but, he claims, it is little better than the theistic view of 
adaptation. Darwinism is important for science but it must be seen as a metaphysical theory and not a 
scientific one. As a Metaphysical Research Programme, Darwinism can make certain predictions: evolution 
will be a gradual process and small changes will be due to mutation. However, these predictions are limited 
in their explanatory power according to Popper. Moreover, Darwinism cannot predict a particular 
evolutionary change; at best, it can perhaps predict gene changes within a population, without being specific. 
 
Popper notices a possible inconsistency. If mutations are ‘random’ and change could go in many directions, 
why does natural selection seem to ‘prefer’ sequences of evolutionary change that are similar? Why do 
‘orthogenetic trends’ keep repeating themselves? Popper believes Darwinism could be enriched if it could 
answer these questions. He proceeds with his own possible solution, which includes two forms of selection. 
One is environmental selection, where the pressure is external; the other is internal and comes from the 
organism itself (ibid. p201). However, Popper goes into a lot of assumptions about the nature of genes that 
look unlikely to be supported by modern evidence. These assumptions include ‘a’ genes which control 
anatomy, ‘b’ genes which control behaviour and ‘Intermediate’ genes which have mixed functions. Further, 
‘a’ and ‘b’ genes can be divided into other genes that might control preferences or skills respectively.  
 
Popper Recants on Natural Selection? 
 
In 1977, Popper gave a paper which some said demonstrated a reversal. This is only partially correct. 
 
I still believe that Natural Selection works in this way as a research programme. Nevertheless, I have 
changed my mind about the testability and the logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am 
glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation. (Popper 1977 p243) 
 
Popper goes on to consider what can be explained without recourse to natural selection. One phenomenon is 
genetic drift, which can occur without any selection pressures; all that is required is reproductive isolation 
through geographical separation. It has been argued that reproductive isolation could be sufficient for genetic 
drift. Natural selection in its most sweeping form can be seen to explain all organisms and all complete 
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structures, such as the eye. However, Popper maintains, this sweeping form is problematic, especially if one 
includes all forms of animal behaviour: 
 
In its most daring and sweeping form, the theory of natural selection would assert that all organisms, and 
especially all those highly complex organs whose existence might be interpreted as evidence of design 
and, in addition, all forms of animal behaviour, have evolved as the result of natural selection; that is, as 
the result of chance like inheritable variations, of which the useless ones are weeded out, so that only the 
useful ones remain. If formulated in this sweeping way, the theory is not only refutable but actually 
refuted. (ibid. p243) 
 
The example of the peacock’s tail is cited as a refutation, which was accepted by Darwin himself. This 
refutation was explained away by Darwin by recourse to the idea of sexual selection, according to Popper. 
The danger, as Popper sees it, is that any attempt to get round the refutation by verbal manoeuvre is likely to 
lead to a tautology. Further, it would be better to admit that everything that evolves may not be useful, and 
that evolution by natural selection is not strictly universal, though it seems to hold for a vast number of 
important cases. Biologists face the challenge to discover which characters are the results of natural selection 
and which are not: ‘Yet in every particular case it is a challenging research programme to show how natural 
selection can possibly be held responsible for the evolution of a particular organ or behavioural programme.’ 
(Popper 1977 p244.) 
 
Selectionist theories are still seen by Popper as immensely important when considered historically. An 
important conceptual leap was made from the views of Paley, which implied some form of instruction, and 
subsequently replaced by non-theistic selectionism. 
 
Fitness and the Problem of Tautology 
 
The replacement of Malthusian natural selection with the concept of ‘fitness’ has introduced the problem of 
tautology. This has vexed philosophers and biologists alike and has led to several responses. One solution has 
been to accept the theory as tautological but still consider the theory important. Another solution is to argue 
that the theory, when complete and within the Darwinian framework, is not tautological. The philosopher 
Sober outlines some of the possible solutions to the matter. First, however, it is best to try to state exactly 
what ‘fitness’ entails. According to Sober (1993 p70) – 
 
‘Trait X is fitter than trait Y if and only if X has a higher probability of survival and/or a greater expectation 
of reproductive success than Y.’  
 
Sober argues that one could quibble over the finer points, yet overall the definition is reasonable, but he 
concedes that this formulation is indeed tautological. However, one should not be too concerned by this 
because, according to Sober, the tautology is only one part of a broader Darwinian Theory. One has to take a 
more holistic or integrative approach and recognise the other main feature of the theory: that all life is 
related. When one considers the whole idea, the theory is no longer tautological. ‘The fact that the theory of 
evolution contains this tautology does not show that the whole theory is a tautology. Don’t confuse the part 
with the whole.’ (Sober 1993 p70.) 
 
If one wants to defend the theory against those who are hostile to the whole concept of evolution, then this 
might be a satisfactory response. However, it does little to satisfy those who are committed to the 
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evolutionary thesis but are sceptical of natural selection as an important mechanism. If one can develop a 
theory of evolution that does not contain a tautological component, then surely this is preferable? Defenders 
of natural selection would argue that this is unlikely to be achieved, the ‘if’ being too immense. This 
statement may be premature, however, as new evolutionary explanations are emerging and recent alternatives 
may not have been fully examined and appreciated. To continue, Sober points out that many of the theories in 
evolutionary biology are different in nature from the general laws of physics: 
 
In physics, general laws such as Newton’s Law of Gravitation and the special theory of relativity are 
empirical. In contrast, many of the general laws in evolutionary biology (the if/then statements provided by 
mathematical models) seem to be non-empirical. That is, once an evolutionary model is stated carefully, it 
often turns to be a (non-empirical) mathematical truth. (Sober 1993 p71) 
 
Examples of these mathematical truths are Fisher’s sex-ratio argument (1930) and the Hardy–Weinberg Law. 
These too are tautologies, Sober argues, but they are not trivial. Tautologies are often seen as truisms, 
without value and therefore vulnerable. This is not the case with these two examples; Fisher’s argument is 
something of a conceptual breakthrough, maintains Sober (1993 p73): ‘Even so, it is very far from being 
trivial. And it was not obvious until Fisher stated the argument. Thanks to his insights, we now may be able 
to find obvious what earlier had been quite unclear.’ 
 
Sober gives the example of the Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium (HWE) to demonstrate that some tautologies 
can be insightful and increase our general understanding of the world. Although it can be accepted that the 
HWE is insightful, it is less clear that it is a pure tautology as described by Sober. Unlike the concept of 
‘fitness’, the HWE takes the form of an equation, which under certain conditions allows one to make certain 
predictions. For example, if we took a given population and identified that one person in ten thousand had a 
particular genetic disease, we would be able to calculate the number of people who are carrying the recessive 
unexpressed gene (198 people in 10,000 in fact). Similar to other equations, once we know X, we can 
proceed to calculate Y. The HWE refers to the relationship between dominant and recessive alleles and tells 
us how the variation is distributed. It is important to remember, however, that the HWE can only be 
successful if the empirical genetic laws as we understand them are maintained. If Mendelian genetics were to 
collapse in the light of new discovery, then the HWE might have to be abandoned in its present form. 
 
One must now consider whether the ‘fitness’ concept has the same vulnerability and reliance on empirical 
stability as the HWE. As it stands, ‘fitness’ could not be refuted, at least whilst reproducing organisms are 
still in existence. The charge is that there would be little point in going out and checking to see whether 
favourable attributes had survived and unfavourable ones been eliminated, for it could not be otherwise.8 
Nevertheless, let us grant that Sober has a point, for the sake of argument. The sex-ratio argument may be 
non-trivial and an important insight, containing mathematical foundations. However, can one also claim the 
same non-trivial status for the concept of ‘fitness’? One might question whether any great conceptual 
advantage was made in the move from Malthusian explanations. This was Popper’s point: the 
Darwin/Wallace Malthusian explanation was a great conceptual step forward, demarcating the theory from a 
theistic account. Can we argue similarly for the change to ‘fitness’? It can be argued that the Malthusian 
explanation can be empirically tested. One can examine the situation to see, for example, whether there is 
                                                 
8 Stove (1995 p134), in his discussion of neo-Darwinian fallacies, gives a reminder that starting from a tautological premise, one cannot 
validly infer from it any conclusion that is not itself tautological. 
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food scarcity producing competition for resources. The observation could hold true or could be refuted. The 
situation is testable. But can the formulation of ‘fitness’ be empirically examined and tested?  
 
The original motive for producing a more elastic definition of natural selection seemingly was to solve the 
problems that included, for example, co-operative behaviour between animals. The new elastic definition 
could also be extended further to embrace other types of behaviour not originally considered to be within the 
original Darwin/Wallace account. These might include ‘sneaky’ and ‘cheating’ behaviour, or any behaviour 
that led to successful future reproduction. However, is the formulation of ‘fitness’ sufficiently elastic to 
account for any form of behaviour? Hull has noticed just how elastic and accommodating this aspect of 
Darwinism can be: 
 
To some extent, the ease with which Darwinians co-opt positions that were presented to refute them looks 
suspicious. For example, early on Darwinians opposed Kimura’s neutralist views, but as the data piled up 
indicating that most mutations are neutral and not negative, Darwinians simply modified their theory and 
termed the result ‘Darwinism’. (Hull 1999 p501)  
 
The desire is to avoid such refutations, but with such accommodations to the theory the spectre of tautology 
is invited. Neo-Darwinians are in something of a dilemma. Either one accepts the refutation and admits that 
natural selection is not a universal explanation or one commits to natural selection as a universal explanation 
but of a tautological nature. 
 
There is a further problem with ‘fitness’ as a viable theory. What constitutes ‘fitness’ is not that easy to 
distinguish and the problem can lead to conflicting interpretations: “I do not think that a single measure of 
fitness, no matter how defined or operationalised, can be very significant because too many factors, many of 
them conflicting, contribute to an organism’s fitness” (ibid. p501). There is also the problem of non-realised 
or latent fitness. It has been said that with two identical brothers, one could be struck prematurely by some 
accident, perhaps a bolt of lightning, whilst the other survives, mates and has viable offspring. Does one then 
say the latter was fitter even though their genomes were the same? ‘Potentiality’ and the ‘probabilistic 
propensity’ (Beatty & Mills 1979 & Brandon 1990) need to be included in any calculation, it seems, but this 
requires considerable knowledge of environmental influences and future events (Abrams 2007). As an 
example of the difficulty, if one organism died as a result of an unexpected drought, one might still maintain 
that the individual possessed some measure of fitness. However, if all the members of the population were to 
die from the drought would one still bestow fitness? Considerations of probability or propensity were first 
added to the fitness concept in order to prevent the circularity charge. Beatty, however, has concluded that 
this attempt failed: 
 
To be sure, the claim that ‘the fittest are most likely to leave the most offspring’ is a tautology when 
‘fittest’ is defined in terms of actual offspring contribution. But the claim is no more empirical when 
‘fittest’ is defined as ‘best able to leave most offspring’. (Beatty 1994 p118) 
 
Beatty goes so far as to suggest that the Principle of Natural Selection should not be considered equivalent to 
the centrality given to Newton’s Laws of Motion. Instead, one should focus on the deductive consequences of 
the Hardy–Weinberg Law, which Beatty considers suitably empirical.  
 
Modern philosophical considerations on the Fitness problem 
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Contemporary philosophers are continuing to work on the problems that Fitness presents. The ambition is 
still to provide some genuine explanatory value and curtail the threats of tautology, triviality and 
unfalsifiability. It is worthwhile to outline the responses to date before any conclusion is drawn. Philosopher 
Ariew and biologist Lewontin have produced a joint paper. The introduction of this nicely summarises the 
root of the problem –  
No concept in evolutionary biology has been more confusing and has produced such a rich philosophical 
literature as that of fitness. The confusions have arisen because a concept, originally introduced as an 
inexact metaphor by Darwin, has come to play an analytic role in the formal quantitative dynamics of 
evolutionary biology.  (Ariew & Lewontin 2004 p347) 
 
In other words the notion of ‘fitness’ has evolved, producing multiple definitions. One definition takes on a 
new identity as an analytic tool in population genetics. The authors argue that the original Darwinian 
definition of fitness is incommensurable with the numeric values associated with reproductive rates used in 
population genetics and recommend a more pluralistic approach. Nevertheless, there still remains a problem 
of biological identity; what are the referents to fitness? Should one consider species, populations, individuals, 
male and/or female offspring, cells, genes or amino acids? For instance, nature does not always fall into neat 
categories and complex organisms can be composed of more than a single individual. (Bouchard  2008, 
O’Malley and Dupré 2007) Earlier, Matthen and Ariew (2002) following on Dennett’s ideas of design (1995) 
developed a new approach which they called ‘vernacular fitness’. This is formulated as- 
 
x is fitter than y if and only if x's traits enable it to solve the ‘design-problems’ set by the environment more 
fully than y's traits do. 
 
Once again however there are problems, namely over the identification and measurement of the so-called 
‘design problems’. It could be argued that introducing such criteria obscures rather than clarifies the 
principle. Yet another possible solution is proposed, called ‘Block fitness’, where “(1) an individual’s fitness 
is fixed over its lifetime, that is, its fitness cannot increase or decrease with time, and (2) fitness comparisons 
can only occur between conspecifics that occupy the same fitness environment”, Ramsey (2006). Ramsey 
may have a point here concerning (1), for it could be argued that the size of an organism constrains its 
reproductive ability, for instance mice can multiply more quickly than elephants, and so forth. However, if 
one confines consideration only to conspecifics (2) then this general comparison across different species is 
prohibited. To complicate matters further Lewens (2010) is critical of Sober (1984)9 - ‘sometimes he appears 
to equate the force of selection with variation in fitness, sometimes with ‘selection for properties’. The 
question of natural selection as a force is considered in the next chapter.  
 
The difficulty here is to adjudicate as the subject matter is in a seemingly endless bifurcation. Any attempt to 
do so would transcend the parameters of this thesis and one wonders if there is a coherent solution after so 
many years. Moreover, is the concept(s) of fitness actually worthwhile retaining?  
 
The ambiguity of the situation was anticipated well by Dawkins to the conviction that the term should not be 
employed or should at least be avoided wherever possible: 
 
                                                 
9 Sober’s The Nature of Selection 1984 has become something of a classic within the philosophy of biology and noted for the important 
distinction between ‘selection for’ and ‘selection of’. This early work of Sober sees ‘selection for’ as the ‘causal concept par excellence’. 
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‘Fitness’, as it is normally used by ecologists and ethologists, is a verbal trick, a device contrived to make it 
possible to talk in terms of individuals, as opposed to true replicators, as beneficiaries of adaptation. The 
word is therefore a kind of verbal symbol of the position that I am trying to argue against. More than that, 
the word is actively confusing because it has been used in so many different ways. (Dawkins 1982 p179) 
 
Dawkins – identifies five different interpretations of fitness, which he refers to as the ‘agony in five fits’:10  It 
is worth noting that Dawkins see the earliest formulation of fitness as Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’, 
which is a metaphor for Darwin’s metaphor of ‘natural selection.’ Dawkins argues against this usage and also 
the other ‘fits of agony’ but recommends that if one is to use any formulation then it should be only 
‘inclusive fitness’ and from the perspective of the gene. The suggestion of measuring fitness through the 
medium of the gene however presents more problems than answers. It can be argued that modern biologists 
give consideration to many factors other than genes.11  
 
Once one looks at actual mechanisms, it becomes clear that no phenotype is due to genes alone. The 
external environment comes in many ways: nutrition, micronutrients, temperature, photoperiod, 
pheromones, social environment, and many more. And the internal environment also plays an critical role: 
cell-cell signaling, endocrine signaling, ion gradients, membrane potentials, etc. (Nijhout 2013) 
 
There seems no reason, in principle, why a researcher should not investigate the fitness at any level of 
taxonomy. Attempting to measure every biological change through the medium of the gene is problematic for 
several other reasons. Not many genes are discrete entities that simply code for a particular trait; they can be 
very difficult to individuate and identify (Barnes and Dupre 2008). The idea that a gene can be seen as an 
object that codes for a particular protein is nowadays considered an oversimplification: an individual gene 
can code for up to 38,000 different proteins (Alberts 2002). Definitions of a gene are proving highly elusive. 
Barnes and Dupre argue that early definitional attempts have failed to recognise the complexities involved 
and question whether a gene is even an entity: 
 
If genes are objects, then they are objects that vary enormously in their constitution, and they are composite 
rather than unitary objects – objects only in the way that the solar system is an object, or a forest is, or a 
cell culture is. (Barnes and Dupre 2008 p53) 
 
Moreover, genes take on multi-functional processes: 
 
One striking illustration of the change of perspective involved here is the increased interest now being 
taken in how many ‘copies’ of a given gene or DNA sequence are to be found in the genomic DNA of an 
organism (Radon et al., 2006). It is hard to find a place for such a question within a framework in which a 
gene is simply a unit of inheritance: what would be the role of several copies of a gene for brown eyes? But 
if genes are recognised as having other functions things can look quite different. (ibid. p50) 
 
Barnes and Dupre are not representing a maverick perspective12. There could be, for example, a change in the 
genotype of an organism but no change in its phenotype. Conversely, there could be a change in an 
organism’s phenotype but no change in its genotype. Jablonka and Lamb (2005) argue that a single genome, 
                                                 
10 Inspired by Lewis Carroll from ‘The Hunting of the Snark: An Agony in Eight Fits’. 
11 The problems and consequences of genetic reductionism have been well discussed by both biologists and philosophers, see Fox Keller 
(2002), Moss (2003), Morange (2000, 2001), Dupre (2004) and Waters (2007).  
 
12 For an excellent modern introduction to all the complexities and implications of epigenetics, see Carey (2012). Carey also argues that 
we are witnessing a paradigm shift. 
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either unicellular or multicellular, could potentially yield an enormous variety of phenotypes and furthermore 
populations that become geographically or ecologically separate can display distinct phenotypes even though 
their genomes remain unchanged. One could consider the genome as a vast switchboard of genes which can 
be turned on individually or in groups or sequences with the combinations yielding countless results. The 
factors that determine the switching on or switching off are also of interest. Jablonka and Lamb suggest an 
epigenetic explanation. Another concern arises when wishing to contrast fitness at higher taxonomic levels. 
This is a difficult procedure even when counting identifiable phenotypes; both survival and reproduction 
have to be quantified with objective criteria. However, does multiplying the number of offspring by the 
number of generations give us the fitness of individuals, or the fitness of species, or even the fitness of 
lineages? It is not entirely clear. As Fox Keller says, along similar lines and noticing an ambiguity: 
 
A chronic confusion persists in the literature of evolutionary biology between two definitions of individual 
fitness: one, the (average) net contribution of an individual of a particular genotype to the next generation, 
and the other the geometric rate of increase of that particular genotype. (Fox Keller 1994 p120) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The perspective of natural selection as universally Malthusian was challenged in the 1930s; other factors 
such as cooperation, sheer luck and cheating might also play important roles in evolutionary changes. To 
embrace these factors, the architects of the ‘modern synthesis’ focused upon any behaviour that facilitated 
replication, reproduction and fecundity over the generations; the concept of ‘fitness’ was established. 
However, this adjustment from the original perception of Malthusian natural selection invited criticism of 
tautology, with Popper illustrating the dichotomy that faced the new formulation: either one accepted that 
other factors such as ‘drift’ were important in evolutionary changes or one accepted the Principle of Natural 
Selection and fitness as circular, without any predictive power and of little explanatory value. However, 
many years after Popper’s remarks, the issue is as controversial as ever and attempts to resolve matters have 
become increasingly complex, with no consensus amongst philosophers. Dawkins anticipated the ambiguity 
in these endeavours and advised against the use of the term ‘fitness’, suggesting that the inclusive fitness 
concept developed by Hamilton (1964) could be advantageous if one adopted a genic perspective. It was 
argued here, however, that this suggestion was itself problematic, especially in the light of recent biological 
discoveries. Further, developments since the adoption of Mendelian genetics and the ‘central dogma of 
molecular biology’ suggest that matters are far more complex, with the role of the gene now seen as essential 
but without a privileged or celebrity status. Despite all of these problems, one can still ask, is the neo-
Darwinian explanation the only viable one we have and it should therefore be maintained for heuristic 
reasons. However, this could be an argumentum ad ignorantiam, as the structuralists will argue that any 
resolution will only take place by considering factors outside the normal Darwinian domain.  
 
The principal conclusions reached from this discussion is that the concept of ‘fitness’ has evolved from the 
term ‘survival of the fittest’, has added a further layer of ambiguity and confusion. The philosophical 
endeavour to clarify definitions has failed and in fact clouded the issue rather than resolve it.  Moreover, 
whatever definition one subscribes to, none is sufficient to explain how major or small evolutionary 
transformations occurred. At most, it can only be seen as mapping population changes. However, such 
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stability is more akin to the ideas of fixity that Darwin and Wallace sought to replace. Even the creationists 
would accept that population numbers might increase, decrease or become extinct over time. Evolution, 
embracing novel traits and speciation, however, is another matter and one must look beyond the conservative 
concepts of fitness to explain these. In chapter 13 a fresh approach to the age-old problem will be presented 
which will hopefully simplify matters. Nevertheless, before this, one must decide what natural selection 
actually is. 
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Chapter 3: The Ontological Question 
 
In the search to understand what natural selection actually is, it is useful to eliminate that which natural 
selection is not. Consideration will be given to natural selection as a force, as a pressure and as having the 
ability to act.  
 
Is Natural Selection a Force? 
 
This question has been addressed by several individuals (Endler 1986, Denton 1998, Ghislen 2007). Their 
consensus is that natural selection cannot be considered strictly as a force in the scientific sense. This view is 
endorsed here but it is further argued that if natural selection cannot be considered as a force then it must 
follow that it cannot also be considered as a pressure, at least in the scientific sense. 
 
To paraphrase one general science textbook, force is that physical quantity that changes or has the potential 
to change a body’s uniform motion in a straight line or change its state of rest. Forces as employed in physics 
require some object for the force to act upon. However, if natural selection is a force, then what object or 
objects is it acting upon? For instance, Endler discusses Newton’s classic law F = ma and concludes that 
natural selection cannot be formulated in a similar manner: 
 
A force is meaningless without an object. If natural selection were a force, it should be possible to 
decompose it into a mass and acceleration. In this case ‘acceleration’ is phenotypic selection, but what is 
the mass? (Endler 1986 p32).  
 
Endler believes there is a further deeper problem, for he argues that physicists only employ force when they 
do not know what causes an object to be accelerated and he gives the examples of gravity and magnetism. 
This may be true of gravity, but it is no longer thought to be true of magnetism. In the non-Newtonian world 
of the ‘Standard Model’, what are known as the three (of four) fundamental ‘forces’ of nature are more 
accurately ‘the weak interaction’, ‘the strong interaction’ and ‘the electromagnetic interaction’. Each 
interaction involves different types of particle: for instance, the weak interaction is mediated by the W 
(negative and positive) and Z particles, which interact with quarks and leptons, giving rise to radiation. One 
can appreciate that natural selection has no corresponding particles or body essential for an interaction; 
therefore the description of natural selection as a force is inappropriate. Nor can one assimilate natural 
selection with the remaining ‘force’ not accommodated by the Standard Model – gravity. For gravity, too, 
requires at least two physical objects for a simultaneous attraction. How this attraction occurs and whether 
the carrier is the graviton particle is still to be determined, but this can be left to the physicists.  
 
Is Natural Selection a Pressure? 
 
If natural selection is not a force, can it be considered as a pressure? One often hears the term ‘selective 
pressure’, but what might this mean? The problem here is that, in scientific vocabulary, a pressure requires a 
force, measured often in Newtons, and an area. Pressure is equal to force divided by area, with the resulting 
pressure measured in Pascals. As it has already been established that natural selection cannot be a force, it 
follows that it also cannot be considered a pressure as in the sense used in physics. The usage is more akin, 
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one could argue, to Economists talk of ‘market forces’.  Users of the term ‘selective pressure’ are employing 
it in some loose manner that cannot strictly be considered synonymous with the use of the term pressure in 
the physical sciences. One of the triumphs of scientific practice is its adherence to logical thinking and that 
terms are defined as clearly as possible without ambiguity and equivocation. Moreover, it is most important 
that definitions of terms are accepted by consensus within the scientific community.  This is not the case at 
the moment with the term ‘selective pressure’. One cannot be sure whether the adherent is considering 
factors that give an organism an advantage over other organisms or is considering factors that simply help an 
organism to survive and replicate. If these two perspectives are blurred, then clarity and validity are the first 
casualties within scientific enterprise. 
 
Can Natural Selection Act? 
 
Natural selection, as evaluated to date, is neither a pressure nor a force in the sense demanded by science. 
With this in mind, does it follow that natural selection cannot ‘act’ upon something as it is not a scientific 
object? Ghiselin and Endler both argue that it is imprecise to talk of natural selection acting upon substances 
as if it was an agent or some form of agency: 
 
In various places the exposition might have been improved by not saying that selection ‘acts’ on 
something. Selection is not an agent, and talking about it that way can be most misleading. (Ghiselin 2007) 
 
Natural selection no more ‘acts’ on organisms than erosion ‘acts’ on a hillside. (Ghiselin 1969) It is a result 
of heritable biological differences among individuals, just as erosion is a result of variation in resistance to 
weathering and running water. (Endler 1986 p29) 
 
Endler believes this is a source of confusion concerning cause and effect: if natural selection is the result of 
heritable biological differences among individuals, then it cannot also be its own cause. Endler says natural 
selection can be seen as a process; but more on this below. One can see here the distinction between natural 
selection and artificial selection. The latter entails the agency of humans to direct the selection of desired 
traits. This is not the case with natural selection as there is no selecting agency residing in nature. Nature is 
blind to future events, and to argue otherwise would be to court the teleological. 
 
So far, it has been established that, as natural selection is not a material body, it therefore cannot be rightly 
described as a force or a pressure. Neither can natural selection act upon events; this is a metaphorical 
statement. Moreover, that the term ‘selective pressure’ requires some consensual clarification. Later, natural 
selection will be considered as a series of events, or a process, or even as representing several different 
processes. The examination will be necessary to see if Natural Selection can be characterised more clearly. 
  
Evolution and Natural Selection: The Distinguishing Features 
 
It is very important to bear in mind that evolution is the explanandum and natural selection is the proposed 
explanans. However, one reads not only in the popular media but also in the peer reviewed literature terms 
such as ‘evolution selects’, ‘evolutionary pressures’ or ‘evolution favours’. For example, ‘The evolutionary 
pressure that produced the emergence....’ (Csibra & Gergely 2011), ‘Evolution shapes and selects for 
symbiosis’ (Gilbert et al 2010) and ‘Evolution favours a medium level of assertiveness in all 
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individuals……’(Conradt and Roper 2009). It should be noted that these are not selective instances but are 
representative of frequent use by evolutionary biologists. Unfortunately, there is a lax tendency to equate the 
terms evolution and natural selection to such a degree that they become synonymous. The authors are not 
alone in such descriptions, for one can find similar in the biological literature, both peer reviewed and the 
popular. It is imperative, however, to distinguish the two terms ‘biological evolution’ and ‘natural selection’ 
from each other. A good starting point is to remind ourselves what evolution and natural selection are each 
addressing. Principally, evolution is concerned with change; it is not concerned with historical epochs that 
remained in a similar form. History, on the other hand, describes both periods of change and periods of no 
change. Evolution is devoted to the former. One sometimes hears, however, the term ‘evolutionary history’. 
This may sound a little misleading but it could be that the speaker is acknowledging that life on the planet is 
punctuated by periods of nil or very little change and periods of gradual or rapid change. Of course, it does 
not follow that evolutionists are uninterested in periods of stasis; quite the contrary, understanding the 
reasons for stasis informs why it is that evolution occurs. 
 
If it is to have any distinguishing feature, therefore, evolution is about change. But what sort of change does 
it address? The big picture here encapsulates the emergence of the first cellular organism or organisms and 
the proliferation that has occurred since, from one or a few to many millions of much diversity. Many have 
alluded to this as the tree of life, some more recently as the web or mosaics of life and others see the changes 
that have occurred as discontinuous or episodic.13 All agree that evolutionary changes have taken place; all 
agree that there is much diversity where there was once singularity; all agree that nearly all of what was 
extant is now extinct; and all agree that there is greater complexity rather than less. The big picture of change 
is uncontroversial, creationists notwithstanding. This cannot be said, however, when it comes to explaining 
how these changes came about, for here there is great controversy and much confusion. The study of micro 
evolution has advanced enormously since the 1950s and has accelerated of late. The mass of detail is difficult 
for any one researcher to comprehend in evolutionary terms and this has led to much interpretation, debate 
and controversy, which is still ongoing. However, despite this discussion, it is important, for the purposes at 
hand, to recognise the distinction between evolution and the different processes that explain how changes 
came about. Natural selection is said to explain biological evolution, not to reiterate it.  
 
Natural Selection and the Causes of Evolutionary Novelty 
 
Virtually everybody agrees that the theory of natural selection is a causal theory – it aims to provide a 
causal-historical explanation for changes in gene/trait frequency over time. (Okasha 2008 p148)  
 
Natural selection as the chief causal process behind all organisms. (Ruse 2006 p103)  
 
Friction heats, and oxygen corrodes, but fever and inflammation are effects of disease, not its causes. If the 
same logic is applied to Selection Theory, differential reproduction is real but it is an effect of evolution, 
not its cause. (Reid 2007 p29) 
 
It is important to note that the term ‘natural selection’ is often used in the inaccurate yet fairly harmless 
metaphorical sense as having causal status. To be precise, natural selection is not truly a ‘mechanism’ in 
itself, as opposed to something like gravity. Instead, natural selection is the result of genetic and 
environmental forces acting upon an organism. (http://www.biologydaily.com/biology/Natural_selection)  
 
                                                 
13 See Ragan et al (2009) for a modern assessment of the ‘tree of life’ metaphor. 
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Nonetheless, mutation is the ultimate source of genetic variation and thus makes evolution possible. It is 
important to remember, however, that the likelihood of a particular mutation occurring is not affected by 
natural selection: that is mutations do not occur more frequently in situations in which they would be 
favoured by natural selection. (Raven et al. 2005 p438)  
 
Some have even imagined that natural selection induces variability, whereas it implies only the 
preservation of such variations as arise and are beneficial to the being under its conditions of life. (Darwin 
1900 p99)  
 
One of the greatest difficulties in discussing natural selection is that there is no consensus over the definition 
of the term, as the quotations above illustrate. These are just a few examples but unfortunately they do not 
fully represent the full scale of the problem. Margulis (2001) argues that natural selection has no causal 
powers other than to eliminate or preserve novel entities, such as those produced by symbiogenesis. In other 
words symbiogenesis is a ‘driving force’ or a causal processes of evolution. Identifying the cause, 
‘symbiogenesis’ is to give explanatory satisfaction. Natural selection, on the other hand and according to 
Margulis, preserves or eliminates the changes resulting from symbiogenesis.  
There is some equivocation also over natural selection, on the one hand, it can be seen as either preserving 
favourable traits or eliminating unfavourable traits once they have arisen and, on the other hand, as the 
creative cause of evolutionary novelty. (See below a discussion on what philosophers have considered the 
positive or negative faces of natural selection). Darwin himself was ambiguous about the term (Butler 1882, 
Denton 1998): sometimes he spoke of the theory of natural selection as a naturalistic causal theory to counter 
the prevailing theories of fixity; other times he maintained a more modest role for natural selection, as 
expressed in the quotation above. This measured account of natural selection, one of preservation and 
elimination, is foundational to the concept of natural selection as a filter, which, by definition, renders natural 
selection conservative or eliminative. This is consistent with the view that natural selection can only ‘act’ if 
variation is present, but it therefore follows that natural selection under such an understanding is not the 
creative or causal factor of the variation. If John Stuart Mill (1843) were still alive, he could say that the 
situation can be considered within his ‘method of difference’, where changes in gene sequence are the 
relevant differences that give rise to variation and are therefore said to be the cause. This is analogous to the 
boy who dropped the lit match into the straw and therefore caused the field to burn, with the counterfactual 
being that had he not dropped the match the field would have remained in its pristine state. Similarly, had a 
change in genetic sequence not occurred, ceteris paribus the organisms in question would not be subject to 
evolution. One might argue that ‘differential reproduction’ is the cause of evolutionary change. It is, 
however, important to get the chain of causality in the correct chronological order. For differential 
reproduction to be evolutionarily significant, some event, such as a genetic rearrangement, must precede as 
the causal factor. As Reid puts it (above) in Selection Theory, differential reproduction is real but it is an 
effect of evolution, not its cause. 
 
It could be argued that any proponents of natural selection as a causal theory might feel some disquiet with 
the ideas expressed by Reid above and with the idea that natural selection only plays a conservative role of 
arbiter or filter. In the eyes of those that see natural selection as positive, natural selection is both the driving 
and creative force that produces the evolutionary changes that eventually lead to speciation and adaptation. 
 
 How might this be established? For the sake of argument and illustration, one could consider natural 
selection to be an entirely causal process or mechanism rather than a filter. This process conceivably begins 
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with a breeding population that experiences differential reproduction, perhaps following some form of 
genetic rearrangement in the chromosome. This on occasions produces a new trait that allows an individual 
organism to breed more effectively than those without the newly acquired trait. Thus, over a long period of 
time and generations, this trait is more likely to spread through a population. In this light, natural selection is 
a series of steps or a particular process rather than a force or single causal factor. The proponent of natural 
selection as a filter might argue that natural selection requires additional qualities to distinguish it, as it is 
presumed by some neo-Darwinists that natural selection is the cause of adaptation. However, this in turn 
raises the awkward question of what is the distinguishing feature that characterises natural selection from 
drift. If genetic changes are small and cumulative, then one cannot know at the time whether the initial 
changes will prove to be of adaptive value; this can only be recognised retrospectively. The matter then 
becomes a difference of designation but not of different processes. All one can do is wait to see whether the 
trait becomes an adaptation and, if so, call this natural selection; but if the trait remains neutral, then call this 
drift. The difficulty here is that there is no causal factor, as in Mill’s methods, once the small mutation has 
taken place to determine whether the process is to be one of drift or one of natural selection. How does one 
therefore distinguish Drift from NS? Do initial changes begin as neutral then as they accumulate produce a 
trait that in turn increases fitness?  Or is it that each small mutation must demonstrate fitness?  
 
The Reification Fallacy 
 
Is part of the confusion here explained by the reification fallacy? This is said to occur when an abstract idea 
is transformed into something more concrete, or when a process transforms into a physical entity. It could be 
said that natural selection actually denotes a variety of processes but eventually concretises into a thing, such 
as a filter. In other words, what begins life as a verb (perhaps an adverb) becomes, later in life, a noun. In this 
case, natural selection is now both a verb and a noun. This may explain why it is that one talks of natural 
selection ‘acting’ upon organisms as some kind of force rather than a particular process. A process is a 
clearly defined series of events which describes the features involved and arrives at a result. The result is 
natural selection producing biological adaptation and, in some people’s view, speciation. In this light, it is 
hard to conceive of a process ‘acting’ upon something, but rather a process should be seen to ‘concern’ 
something. Therefore perhaps one should speak of natural selection as a filtering process rather than as a 
filter; this avoids the charge of the reification fallacy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been argued that the term ‘natural selection’ cannot be considered as a force or a pressure in a strictly 
scientific sense. If this is so, then it follows also that natural selection cannot act upon biological objects. The 
perception of natural selection as a process looks more promising and avoids the reification fallacy. 
However, it is important that natural selection as a process does not become conflated with evolution. 
Evolution is the explanandum and natural selection is proposed as the explanans. The difficulty here is that 
the process of natural selection and the process of drift both share the same causal component of small 
mutational changes; therefore it is necessary to identify why it is that either neutral or adaptive traits follow 
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in a non-arbitrary manner.14 The next chapter will consider, in more detail, natural selection as a process and 
as a filter, as has been proposed in the literature. 
                                                 
14 See Futuyma (2006) for an outline of this problem. Futuyma argues that drift is often a source of speciation. 
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Chapter 4:  A Critical Analysis 
 
Before examining the problems of causality further, it is pertinent to outline the Principle of Natural 
Selection (PNS) as perceived and discussed in the contemporary biological textbooks and in the 
accompanying philosophical literature. However, there are several problems with this approach as not all 
agree on the content.15 Nevertheless, a fair attempt will be made to come as close as possible to the 
foundations of a consensus, without hopefully constructing a straw man. It has been observed (Ch.1) that a 
clear expression of natural selection was found wanting and this problem has never been resolved. The 
problems of ambiguity are discussed more fully later. Rosenberg and Arp (2010 p1) provide the following 
definition of the PNS in terms of a process: 
 
1. There is variation in organisms such that they differ from each other in ways that are inherited. 
2. There is struggle or competition for existence, since more organisms are born than can survive. 
3. There is natural selection of the traits that are most fit in an organism, given a particular environment 
which the organism inhabits. 
4. Organisms fortunate to have the variation in traits that fit a particular environment will have an 
increased chance of surviving to pass those traits on to their progeny (survival of the fittest). 
5. Natural selection leads to the accumulation of favoured variants, which may produce new species 
(evolution), given the right environmental conditions and a certain amount of time. 
 
The great advantage here is that the argument is open to empirical examination, escaping the charge of 
circularity that was levelled at the concept of ‘fitness’. However, under closer examination there are many 
problems. 
Point one, there is variation in organisms such that they differ from each other in ways that are inherited, 
looks at first glance to be fairly uncontroversial, but the premise overlooks the reproductive nature of the 
prokaryotes. This domain constitutes the small organisms that reproduce by binary fission, producing 
identical daughter cells. (Audesirk and Audesirk 1999). The premise should be rewritten- there is often or 
sometimes variation …………. There is a world of difference between universal and general statements, it is 
fundamental in logical reasoning to ensure the premise is an accurate one, otherwise soundness is threatened. 
The second evolutionary factor that is unclear here is whether the authors conceive of inheritance as purely a 
vertical transmission. It must be noted that differences can also arise from lateral transmissions of genetic 
exchange, such as lateral gene transfer, endosymbiosis and hybridisation, but more of this in Chapter 7.  
Point two, there is struggle or competition for existence, since more organisms are born than can survive, is 
indubitably contentious. One cannot conclude that because there are more organisms born than can survive 
that there is necessarily a struggle or competition for existence. The major clause there is struggle or 
competition for existence requires clarification. Does it state that the struggle is a permanent feature facing 
organisms all of the time, or are there periods of struggle and it is only during these that evolutionary changes 
may occur? Further, is the argument that all organisms are forced to struggle against one another? If this is 
the claim, then it is clearly refuted by the vast reservoir of biological literature devoted to symbiosis (see also 
Chapters 1 and 13). 
 
 
                                                 
15 See Hull (2001), who demonstrates just how difficult it is to characterise natural selection. 
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 It could be argued that the term struggle is rather emotive and evocative of Victorian laissez-faire values, 
and not an accurate description of nature. In order to survive, an organism does have to fulfil certain 
requirements, but that does not necessarily mean that the task is always an onerous one. Point two could be 
rewritten to reflect the original Malthusian spirit that so inspired both Darwin and Wallace in their searches 
for the elusive evolutionary mechanism. This includes the perception that food resources tend to be scarce 
and increase only arithmetically in availability, whereas population numbers rise exponentially and outstrip 
the available food resources, hence the struggle.16 Unfortunately, this argument is far from universal, failing 
empirically. One only has to consider human society: historically, food production mostly stays ahead of 
human reproduction, with any scarcity often the result of maldistribution.17 One might argue that humans are 
atypical but then consider also those organisms that colonise virgin territory: they often have bountiful 
resources, which can support fairly rapid evolutionary radiations (Russell et al. 2008). Microbes colonise the 
most varied of territories, lichen colonise many a mountain, rhododendrons colonised large areas of Great 
Britain and have succeeded, it is said, because they are free of predators in their new environment (Seckbach 
2004). Hawaiian islands only 8 million years old have witnessed a radiation of the fruit fly from a single 
ancestor to an estimated 500 unique species (Whittaker & Fernandez—Palacios 2006). Fish speciation can be 
rapid in lakes that were previously without fish, thus facilitating evolutionary changes free from scarcity of 
resources and competition (Russell et al. 2008). The modern biologist is in an advantageous position, 
appreciating that mutational changes, as an example, do not require the Malthusian element to secure 
evolutionary changes (Roughgarden 2004 p181). 
 
In defence, one might argue that there is no necessity to demonstrate a universal application but just that it is 
frequently true. The question arises however, can one demonstrate that it is frequently true? If anything is 
demonstrated, then it could be argued that the converse to individuals struggling is more likely achieve 
survival. Is it not the case that the eusocial insects have achieved ‘evolutionary successes’ by means of strong 
cooperation between individuals and not by struggling against each other? Proponents of kin selection might 
counter the claims of group selectionists by arguing that eusocial insects manifest an example of genetic 
selection, but then who has the last word? Wilson, D & Wilson, E. O. (2007), Nowak et al (2012) have 
argued that kin selection does not have the explanatory power that its proponents believe. 
 
In point three, there is natural selection of the traits that are most fit in an organism, given a particular 
environment in which the organism inhabits,. It is difficult to see why this point is necessary to their 
argument as the main thrust of the argument is repeated in point 4, below. Furthermore, it is not generally 
helpful when explaining a term or principle (natural selection) to use the same term as part of the 
explanation. 
 
In point four, organisms fortunate to have the variation in traits that fit a particular environment will have an 
increased chance of surviving to pass those traits on to their progeny (survival of the fittest), ‘survival of the 
fittest’ is far too strong a term. As Gould (1992) remarked, ‘survival of the fit enough’ is closer to the truth. 
Gould’s ascription captures the spirit of the modern synthesis, thinking the term ‘survival of the fittest’ rather 
                                                 
16 Stove (1995 pp54–58) argues that there are many factors other than resource shortage that can check population growth; these include 
epidemics, contraception, wars and predation. (The criteria of natural selection are, one assumes, expanded to include epidemics and 
predation). 
17 See Cribb 2011 for a modern assessment of the ‘food crisis’. 
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crude (and one could add inaccurate). Without Gould’s reform there is an unwritten premise or assumption at 
work to the effect that only organisms with superior qualities will survive and go on to reproduce.  It could be 
that offspring of mixed quality all manage to survive and procreate. In this instance, the population could 
grow in numbers, accumulating variation and complexity – but only, of course, if resources are available. In 
Cuvier’s terminology, this would read that progeny that ‘meet the conditions for existence’ are more likely to 
develop and reproduce, whereas those that fail to meet the conditions for existence will wither from the 
scene. Empirically, this phenomenon is observed when a species or several species colonise virgin territory 
such as a newly formed volcanic island. The points discussed so far are insufficient for speciation; point five 
is requisite.  
 
Point five, natural selection leads to the accumulation of favoured variants, which may produce new species 
(evolution), given the right environmental conditions and a certain amount of time, again confuses whether 
natural selection is the explanandum or the explanans. It may be clearer to simply say that the ‘accumulation 
of favoured variants may produce new species (evolution), given………….’ Or it would perhaps be better to 
substitute the term ‘natural selection’ with ‘inheritance’. Again, natural selection is to be explained and 
therefore cannot be explained by including the term itself.  That said, some serious questions remain. For 
instance, a certain amount of time is very vague for any scientific measurement and the right environmental 
conditions is so wide and open that almost anything could apply. Furthermore, an organism may possess 
traits that do not confer reproductive advantage or disadvantage but a change in the environmental conditions 
may mean that those traits previously considered neutral are now highly beneficial (or even detrimental). 
  
Population genetics can only apply quantitative tools when measuring changes to gene frequencies after the 
event, never before (Fisher 1930). This leaves the claim to scientific credence resting almost wholly on the 
theory’s explanatory power, but the problem here is that the explanatory component of neo-Darwinian theory 
is still to be determined. One of its critics is Margulis (following Goldschmidt (1940)), who raises the 
pertinent empirical question that goes to the core of the justification of the PNS. She asks whether there is a 
single documented case in the biological literature that demonstrates in nature a succession of mutational 
changes that has gradually accumulated through heredity, leading to the establishment of a new species: 
 
I once asked the eloquent and personable palaeontologist Niles Eldredge whether he knew of any case in 
which the formation of a new species has been documented. I told him I’d be satisfied if his example were 
drawn from the laboratory, from the field or from observations from the fossil record. He could muster 
only one good example: Theodosius Dobzhansky’s experiments with Drosophila, the fruit fly. (Margulis 
2001 p9) 
 
Unfortunately, even this example proved not to be an example of speciation through genetic mutation and 
accumulation. Instead this is, Margulis continues, an instance where flies bred at hot temperatures had lost an 
intracellular symbiotic bacterium. This loss explained the speciation. Uncontroversially, one can find many 
examples of mutational change leading to variation, Biston betularia being one classic example, but finding 
evidence of actual speciation by this means has proved elusive. However, a note of caution is called for here: 
the advent of melanism in the peppered moth may not necessarily be a straightforward mutation; there could 
be extrinsic factors that induce the biochemical processes that result in the darker colouring. This classic 
example of evolution in action gave rise to a heated debate as to the causes and mechanisms involved (Coyne 
1998, Hooper 2003, Majerus 1998 and 2005, Sargent et al. 1998). Nevertheless, it is one thing to give an 
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example of variation through single mutation but it is much more problematic to provide an illustration of 
mutation through generations followed by established speciation. 
 
The accumulation of favoured variants is itself a term that requires further elucidation, for how does one 
identify a favourable variant? Are there criteria that can provide objectivity and escape the charge of 
researcher subjectivity? To judge a variant as favoured, one must recognise the contingency of the immediate 
environment. The variant will remain favourable unless the environment changes and becomes more hostile. 
The new favoured variant must therefore still be favoured in subsequent generations and this also holds for 
each additional accumulative variation.  For a new species to arrive, the favourable trait must spread through 
a population successfully. It would take many generations for a variant to become established and more time 
still for a further favourable mutation to occur and follow the same procedure. Under these conditions, the 
emergence of new life forms looks remarkably fortuitous and could be problematic unless there is a good 
deal of phenotype plasticity. One could plausibly consider that a species that is particularly specialised and 
dependent upon a small range of attributes within the environment is more likely to become extinct than to 
evolve. Hence it can be said that generalists are more apt to survive in the longer term than specialists. 
However, there is still a significant barrier in the explanation of speciation that relies upon accumulative 
mutations.  
 
Some Empirical Problems for the Theory 
 
Consider chromosome accretion. One could argue that a good defining characteristic of a species is the 
quality and number of chromosomes it possesses. As simple examples, donkeys have 62 chromosomes, 
horses have 64 and hermit crabs a massive 254. One must tread cautiously here, for zebras of different 
subgenera can have between 32 and 46 chromosomes. Recent research discovered the Indian muntjac 
(Muntiacus muntjak) has the lowest number of chromosomes for a mammal, a diploid number of seven for 
the male and only six for the female. This compares with a diploid number of 46 for Reeve’s muntjac 
(Muntiacus reevesi).18 When a new species of animal emerges there often is qualitative and quantitative 
differences chromosomally, but it is very difficult to see how the process of continuous single mutations can 
account for such differences. The accretion of chromosomes from the early prokaryote to the eukaryote may 
be better understood endosymbiotically. Further, accretion can be achieved in plants by the process of 
polyploidy. But how does one explain the accretion of chromosomes within the kingdom of Animalia? Our 
distant ancestors in the form of a single eukaryote cell probably had no more than two million nucleotide 
base pairs on its single chromosome but over the course of time one can witness the increase to a massive 3.2 
billion base pairs on 46 chromosomes in humans (Van Straalen & Roelofs 2006). How can this highly 
significant evolutionary accumulation of genetic material be explained by the mutation theory described in 
the new synthesis? Large mutational changes were traditionally perceived in the biological textbooks to be 
very rare events and almost always resulting in abnormal phenotypes with zero fitness (Stearns and Hoekstra 
2005 p101). The modern view is however somewhat different: genetic rearrangements and accretion of DNA 
are far more complex than conceived by the founders of the new synthesis. It is now appreciated that whole 
genomes can be acquired or duplicated, sometimes quadrupled (Shapiro 2011) 
                                                 
18 For research upon the various species of muntjac deer see Wang and Lan (2000). For a good general overview of chromosomal 
distribution in animals see Makino (1967). 
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Natural selection looks to have explanatory value concerning the elimination of undesirable traits and the 
preservation of the biological status quo, but does it provide a convincing explanation of the emergence of 
the diverse and numerous species that have blossomed over the past two billion years? Providing a 
naturalistic causal account of evolutionary diversity and replacing the prevailing Linnaean ideas of species 
fixity could be a serious problem for the theory as it was originally conceived. For natural selection to 
explain how species come into existence and then flourish or not, there is a need for more elaboration than 
the model here presents.  
 
The Filter Analogy 
 
These shortcomings do not always seem to be appreciated within the philosophical literature for one often 
comes across arguments that purport to be in defence of natural selection but seemingly only confirm its 
essential conservatism. Take the ‘filter analogy’. For the purposes of this argument, and as discussed in 
Chapter 3, we will refer to natural selection as a filtering process rather than as a filter (which is a reified 
noun). Nevertheless, arguably natural selection can be seen as a filter that sorts the biological chaff from the 
biological wheat, whether it is at the level of the gene or the individual or even perhaps the group. Rosenberg 
and McShea (2008 p18) have argued that the filter analogy is suggestive of teleology, for there is no force or 
body in nature that is purposely selecting traits that one might see as beneficial. Rather, it is better to see the 
environment as the filter, or a continuous series of changing filters, blindly interacting with organic bodies. 
This is indeed a step in the right direction, as it reduces the teleological implications inherent in the term 
‘selection’. Nevertheless, there are still problems, regardless of whether one calls it an environmental filter or 
a natural selection filter. Both types of filter would act to reduce variation, as all filters would invariably do. 
Further, if natural selection were simply a filter, then it would not be able to account for the emergence of 
new varieties. What would be the source of the diversity all around us? As Camilla Berry is quoted by Reid 
(2007 p27), ‘If natural selection is the filter, what’s making the coffee?’ A filter is not a creative process; it 
can only interact with material that is already present. By definition, selection or filtering can only take place 
if variation already exists; selection must logically follow form, whether one is applying selectionist thinking 
to reproducing mammals or to the emergence of life from the primordial soup or even, as some do, to the 
distribution of chemicals and minerals after the Big Bang. An account for the emergence of the ‘stuff’ is 
needed if one perceives natural selection simply as a filter.  
 
One can construct a logical argument to illustrate the problem. At some point, a founder species (A) must 
have evolved to become two species (A and B). For the sake of argument, assume that this was the result of 
mutational changes and that the new B species is sufficiently phenotypically different to create a mating 
barrier within the same location. What would be the role of natural selection in the creation of species B? 
Natural selection cannot ‘act’ upon A, as A is singular, other than to eliminate A. In other words, if Natural 
Selection is contrastive, i.e. A rather than B, then this must entail at least two entities. One could not place a 
single apple on the table and then say please select an apple from the table. Selection is only meaningful if 
there are two or more apples available. As the presence of both A and B are necessary conditions for 
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selection they cannot be the cause or result of selection. All filters, material or metaphorical, require a 
plurality of material to sift and separate. The question is then how does this plurality arise? Moreover, if A 
and B are now both present, then natural selection can only ‘act’ to eliminate one (or both). But if it were to 
do so, then any diversity would be lost. How does one explain the emergence of B, if natural selection only 
has eliminative or filtering powers?  
 
How does one explain by natural selection the fantastic diversity of life as we witness it today if natural 
selection is simply a filter? Darwin’s solution to such problems was to recognise natural selection as 
preserving or eliminating changes. The first problem here is that preservation is not causal in an originating 
sense, as it occurs after the event. The second problem is that to say that the evolutionary emergence of  
2,000 species of cichlid fish is preserved by natural selection is, by all accounts, rather hollow. The third 
problem is that if mutation is the factor that caused the creation of new species, then why does one need to 
invoke natural selection when step-by-step causality is more parsimonious? In short, if natural selection acts 
on variation, then how does one explain the origin of the variation? If variation can emerge prior to natural 
selection, why not investigate the sources and incorporate these within the evolutionary framework? This 
point was raised by Bateson (1894) and referred to in Chapter 1.  
 
One hundred years later philosophers are once again debating the same issues that were extensively discussed 
during the period known as the ‘eclipse of Darwinism’. Today the issue of natural selection is discussed in 
terms of ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ causality, but the arguments are essentially a repeat of what was argued 
before19. Several philosophers have advanced the view that natural selection has negative causality. Sober 
(1995) discusses the concept of ‘distributive explanation’ and derives the view that natural selection cannot 
explain why organisms have the traits they do have. At best natural selection explains the frequencies of traits 
in populations. Pust (2001) reflects what has been written above in the preceding paragraph, when he 
considers the ‘doctrine of origin essentialism’. Brunnander (2007) argues also that natural selection cannot be 
considered a force that creates adaptations. Fodor (2008) argues that natural selection has no causal powers 
and that evolutionary explanations are consigned to a collection of natural histories. Matthen and Ariew 
(2009) also defend the negative view, citing the reification problem to justify their position. It should be 
noted perhaps that, apart from Fodor, the above are not critical of neo-Darwinism in general but see room for 
philosophical clarification of natural selection. In Chapters 9 &10 it will be demonstrated, however, that 
evolutionary explanation can draw on resources other than just selection and natural history. 
 
Supporting the positive causality view Millstein (2006) argues that natural selection takes place at the level of 
populations, and it is a causal process. Birch (2012) questions the ‘doctrine of origin essentialism’ in his 
attack on negativism. Pigliucci (2009) defends natural selection against the criticisms of Reid (2007), 
maintaining that only natural selection can explain adaptations. Reid’s criticism will be discussed in Ch.11.  
Huneman (2012) suggests selection is “both causally and explanatory relevant (rather than being shorthand 
for infinitely numerous individual causal processes)”. Martinez & Moya (2011) defend the positive role of 
natural selection in the generation of organismal form and incorporate a role for ‘downward causation’ ; 
 
                                                 
19 Both sides of the argument are represented in a collection of essays in  Evolution in Modern Thought (1909). The claim for the 
causality of natural selection is attacked by Bateson (1894), Dennert (1904) and DeVries (1909). 
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In other words, the adaptive success or failure of certain higher-level entities has a decisive effect on the 
future presence and distribution of the lower-level entities that (re)produce them. 
 
Rather than extrapolate from lower-level activity such as the gene to explain higher-level activity, one can 
extrapolate from macro–entities to explain the more micro entities. This is an interesting and novel 
contribution but even if one accepts this there are still severe limits to its causal power.  For instance, one 
could argue that speciation, the origin of new traits and major evolutionary transitions, are beyond its scope. 
The other danger here is to divert from natural selection as it was conceived to a more anomalous form. 
Macro incidents such as a meteor strike inflicting damage on higher-level entities would indeed also have 
severe consequences for lower-level entities, that much is uncontroversial. Nevertheless, one can question 
whether mass extinctions and their consequences are embraced under the principle of natural selection. 
 
 
The Problem of Ambiguity: What does the word ‘selection’ mean? 
 
Natural selection was originally employed in reference to the competitive struggle for resources under 
increasing population numbers but in the twentieth century, the PNS was broadened and applied to any 
phenomena that might give advantage or disadvantage to an organism’s ability to reproduce. Darwin also 
conceived of sexual selection as an additional process independent of natural selection in order to explain 
traits that on the surface may inhibit successful competition. (Ch.1) The peacock’s train was the classic 
example. Sceptics of this latter form of selection saw it as an ad hoc measure to plug anomalies in the 
original PNS (Popper Ch.2); whereas neo-Darwinism, to summarise, saw it as a legitimate extension of the 
paradigm. The situation has grown most bizarre, natural selection was originally conceived to explain 
evolutionary changes but now evolutionary changes are said to occur when natural selection is relaxed or 
lifted. (See below) This is why one must conclude that the term ‘natural selection’ has become anomalous.20 
There is now such a proliferation of forms of selection, many are detractive. These terms will be considered 
in an attempt to establish why the introduction of these forms was thought necessary and whether these new 
forms of selection are processes independent of natural selection or whether they are subsumed under an 
overarching umbrella of natural selection. Finally, consideration will be given to the sceptic’s charge of ad 
hoc manoeuvring. 
 
Although Wallace never accepted sexual selection as an evolutionary factor, the term was introduced by 
Darwin in the 1858 submission and maintained by him throughout his life. (Ch.1) Under pressure from 
Wallace and Mivart, Darwin was forced to add a further term of ‘reversed sexual selection’. This was 
intended to cover what Wallace (Quoted in Berry 2002 p89) and Mivart (1876) saw as an anomaly in the 
theory, for example, it was the males rather than the females that appeared to be selecting partners. 
Explanations of a selective nature fell from fashion after Darwin’s demise, but were revived again some 50 
years later. Schmalhausen (1949) introduced the term ‘stabilising selection’ to denote an organism’s 
robustness in early development against the background of an unpredictable environment. Quite why the 
term ‘selection’ was affixed here is not entirely clear, as the term ‘stabilising’ imputes order and regularity. 
‘Canalising selection’ was coined by Waddington (1942) and today denotes either environmental or genetic 
                                                 
20 Anomalous, in the sense defined by the Merriam – Webster dictionary: inconsistent with or deviating from what is usual, normal, or 
expected and of uncertain nature or classification 
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canalisation. Again, one must wonder why the term selection was applied when canalisation implies order 
with only a little variation. Nowadays one mostly hears or reads ‘canalisation’ without the suffix being 
unnecessarily applied.  More recently, ‘balancing selection’ or sometimes ‘overdominant selection’ is said to 
‘act’ within a population and is able to maintain stable frequencies of two or more forms of phenotype.21 A 
mutant homozygote or the normal homozygote is said to have less fitness than the products of the 
heterozygote. Contrast this with ‘purifying selection’, which is ‘acknowledged by most evolutionists as the 
predominant form of selection’ (Bustamante et al. 2000 p103), where mutations are eliminated and the 
existing genetic stock is highly conserved. Purifying selection can also be strong or weak. Continuing in this 
vein, ‘orthoselection’ was introduced by White (1973) to denote how chromosomal arrangements might 
become fixed, which included both the symmetry and asymmetry of forms. Orthoselection proved 
controversial, though, not because the term has undertones of an oxymoron but because White’s empirical 
data was questioned (King 1995). It was suggested by King, however, that the selective terminology was 
unnecessary.  
 
All of the selective terms above, apart from those concerning sexual selection, have in common a 
conservative foundation where order and consistency are maintained at the different biological levels. With 
selection here displaying such a conservative nature, one might wonder how evolution occurred. However, 
the list is far from complete, and opposing forms of selection are now examined. The most commonly used of 
these is ‘directional selection’, which can also be referred to as ‘dynamic’, ‘linear’ or ‘progressive’. There is 
some ambiguity concerning the events that directional selection is said to represent. One account Ridley 
(2003) gives the example of greyhound dogs being selected for speed, which is actually a form of artificial 
selection, and later gives the example of the selection in nature of body size. However, directional selection 
could result in fitness for larger bodies and also in fitness for smaller bodies. For instance, predation could 
eliminate a particular size, thus favouring the remaining size. Similar to directional selection, ‘frequency-
dependent selection’ considers how different organisms may have their fitness improved when their 
frequency is considered in relation to the frequency of other organisms. There may also be a more 
conservative maintaining role, including a 50:50 sex ratio, polymorphism in prey species, males with rare 
attributes, and even left-handedness in humans (Dorak 2007). However, one must be careful, for there are 
said to be various forms of ‘frequency-dependent selection’, including ‘stabilising frequency-dependent 
selection’, ‘disruptive frequency-dependent selection’, positive frequency-dependent selection’ and ‘negative 
frequency-dependent selection’. Further, ‘frequency-dependent selection’ is also said to be strong or weak. It 
is not surprising that this proliferation of terms has caused some confusion and led researchers Heino et al. to 
lament: 
 
Frequency-dependent selection is so fundamental to modern evolutionary thinking that everyone ‘knows’ 
the concept. Yet the term is used to refer to different types of selection. The concept is well defined in the 
original context of population genetics theory, which focuses on short-term evolutionary change. The 
original concept becomes ambiguous, however, when used in the context of long-term evolution, where 
density dependence becomes essential. Weak and strong frequency dependence, as distinguished in this 
article, refer to two very different forms of selection. (Heino et al. 1998 abstract) 
 
This ‘enigma’, as the researchers say, is the result of a term being employed to denote one set of events at 
perhaps the micro level but the same term being employed at the macro level to denote a similar but 
                                                 
21 All definitions of the various forms of selection, other than those referenced in the text are extracted from Bell (2008). 
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nevertheless different series of events. There is a profound problem here and it is not simply one of 
semantics. Appendix 4 provides a compilation of selective terminology but is far from exhaustive. The 
selective terms cover an enormous range of phenomena from many forms of sexual selection, environmental 
and ecological selection, artificial selection and much biochemical selection. With such diversity of events 
denoted, one is left to wonder what the term ‘selection’ actually means. The term has become so elastic that it 
has lost any meaningfulness and has led to the charge of being a biological ‘phlogiston’ (Lima-de-Faria 1988 
see below). 
 
In efforts to reform the anomalous use of the term ‘selection’ as perceived in neo – Darwinism, Reiss (2009 
Table 12.2) has demonstrated how selective terminology can be explicated and passages re-written in a 
clearer and more parsimonious manner. Two examples, from the many that Reiss provides, follow. From his 
survey of the literature Reiss identifies a common usage first, followed by his explication. 
 Example 1 - 
“Because it is difficult for small forest fliers to soar, the selective pressure to increase horizontal range by 
switching to flapping should be considerable”. 
 
Reiss’s explication- 
Because small forest fliers can’t soar, an increase in horizontal range can only occur by switching to 
flapping. 
  
Example 2 
Whatever the reason, selective evolution has resulted in an arrangement in which dinosaurs best adapted for 
operating in well-lit conditions mainly fly during the day, and mammals well suited for flying in the dark 
take over after sunset. 
 
Reiss’s explication-    
Whatever the reason, evolution has resulted in an arrangement in which dinosaurs best adapted for 
operating in well-lit conditions mainly fly during the day, and mammals well suited for flying in the dark 
take over after sunset. 
 
Reiss should be congratulated upon some excellent reforming work and hopefully his book will reach a wide 
audience.22 (In chapter 12 Reiss’s views on neo-teleology will be considered). Let us now return to an earlier 
critic of selective terminology. 
 
The Phlogiston Problem 
 
The phlogiston theory of combustion makes a frequent appearance in the philosophy of science literature 
when issues of realism and anti-realism are discussed (Cohen et al. 1996). It is an example of a postulated 
entity that has subsequently been shown not to exist, and yet it enjoyed a fair amount of empirical success. 
The following historical summary is extracted from Larson (2008).Phlogiston was considered to be a 
substance that every object possessed: for example, the earth or soil was low in phlogiston whereas metal and 
fire were high. When metal is heated at high temperatures, it reduces in size; this was said to be because of 
the loss of phlogiston. The theory ‘explained’ that fire burns out in an enclosed space because the air 
becomes saturated with phlogiston. Moreover, any creatures confined in airtight spaces would die from such 
                                                 
22  Dupre 2011 gives a very favourable review of Reiss’s ‘Retiring Darwin’s Watchmaker’, see 
http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/the-conditions-for-existence. For a more critical review see Deprew 2010. 
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saturation. In describing what the phlogiston theory explained, Larson says further, ‘some metal calxes turn 
to metals when heated with charcoal because the phlogiston from the charcoal restores the phlogiston in the 
metal.’ Lavoisier was one who was sceptical of the theory, in particular when supporters of it ascribed 
additional properties to phlogiston in order to overcome anomalies. In the following example, phlogiston was 
‘discovered’ to have negative, neutral and positive qualities: 
 
The problem was that when some metals were calcined, the resulting calx was heavier than the initial 
metal. Some proponents of the phlogiston theory tried to explain this phenomena by saying that in some 
metals, phlogiston has negative weight. Furthermore, it was discovered that mercury could be turned back 
into a metal simply by heating it, that is without a phlogiston rich source such as charcoal. Rather than 
except [sic] this theory that phlogiston could have positive weight, negative weight, and sometimes no 
weight at all, Lavoisier suspected and later proved that the weight increase was a result of the metal 
combining with air. (Larson 2008) 
 
The theory of phlogiston enjoyed longevity of over 100 years and acceptance by the vast majority of 
scientists and thinkers. There were persistent critics, but these were often outsiders and marginalised. There 
was also enormous peer pressure to accept what everyone knew to be true; if one harboured any doubts, it 
was better to keep such reservations to oneself, especially if one was career minded. Those who did question 
the majority view, though, discovered they were attacking shifting sands. This was principally due to the 
ability of the proponents to invent new terminology each time an anomaly was encountered or to suggest 
external inconsistencies, such as the quality of the air, to explain away any potential loopholes. The theory 
also lacked any predictive power; one was only wiser after the event: 
 
Of course, one didn’t use phlogiston theory to predict the outcome of a chemical transformation. You 
looked at the result first, then you used phlogiston theory to explain it. It’s not that phlogiston theorists 
predicted a flame would extinguish in a closed container; rather they lit a flame in a container, watched it 
go out, and then said, ‘The air must have become saturated with phlogiston.’ You couldn’t even use 
phlogiston theory to say what you ought not to see; it could explain everything. (Yudkowsky 2007) 
 
There are, it seems, some striking and alarming parallels between the extended PNS and the phlogiston 
theory. Is this the case and does the charge of a biological phlogiston put forward by Lima-de-Faria hold? 
The criticisms are now outlined and their strength, if any, evaluated. Lima-de-Faria recognises that selection 
does exist but, similar to phlogiston, it has no material body: ‘selection cannot be weighed, stored or poured 
into a vial.’ (Lima-de-Faria 1988 p7) A better comparison, it is argued, is that of ‘heat’. Heat was once 
considered to be a material component but, following the insight and work of Joule, heat was later deemed 
not to be matter but to be only a state of matter. Selection is similar to heat or work, in that it represents a 
state in progress. The conclusion is that ‘selection cannot be the mechanism of evolution for the simple 
reason that it is not a material component of organisms.’ (Lima-de-Faria 1988 p7) 
 
There are a couple of concerns with this analysis. First, it is not clear that any evolutionary biologists or 
philosophers would consider natural selection to be a material entity. Second, it does not seem unreasonable 
to consider natural selection as series of causal interactions that constitute a process. The real difficulty is to 
clearly identify without ambiguity what constitutes this process. However, there is a common lax tendency to 
talk of the PNS as if it were a force or pressure and this usage is more difficult to substantiate.23. The second 
                                                 
23 Incidentally, Lima-de-Faria’s own hypothesis of ‘autoevolution’ fails to meet the criteria he sets out for a mechanism, for 
autoevolution too has no particular material components. 
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charge within the analogy is more serious and concerns the proliferation of selective terminology discussed 
above. The similarity here, according to Lima-de-Faria, is that phlogiston enjoyed properties that could 
explain all manner of chemical reactions. The example that phlogiston could have weight, be weightless and 
exhibit negative weight is disturbingly of the same order of the properties that selection is said to have: 
‘Selection has been ascribed the most conflicting properties. Selection can be both “directional”, and 
“accidental”, it can “canalize” and it can “diversify”.’ (Lima-de-Faria 1988 p9) What is perhaps more 
disquieting is that since these words were written in 1988, there has been a mushrooming of selective 
terminology, which embraces a much wider range of biological phenomena (see Appendix 4). Several of 
these contrary terms have already been mentioned and further evidence suggests there is a genuine quandary 
here. What has happened with ‘selective terminology’ is that because a formal definition of natural selection 
or the term selection has never been agreed, selective terminology has been unwittingly added ad-lib, with no 
foreseeable parameters. It has been applied so widely, from molecules to genes and to universes (See next 
chapter). It is not the case that individual instances of selective terminology do not represent biological 
phenomena, or at least attempt to represent biological phenomena, but it is the case that the term ‘selection’ 
has become superfluous. It would be a clearer practice to individually name, or refer to each of the natural 
processes the selective terminology is thought to represent.  Every eventuality, it seems, could be given the 
term ‘selection’ as a referent; but with so many referents, what does the term ‘selection’ actually mean? 
When a commentator says ‘there is selection of’ or ‘there is selection for’ or ‘there are selection pressures’, it 
is difficult to know what they have in mind as there are so many ascriptions to ‘selection’. What began as 
recognition of one important naturalistic process of evolutionary change has multiplied over the years into 
recognition of very many different naturalistic evolutionary and non-evolutionary processes. Darwin was 
correct to appreciate that his Principle of Natural Selection was one process amongst others, and that the 
other processes were entirely independent of selection.  
Natural Selection and Variation 
Natural selection is said to act on variation, that much is uncontroversial. Selection is therefore 
chronologically post-variation and independent from the sources of variation. However, it seems these 
parameters are not that secure. To compound the serious problem of anomalous selection yet another form of 
selection is employed: ‘antagonistic selection’24. This form of selection actually has a causal effect upon 
variation, ‘we currently know little about the evolutionary interactions between antagonistic selection, 
recurrent mutation, and genetic drift, which should collectively shape empirical patterns of genetic 
variation’  and ‘First, antagonistic selection inflates heterozygosity and fitness variance across a broad 
parameter range…….’(Connallon & Clark 2012). This extension of selective terminology undermines what 
originally was a fairly clear and straightforward formulation of the selection process. Moreover, with these 
additions the term ‘selection’ becomes increasingly difficult to pinpoint. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
24 Antagonistic selection can take different forms, sexually antagonistic selection, antagonistic balancing selection, antagonistic 
directional selection 
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This chapter has demonstrated that if natural selection is seen as a filter, or more correctly as a filtering 
process, then its role is eliminative or conservative only; it cannot be the creative force that gives rise to 
biological diversity. This recognition at least reconciles fitness and natural selection as preserving but not 
causal of de novo features. The role of causal factor is given to mutation, but it was argued that single point 
mutation is insufficient to account for the accretion of genetic materials and complexity. Mutation in the 
modern sense is recognised as much more multifaceted, with genetic duplication occurring. This goes some 
way to addressing the accretion problem. However, it was recognised that other factors, such as lateral gene 
transfer and viral vectors, are now established as playing an important role in genetic accretion and 
phenotypic expression.  
 
The problem of ambiguity is the most serious for natural selection. Much of this difficulty has stemmed from 
the gradual introduction of selective terminology to cover newly discovered biological phenomena, some of 
which were originally conceived as being opposed to natural selection. This has given natural selection a host 
of contrary attributes, prompting the charge of a biological phlogiston. Under examination, the analogy 
between selection and phlogiston was held to be largely and seriously true. The disturbing similarities require 
consideration and some clear criteria are demanded to determine what constitutes ‘selection’. Is the word 
selection shorthand for natural selection or does it have its own identity? Selection, without a formal 
definition, has evolved from its Malthusian origins to something meaningless one might call ‘anomalous 
selection’. 
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Chapter 5: The Further Extended Principle of Natural Selection 
 
As stated, the main objective of this thesis is the disambiguation of natural selection. If this can be achieved 
then one is in a better position to evaluate proper application. However before this can be achieved it is 
important to identify the current applications of natural selection and to examine exactly how far it’s powers 
are thought to extend. It has been fashionable of late to apply neo-Darwinian principles to other fields of 
enquiry. In particular, the PNS has been used to try to provide a further layer of explanation to such fields as 
cosmology, mineralogy and chemistry. In the social sciences, neo-Darwinist ideas have permeated areas such 
as psychology, economics, ethics and anthropology.25 There is a proselytizing website called 
‘universaldarwinism.com’ and Dan Dennett (1995) has aptly talked of the ‘universal acid of natural 
selection’ to describe this spreading phenomenon. Historically, natural selection has been employed to justify 
some dubious economic excesses of laissez faire and in the 1920s until the 1940s the evils of Nazi eugenics.  
Unfortunately without parameters then anything goes. Focus here however will concern the extension of 
natural selection to cosmology and mineralogy, for these areas concentrate upon the import of natural 
selection rather than the entire neo-Darwinian thesis. This singularity will make it easier to identify what 
manner of natural selection is being employed and whether this move adds or subtracts explanatory power. 
First, consideration will be given to cosmology and the arguments of Lee Smolin. This will be followed by 
consideration of a similar line of argument that applies to molecular and mineral evolution.  
 
Cosmology and the PNS 
 
‘Cosmological natural selection’ is a hypothesis projected by Smolin (1998) and intended as a scientific 
alternative to the anthropic principle. In the outline that follows, the accuracy of Smolin’s descriptions of 
cosmology will not be questioned. The only question will be, ‘If Smolin’s description is true, then can one 
apply principles of natural selection to it?’ Smolin takes it as given that there is a multiverse, an almost 
infinite number of universes rather than just the singular. Within these universes, there can be black holes, 
absorbing matter that passes through to the ‘other side’. In the event horizon of a black hole, a child universe 
is created and this child universe inherits almost the same value for parameters as its ‘parent’ universe. 
Reproduction of the new child universe is not perfect owing to ‘mutation’, and this can affect the quality of 
the parameters. It is these parameters of physics which determine the lifetime of the emerging child universe 
and also the number of black holes in each offspring universe. From this, it follows that universes with the 
highest number of black holes will predominate over universes with fewer or no black holes. In other words, 
the universes with the largest number of black holes are the fittest as they are the ones that will produce the 
greatest number of child universes. Ceteris paribus, these child universes are more likely to contain the 
greatest number of black holes within the population of universes.  
 
One thing that is clear from this analogy is that it is not analogous with the Malthusian form of natural 
selection. There are no problems, it seems, with rising populations of universes in competition for resources. 
The analogy does, however, seem quite consistent with the concept of fitness at its bare bones: successful 
reproduction is more likely to beget further successful reproduction in later generations. This more general 
                                                 
25 See Barkow (2006) for an overview of the influence of neo-Darwinism on other sciences. Also Blackmore, S. as a supporter of 
‘universal darwinism’(1995). 
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principle is more accommodative and applies if one is considering vertebrates, invertebrates, prokaryotes or 
black holes. Nevertheless, one might argue that the analogy with respect to the biological world begins to 
break down when one considers that the fitness of an organism is dependent upon a changing and 
unpredictable environment (Vaas 1998). This is in contrast to the environment that the child universe 
encounters; here, there is predictability, because the void is, one assumes, of a constant nil quality. (Also, one 
assumes that the void presents no barriers, so there is no problem of competition for biological space.) One 
might also argue that Smolin has actually given a presentation of ‘drift’ rather than one of natural selection. 
The difference between drift and selection is said to be that natural selection leads to adaptation, whereas 
drift does not. In Smolin’s account of evolving universes, there is no talk of adaptations. A further breakdown 
of analogy concerns the mutation of the parameters. According to neo-Darwinism, aforesaid, in the biological 
world, mutations are mostly considered to be harmful but, on very rare occasions, a beneficial mutation 
subsists and then, at a later date, another beneficial mutation subsists, and so forth with cumulative success. 
Mutations here are considered to be random (not uncaused) and cumulative, but is this the same for the 
mutations that are said to alter the parameters of the developing child universe? Moreover, are the mutations 
in the formation of parameters random? They are certainly not cumulative.  
 
Despite all of these dis-analogies, one could still accept that there are these differences but that, in principle, 
the fundamental line of successful reproduction, however it is achieved or comes about, remains the same in 
the biological and the cosmological realms. There is within the principle of fitness a clause of ceteris paribus, 
which removes such extrinsic factors and considers only the fundamental principle. Let us remind ourselves 
what the fitness principle actually is, or at least consider what purports to be a fair representation of a difficult 
concept: ‘Trait X is fitter than trait Y if and only if X has a higher probability of survival and/or a greater 
expectation of reproductive success than Y.’ (Sober 1993 p. 70.) In cosmological terms, this simply translates 
to ‘Universe X is fitter than universe Y if and only if universe X has a higher probability of survival and/or a 
greater expectation of reproductive success than universe Y.’  
 
Under this light, Smolin could argue that his version of cosmological natural selection is quite consistent with 
the fundamental principles of biological fitness. Indeed, there is nothing in either of the above formulations 
that concerns the random nature of mutations or the effects of changing environments or the controversy over 
the relationship between drift and natural selection. Cosmological natural selection is consistent with 
biological natural selection translated into the principle of fitness, but it is not consistent with the original 
Malthusian concept of natural selection. One concern here, however, is the use of the terms ‘natural 
selection’, ‘survival of the fittest’, ‘fitness’ and ‘fitness landscapes’. The last term is a visual representation 
of fitness concerning the relationship between a genotype or a phenotype and its reproductive success or lack 
of success (Wright 1932). Fitness itself was intended as a refinement to the ‘survival of the fittest’ and 
Malthusian natural selection. (Ch.2) However, Smolin (2008) says that ‘natural selection works on properties 
like fitness’, but is there confusion here? What sense of the term ‘natural selection’ is Smolin alluding to? As 
discussed, Smolin’s analogy with Malthusian natural selection does not hold; therefore Smolin must employ 
the ‘fitness’ version of natural selection. However, Smolin’s statement translates to ‘fitness works on 
properties like fitness’, an undesirable circularity. The issue raised here concerns the term ‘fitness’, which is 
said above to be a property; but ‘fitness’ can also be construed as a more refined process than its predecessor, 
‘survival of the fittest.’ It is unfortunate to have the term ‘fitness’ as both a process and a quality. Perhaps it 
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would be clearer to identify an organism enjoying the property fitness, which resulted from a particular 
process, and then to illustrate whatever the process was. A further problem for cosmological natural selection 
is that the analogy rests exclusively upon mutation providing the process of evolutionary change. This may 
have been the ‘received view’ for many biologists up until the 1990s, but arguably this is no longer the case. 
Issues of genetic exchange are now incorporated into evolutionary theory (See Ch.7). The analogy is out of 
date with the extended modern synthesis (Pigliucci and Muller 2010). This is a major oversight within 
Smolin’s analogy; it is very difficult to see how two universes could ever combine to produce a child 
universe.  
 
The analogy also has its limitations. For instance, there must be a maximum number of black holes a universe 
can sustain. This consideration can only be understood mathematically, and recourse to ‘natural selection’ is 
not necessary or helpful. Further, the account of successive universe reproduction seems little more than a 
mathematical progression. Consider different banks offering different rates of interest to investors; one does 
not have to be a genius to realise that the accounts providing the higher interest will grow at a faster rate than 
those providing a lower interest rate. This simple type of reasoning is sufficient to explain why universes 
with greater numbers of black holes are more likely to predominate, ceteris paribus, after successive 
generations. 
 
Further limitations to the employment of cosmological natural selection concern the origin of a first universe 
in comparison to the origin of our distant ancestor in the biological literature. An original universe cannot 
have been the result of a black hole, because a black hole’s existence can only follow from the existence of 
an earlier universe. If there were an ‘original’ universe, it could only have emerged without the facility of a 
black hole. How do we know that this phenomenon might not repeat itself? This ontological problem is not 
exclusive to cosmological natural selection, but it does illustrate the same problem that biological natural 
selection faces with first emergences of life. Selection, by definition, can only operate once a variety is 
already in existence. However, if there is already in existence a biological variety, then how did this come 
about? Natural selection seems only to preserve and eliminate; a conservative role has already been 
suggested but will be discussed more fully later.  
 
Molecular and Mineral Selection and Evolution 
 
In a similar vein, Darwinian principles have also been used to try to explain the distribution of molecules, 
minerals and chemical compositions. Cairns-Smith (1985) was probably the pioneer of this extension when 
he first introduced the idea that clays played an important role in pre-biotic evolution. Some crystals within 
the clays were more likely to flourish and replicate than other crystals in particular environments, hence the 
analogy of a selection process. Recently, Cairns-Smith (2005) has argued that the driving force for the 
transition from geochemistry to biochemistry was natural selection.26 Hazen goes further still, applying 
selection to both molecules and minerals: 
 
Molecular selection, by which a few molecules earned starring roles in life’s origin, proceeded on many 
fronts. Some molecules were inherently unstable or unusually reactive and so they quickly disappeared 
                                                 
26 Not all bio-geologists subscribe to interpretations couched in selection, see also Sandstrom (2006),  Yushkin (2008) and Bejan and 
Lorente (2010). 
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from the scene. Other molecules proved to be soluble in the oceans and so were removed from contention. 
Still other molecular species sequestered themselves by binding strongly to surfaces of chemically 
unhelpful minerals or clumped together into gooey masses of little use for the emergence of life. (Hazen 
2005 p234) 
 
Hazen, however, sees no role for randomness, an element of importance for neo-Darwinists concerning the 
introduction of evolutionary novelties. Instead, all evolving systems are seen as stochastic processes, which 
may influence specific outcomes of some selective events, but selection is ultimately guided by physical and 
chemical principles. What is analogous here? Clearly, there is again little similarity with the Malthusian 
brand of selection, which incorporates competition resulting from diminishing resources in the face of 
increasing population numbers. Further, as already mentioned, there is little similarity with the neo-
Darwinian mechanism of differential reproduction fuelled by random mutation. Also, what exactly is meant 
by ‘selective events’? For instance, could one not, for the sake of parsimony, rewrite ‘all evolving systems 
are seen as stochastic processes, which may influence specific outcomes of some selective events, but 
selection is ultimately guided by physical and chemical principles’ as ‘all evolving systems are seen as 
stochastic processes ultimately guided by physical and chemical principles’?  
 
One could complain that ‘selective events’ and ‘selection’ above seem to be doing little work when it comes 
to explanatory power and that they confuse issues rather than illuminate them. On the other hand, Hazen 
would argue along the lines that evolution only occurs in systems with combinatorially vast numbers of 
possible configurations: 
 
What we observe in nature in every one of these systems (elements, isotopes, minerals, organic molecules, 
etc.) represent the tiny fraction of all possible configurations that are functional. Such observed 
configurations are selected (deterministically in most cases) from the vast number of possibilities because 
of their functionality. That’s why you will find quartz (function = minimum Gibbs free energy) on every 
terrestrial planet and moon. It’s selection, pure and simple. (Hazen, private correspondence) 
 
Once again, it is difficult to perceive what work the term ‘selection’ is doing here. One could say it is 
determinism, pure and simple, rather than ‘It’s selection, pure and simple’. Elements, isotopes, crystals and 
so on may be distributed throughout the universe by virtue of their functions (or perhaps dynamics), but 
determinism is sufficient here and more parsimonious than adding another layer of selective terminology. 
Why should one introduce a new terminology that is tainted by teleology, contentious and divisive in 
biological theory to a science that has enjoyed freedom from such controversies? 
 
What is Life? 
One of the problems with extending natural selection to other disciplines is that it could erode natural 
selection’s explanatory power in the biological domain. One perplexing question for biologists and 
philosophers is what is it that distinguishes animate matter from inanimate matter? What is it that special 
quality that characterises life? There have been many proposals to this and one currently suggested is that life 
is a “self-sustaining chemical system capable of Darwinian evolution.” (Benner 2010) By this, one assumes 
that ‘Darwinian evolution’ includes natural selection as the major mechanism. From a Darwinian perspective 
the inclusion in the definition of ‘capable of Darwinian evolution’ does not seem an unreasonable inclusion. 
Leaving aside the first part of the proposed definition, ‘sustaining chemical system’ one could argue that 
‘Darwinian evolution’ is an important characterisation that distinguishes life from non-life. However, there is 
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a problem. If one advocates natural selection as an explanatory substrate suitable for export to other sciences 
such as those discussed above then natural selection cannot be used by biologists to distinguish life from non-
life. One must therefore on the one hand stop the characterisation of life by recourse to Darwinian evolution 
if one wishes to extend natural selection to other sciences, or, on the other hand, refrain from extending 
natural selection to other sciences if one wishes to maintain natural selection as a defining characteristic of 
‘life’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The concern here is that, when extended to other fields outside the biological realm, the PNS becomes 
overgeneralised, so much so that all that is achieved is an undesirable vacuity. ‘Cosmological natural 
selection’ is yet another term that can be added to a list of ‘selective’ terminology. When unpacked, the term 
is consistent with the principle of fitness, but in this instance applied to universes and black holes rather than 
to reproducing biological populations. However, the analogy fails to recognise the difference between 
evolutionary drift and natural selection that is said to lead to adaptation. ‘Cosmological drift’ may be a more 
accurate description of the manner in which universes reproduce, for the matter is really one of mathematical 
and logical progression. Similarly, one could suggest that the evolution and distribution of minerals, crystals 
and other chemical compositions is simply and more accurately described as determinism; talk of mineral A 
‘competing’ with mineral B adds nothing but undesirable anthropomorphic language. Importing biological 
terminology adds nothing of explanatory value to non-biological evolution or cosmology and in fact only 
adds unnecessary confusion. To import selective terminology to these fields is to import an area of biology 
that is already ambiguous, confused and controversial.  
 
Without parameters to determine the correct application of natural selection there is nothing to prevent a 
perverse use of the concept. For example, if natural selection takes the contrastive form a rather than b, then 
under the wider extension a and b could signify anything one chooses, from particles to universes, even to 
ethnic groups. One could argue for instance, that during the last ‘ice age’, ice (a) was selected as it extended 
from the poles, in favour over organic life (b). Or even that the present desertification of the planet is the 
selection of sand (a) in favour over arable land (b).  Clearly then parameters are necessary to prevent such 
unhelpful nonsenses. Unfortunately, without a formal definition of natural selection or clear characterisation 
of the ‘substrate’, these parameters are very difficult to establish. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Demarcation 
 
Chapter 6: Seeking Boundaries 
 
There are a wide range of biological scientific objects, processes and behaviours that should be considered 
beyond the scope of explanation by natural selection. Some of these are uncontroversial and are accepted to 
stand outside of the parameters provided by any definition of natural selection, but some prove more 
controversial. Part of the problem here may arise because there are different definitions of natural selection in 
play and it may even be that an individual unwittingly subscribes to more than one definition. Darwin and 
Wallace disagreed over the scope of the explanatory power of natural selection primarily because they held 
similar but not identical theories (Ch.1). It could be argued that those who are the most selectionist consider 
themselves neo-Darwinians but in truth their selectionism is more reflective of Wallace, who had little time 
for all of Darwin’s pluralism. Nevertheless, Wallace himself did not believe that all of nature could be 
explained by his principles and he listed a range of such phenomena under the heading ‘What Natural 
Selection Cannot Do’ (Wallace 1869/70). Both men recognised things in nature that they thought had no 
bearing on the struggle for existence, which they perceived all organisms must face. These were quite wide 
ranging and included Darwin’s view that the colour of the blood was simply the direct result of physical 
determinism.27 Wallace included human characteristics such as moral awareness and the ability to perform 
complex mathematics. Since then, our knowledge has increased immensely; however, the controversy over 
the issue has not receded but seemingly multiplied. As one recognised philosophy website puts it: 
 
Natural selection is a causal process. Distinguishing it from other processes in evolution is one of major 
conceptual and empirical problems of evolutionary biology. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-
selection) 
 
How does one then distinguish items that are covered by natural selection from items that are not? What 
criteria should one employ? To answer these questions, one must first be clear what is meant by natural 
selection and, as witnessed, this is no mean feat. For instance, there is a stricter sense of natural selection that 
denotes ‘differential reproduction’ and ‘differential survival’. There is also a looser sense of natural selection, 
a non-originating sense that simply involves the filtering of whatever emerges of biological novelty. This 
latter perspective could have serious consequences for demarcation of the different evolutionary processes. 
 
One can logically infer that anything that does not conform to the processes above is, by definition, outside 
the realm of explanation by natural selection. For example, if there is no differential reproduction, with all the 
offspring cloned, then natural selection need not be invoked. Neutral evolution is considered to be 
independent of the PNS. This is not because of a lack of any differences in phenotypes that occur via 
reproduction or replication but because these differences do not confer either fitness or lack of fitness. One of 
the difficulties here is that the fitness concept is philosophically controversial and difficult to quantify in a 
meaningful manner (Ch.2). This is particularly so if fitness is contingent to the environment, for the 
environment can be highly variable and unpredictable. If one could stabilise and control the environment, as 
experimenters in the lab can do, then calculations would be easier. Unfortunately, this is not afforded in 
nature, which is our principal concern. One is faced with the problem of trying to clarify an ambiguous and 
                                                 
27 See Darwin 1868 for different accounts of the direct impact of the environment upon form. 
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messy affair concerning natural selection by appealing to the concept of fitness, which is itself an ambiguous 
and messy affair.  
 
One criterion that seems less controversial when demarcating against natural selection is the direct impact of 
the environment upon a whole population. The important consideration here is that it refers to the whole 
population and not to some members or an individual being advantaged or disadvantaged. Differentials are 
not relevant at this juncture when the environment impacts on the whole. An example might be an expanding 
ice age that destroys everything in its wake. Suppose, however, that a few individuals manage to escape such 
rigours by migrating to warmer climes. Does one say, in this instance, that the surviving handful was selected 
for and the majority that perished were selected against? The danger is that if one generalises selection to this 
extent, then one can also claim that whatever happens to exist is the result of natural selection and whatever 
does not exist is also the result of natural selection. The overgeneralisation of a theory could be considered a 
form of ‘underdetermination’. Some of the biological phenomena that may not pertain to natural selection 
will now be identified. 
 
The Forgotten Cause in Evolutionary Theory 
 
One area of concern and debate is the revival of interest in the origin of the form and structure of organisms. 
Muller and Newman (2003) argue this is in contrast to the major focus of many evolutionary biologists, who 
address mainly what is preserved and quantitatively varied. The authors raise pertinent questions concerning 
what they call the ‘Origination of Organismal Form: The Forgotten Cause in Evolutionary Theory’28: 
 
1. Why did metazoan body plans arise in a burst? [This is in reference to the advent of new 
morphologies in the Cambrian explosion 530 million years ago.] 
2. Why do similar morphologies arise independently and repeatedly? 
3. Why do distantly related lineages produce similar designs? [The question of convergence that 
perplexed Mivart.] 
4. Why do building elements organize as fixed body plans and organ forms? 
5. How are new elements introduced into existing body plans? 
6. Why are design units reused repeatedly? [In reference to modularity.] 
7. Why are not all design options of a phenotype space realized? [The issue of constraint.] 
8. Why do characters long absent in a lineage reappear? [Atavisms.] 
9. Why are the rates of morphological change unequal?  
 
Reflection upon these nine difficult questions should indicate that the concept of natural selection as a filter is 
not a helpful explanation. It would be facile, for example, to answer question five by stating that new 
elements are introduced into the body plan because they are successful and if they were not successful they 
would not be incorporated. The question already acknowledges that the new elements are incorporated into 
the existing body plan, so success or fitness is conferred. The pertinent question is how these elements were 
incorporated: what are the underlying physical processes that caused these new (and to be maintained) 
features? How things come about is a different matter from how things become established. Perhaps the 
question could be reformulated to make the point here clearer: ‘How did these novel elements, which have 
now become established into the body plan, originate?’ One can now focus on the causes of the novelty and 
ask whether the ‘natural selection as a process’ version of natural selection provides the explanation. In other 
words, do a series of accumulated random mutations explain how such novel features are formed and 
                                                 
28 The text in italics is added to the original. 
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incorporated into the body plan or does one need to look outside this framework for other conjectures? This 
is an open question, of course, but the authors, by raising these fundamental questions, have in mind the 
exploration of alternative explanations. It should be noted that there is no implication of intelligent design or 
supernatural properties at work; the researchers are seeking naturalistic explanations.  
 
The Major Evolutionary Transitions 
 
In an earlier work than that above, Smith and Szathmary (1995) discuss what they call the ‘major transitions 
of evolution’. The salient ones here include the origin of chromosomes, the origin of eukaryotes, the origin of 
sex, the origin of multicellular organisms, and the origins of animals, plants and fungi from non-cell-
differentiating protista. Within a selectionist framework, the authors discuss the more unfamiliar territory (to 
neo-Darwinists) of symbiosis, autocatalysis and self-assembly. These latter inclusions are welcome but Reid 
doubts whether the explanations are satisfactory: 
 
But they do not explain how the steps were generated. Moreover they admit that paradoxical situations 
must have existed for which it is difficult to imagine what that the selective advantage might have been, 
and they invoke undefined ‘special circumstances’ to explain those situations away. (Reid 2007 p22) 
 
Reid has a point; Smith and Szathmary fail to convince one that they provide a satisfactory aetiology 
concerning these major transitions. ‘Special circumstances’ go undefined and it is not clear that there is 
‘selective advantage’ present, it is assumed by the authors but never demonstrated.  It also illustrates the need 
for a more pluralistic approach that embraces causal chains other than accumulation of successive mutations. 
Trying to apply the same explanatory formula to all biological transformations will not always succeed and, 
when it does not, one will be faced with ‘paradoxical situations’. The paradox is only there, of course, if 
one’s starting premise is that each change must necessarily include some superior advantage over the status 
quo. If one accepts that changes can take place and persist alongside the existing biological scenery, the 
paradox disappears and one can appreciate how the diversities of life have become established. When the 
eukaryotic cell originated, it did not mean death for the prokaryote; both were able to flourish and have done 
so to the present day. This also applies to all the major transitions discussed: multicellularity did not displace 
cellular singularity, meiosis did not displace mitosis, fungi did not displace protista, and so forth. New forms 
emerge and exist alongside the forms from which they emerged. Natural selection as a filter is redundant to 
such emergences, as it is uncontroversial that these events occurred and it is parsimonious not to invoke that 
the results were also selected. That much is obvious. What are under investigation and subject to possible 
controversy are the causal factors that brought these transitions about. It is also worth noting that Malthusian 
natural selection, with its emphasis on competition for diminishing resources, looks equally inappropriate as 
a model of explanation. 
 
Vestigial Organs and Pseudogenes 
 
Following on from the problem of the major evolutionary transitions, there is the issue of vestigial organs. It 
was suggested earlier that natural selection might be best considered as conservative or eliminative, i.e. 
conserving or preserving the emergence of traits that confer fitness or eliminating those traits that are 
detrimental to the organism. However, vestigial organs are a class of traits that were probably once of 
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functional significance but have become redundant over time, although they have not been divested from the 
organism. There are many examples of these. (The following empirical facts are extracted from Spinney 
2008 unless referenced otherwise). In humans, for instance, the appendix is thought to have been of value in 
digesting cellulose, in a diet mainly of plants, but redundancy ensued as diets changed to include much more 
cooked meat and fish, although the appendix remained. Male nipples and breast tissue raise an interesting 
question: does one assume that the ancestral male once breastfed? If one embraces functional explanations 
for the existence of traits, then it follows that male nipples were selected for.29 Another vestigial feature in 
humans is the paranasal sinuses. In other animals, the sinus cavities are lined with olfactory tissues, but this is 
not the case in humans and consequently the sense of smell is much diminished. The coccyx is thought to be 
a remnant of a tail which was lost as our ancestors converted to bipedalism. There are muscles in the ear that 
persist in humans but are very rarely used. Many animals can pick up and direct their ears but, apart from a 
few people who can wiggle their ears, this function has been lost in humans. (The ability to wiggle one’s ears 
is not thought to be of any advantage to survival or reproduction in humans.) It is also arguable that our four 
smaller toes are remnants of our arboreal past and that only the big toe is necessary to ensure good balance. 
Further examples of vestigial items include a third eyelid, which persists in miniature in the corner of the eye, 
a set of cervical ribs within the neck (only found in less than 1 per cent of all humans) and the palmaris 
muscle, which runs between elbow and wrist and is found in 10 per cent or so of humans. Most of us have a 
subclavius muscle that stretches from under the shoulder to the first rib; some individuals even have two. 
Wisdom teeth are thought to be a relic of a herbivorous past. The erector pili are muscles common in animals 
that cause fur to stand up and give the impression of a larger body, which is deemed useful in deterring 
predators. In humans, this manifests itself as Goosebumps. Vestigial organs or parts are by no means 
exclusive to humans; other animals carry non-functional components. Many species of whales, for instance, 
still retain hind legs, pelvis and, in some cases, feet with digits, all inherited from ancestors that were 
originally terrestrial. One curiosity from the plant world is the production of pollen by dandelions and yet the 
pollen is sterile. Dandelions basically clone themselves through a process called apomixis, which is 
reproduction without the need for fertilisation. (Asker 1992 p186-189) 
 
There are also many vestigial or pseudogenes at the molecular level. Humans have lost many of the abilities 
enjoyed by our ancestors but the genes remain, sometimes intact but unexpressed and sometimes as mutated 
remnants. For instance, the L-gulonolactone oxidase gene, the gene required for Vitamin C synthesis, and 
multiple odorant receptor genes were found as pseudogenes in humans- 
 
Our predicted ancestors, like other mammals, had a more acute sense of smell than we do now; humans 
have >99 odorant receptor genes, of which ~70% are pseudogenes. Many other mammals, such as mice 
and marmosets, have many of the same OR genes as us, but all of theirs actually work. An extreme case is 
the dolphin, which is the descendant of land mammals. It no longer has any need to smell volatile odorants, 
yet it contains many OR genes, of which none are functional — they are all pseudogenes (Freitag et al. 
1998 p635). 
 
Such non-functional vestigial organs and genes present a problem of explanation for natural selection. Bodies 
encumbered with these relics of the past are unable to divest themselves of them but, despite these 
redundancies, the organisms still manage to survive and reproduce. As a general rule only, the more complex 
                                                 
29 There are examples of male lactation in the anthropological and medical literature; some claim that males can breastfeed if the nipple 
is suitably stimulated (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=strange-but-true-males-can-lactate). 
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the organism the more difficult it is to divest non-useful parts. It is known, for example, that prokaryotes can 
divest themselves of parts of their own genomes. However, one must tread carefully, for what may appear as 
a vestigial organ in one environment may spring into life in another environment. Take Astyanax mexicanus, 
the cave fish that live in waters without light and whose eyesight degenerated over evolutionary time 
(Yamamoto et al. 2004). The evolutionary and developmental mechanisms underlying this are unknown, but 
individual mutations are now thought unlikely to be responsible, as a result of an experiment devised to see 
whether the eye had become totally redundant. The researchers were surprised by the result. Within eight 
days of transplant of a lens from a surface dwelling fish the once blind fish developed a functioning eye with 
a pupil, cornea and iris. 
 
Order: Regularities and Regularities Disturbed 
 
There are many phenomena at the molecular and biochemical level that proceed in a regular and seemingly 
ordered manner, independent of differential reproduction, which could have profound evolutionary 
consequences. A few examples will demonstrate this.  
 
The diminishing Y chromosome is a recently observed occurrence affecting male mammals in particular. It is 
not entirely clear why there has been a significant decrease in the size and number of genes in the Y 
chromosome (Russell et al 2008). To date, this has not affected fitness in any manner in humans, but the 
implications could be significant for the future. Research with amphibians indicates a more disturbing story:  
 
We investigate the effects of exposure to water-borne atrazine contamination on wild leopard frogs (Rana 
pipiens) in different regions of the United States and find that 10–92% of males show gonadal 
abnormalities such as retarded development and hermaphroditism. (Hayes et al. 2002 abstract) 
 
Whatever the culprit, be it some form of pesticide or the introduction of plastics into our environment, the 
salient point is that the consequences derive directly from the environment. This causal factor may produce 
differentiation but it may also be the death knell for a species. Another consideration is that telomere erosion 
and a regular mitotic clock could be implicated in cancer, vascular disease and diabetes in the short term; in 
the longer evolutionary term, they could be implicated in the sudden demise of a species.30 
 
Mutation rates are also considered to be of regular order, independent of any form of natural selection. 
Zuckerkandl and Pauling (1962) noticed that amino acid changes were consistent over time. The observations 
led to the hypothesis of a ‘molecular clock’, which provided the rates of change for a particular protein 
molecule over evolutionary time. Kimura (1983) expanded the hypothesis to other regularities, including 
spontaneous errors in DNA replication. The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution was accepted by most 
molecular biologists, but some evolutionary biologists found the implications too controversial and the ‘drift’ 
versus ‘selection’ debate reopened. (Hull 1999, Mayr 1991) The whole concept of molecular clocks has been 
challenged, as not all the results could be calibrated against the fossil records. Some evolutionary biologists 
                                                 
30 In 1973, Olovnikov proposed that cells lose a small amount of DNA following each round of replication due to the inability of DNA 
polymerase to fully replicate chromosome ends (telomeres) and that eventually a critical deletion causes cell death. Observations 
showing that telomeres of human somatic cells act as a mitotic clock, shortening with age both in vitro and in vivo in a replication-
dependent manner, support this theory’s premise (Harley 1991). 
 
59 
(e.g. Ayala 1999) have argued that all the rates of change can be influenced by other factors, including 
natural selection.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The demarcation between what natural selection can and cannot explain is a difficult problem. At issue is 
how to determine which causal factors to appeal to in any given case. Without a clear and single account of 
natural selection, the problem is compounded. It is unclear whether ‘selection’ or ‘selection pressures’ entails 
that an organism simply meets the prevailing conditions for existence or whether it also entails that an 
organism has superior fitness to comparable organisms. The illustration began with a list of biological 
phenomena that seem difficult to explain by recourse to traditional Darwinian methods. The major 
evolutionary transitions identified by Smith and Szathmary were deemed ‘paradoxical’ by the authors when 
they propounded selectionist explanations, leaving many challenges for evolutionary theory in general. An 
additional issue is the vestigial ‘organs’ that resist functional explanation and leave an explanation gap that 
needs to be addressed. The notion of natural selection as a filter proved redundant when faced with the 
emergence of novel forms and the notion of natural selection as a process of accumulative mutation seemed 
too narrow to explain much of the biological phenomena discussed.  
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Chapter 7: Genetic Exchange 
 
 
What is genetic exchange and why is it thought to be of evolutionary significance? Is genetic exchange part 
of the ‘modern’ synthesis? If not, then is genetic exchange not subject to natural selection? If genetic 
exchange is included within modern neo-Darwinism does one then extend the explanatory scope of natural 
selection to cover non-vertical inheritance? 
 
Genetic exchange is sometimes referred to as ‘reticulate evolution’. It includes such biological phenomena as 
hybridisation, introgression (backcrossing), horizontal or lateral gene transfer and even meiosis. As the words 
lateral and horizontal imply, the transmission of genetic material is not by means of modification with 
descent. These sideway processes, however, can all radically alter the genetic composition and the DNA 
sequencing of the organism. The possible changes range from the harmful and non-viable to the evolutionary 
emergence of new traits and species. It is the latter that concerns this study. One could argue that only a few 
biologists have appreciated the full potential of genetic exchange in the evolutionary arena, with many 
evolutionary biologists dismissing its significance.31 Moreover, when new researches establish empirical 
satisfaction, the results are nevertheless received with scepticism and marginalised as of peripheral interest 
only. It will be argued here that not only is such a dismissal a serious omission but also that genetic exchange 
has implications for how one thinks about natural selection. Genetic exchange adds to the sources of 
evolutionary pluralism, but is it compatible with or antagonistic to natural selection? Before this question is 
addressed, it is important to sketch out in a little more detail what genetic exchange entails. 
 
Symbiosis and Symbiogenesis 
 
Symbiosis covers a wide range of relationships that can exist not only between members of different species 
but also between members of different phyla. Sometimes the relationship can be mutually beneficial for both 
participating members: plants and fungi, for instance, provide each other with resources they could not access 
if they remained independent. One example is known as mycorrhiza (Jackson and Mason). Mycorrhiza is not 
always mutually beneficial, as with other forms of symbiosis; sometimes the benefits can be one-sided, with 
only one partner seeming to benefit, and sometimes the relationship can be pathogenic to one partner but not 
to the other. One recent and surprising discovery was the ubiquity of endophytes, fungi living within the 
tissues of a plant and being an integral part of the anatomy (Faeth and Fagan 2002). Furthermore, fungi have 
been found to infiltrate the seeds of some plants, thereby establishing a presence in subsequent generations. 
The relationship can be a precarious one, for on the one hand the fungus can protect the plant against 
dangerous infection and act as a defence against the invasion of other plants, but on the other hand a single 
mutation within the fungus could convert it to a predator that feeds upon and eventually destroys its host 
(Gilbert and Epel 2009 p83). When the first researchers discovered the ubiquitous genetic existence of 
endophytes, they questioned whether they were looking at plants or whether they were looking at fungi that 
had taken on the shape of plants. In fact, when one thinks of an individual organism – perhaps a human or a 
fish or an aardvark – one is given to granting the quality of uniqueness, such that entities are autonomous and 
segregated from other individuals. However, this perception may not be entirely accurate. Take the human 
                                                 
31 The last five years has seen an increased awareness of the importance of hybridisation. 
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body as an example. Adults carry up to 100 trillion micro-organisms internally and externally, reflecting 
more than a thousand different species, including worms, bacteria, amoebae, fungi and mites. It is believed 
that up to 90%, in number, of the cells in our bodies are actually bacteria.32 Bacteria start to colonise the 
intestines and colon shortly after birth, acquired in the birth canal by ingesting the mother’s vaginal and 
faecal flora, including a wholesome mix of Lactobacillus, Bifidobacterium, E. coli and Enterococcus. (Child 
and Macfarlane 2008). Passage through a mother’s abdomen provides a different assortment: hospital-
acquired micro-organisms such as Clostridium and Streptococcus. Additional types of bacteria join the gut 
flora in the first few days after birth: Staphylococcus aureus, for example, is transferred from the mother’s 
nipple during suckling, but also from the kisses and embraces of others. Child and Macfarlane suggest 
thinking of the human body as a mobile eco-system: 
 
Genetic analysis shows that our gastrointestinal tracts are home to more than 100 000 billion (1014) 
individual micro-organisms of perhaps 36 000 different species. And more than 90% of the cells in our 
bodies are non-human.[1] These bacteria form a diverse and complex ecosystem with a total gene pool 
(microbiome) more than 100 times larger than the human genome – in effect we are hybrid 
‘superorganisms.’ The types and numbers of bacteria differ from the stomach to the distal colon, reflecting 
the changes in pH, concentration of oxygen, and availability of nutrients. Small numbers persist in the 
stomach (notably Helicobacter pylori, which causes ulcers) and the small intestine, but most of these 
organisms are found in the anaerobic environment of the large intestine. (ibid  2008) 
 
Bacteria play a necessary role in everyday functions.33 Estimates show that 5–30% of the host’s daily energy 
requirements might be procured through bacterial fermentation. Intestinal bacteria also play an important role 
in suppressing dangerous micro-organisms such as other bacteria and yeasts. There are suggestions that 
bacterial colonisation is responsible for full initiation of the immune system. Antibiotics tend to be 
indiscriminate about the micro-organisms that they destroy. The adverse symptoms after a course of 
antibiotics result from the removal of the beneficial bacteria that would normally reduce the body’s ability to 
ferment carbohydrates and metabolise bile acids. In some rare instances, removal of these valuable bacteria 
by antibiotics has led to the death of the unfortunate individual. There are approximately 600 different 
species of bacteria within the mouth.34 Some are harmful, playing a role in tooth and gum diseases, but many 
are active in preventing such maladies as well as in breaking down and digesting food, absorbing the 
converted nutrients and dietary fibre, synthesising vitamins and degrading toxins.  
 
Ryan (2009) has argued that the role of the virus has been enormously important in animal evolution, 
conforming to what he calls ‘aggressive symbiosis’. (See below for further discussion on viral genetic 
exchange.) There are many examples of symbiotic relationships in nature, which demonstrates that life is not 
just a matter of predator–prey relationships, or individuals in Malthusian struggle (Sapp 1994, Weiss and 
Buchanan 2009, Wakeford 2001, Watson 2006). What is of particular interest here is symbiogenesis, for this 
illustrates instances of evolutionary novelty, where two previously distinct species can confederate or merge 
to create a wholly new species. Elysia chlorlotica, for example, is an alga/slug that evolved from ancestral 
slugs that once consumed algae. The algae subsequently permeated the slug’s organs and became an acquired 
characteristic, causing the slug to be green in colour. One interesting novel feature is that the new being does 
                                                 
32 See the Human Microbiome Project - http://www.hmpdacc.org/2012 
33 The empirical facts concerning the relationships between microbes and the health of humans are extracted from the website- 
www.hmpdacc.org/impacts_health/impact_health.php 2012. 
34 Antonie van Leeuwenhoek back in the 1600s was the first person to observe ‘animalcules’, as he called bacteria enjoying life in the 
human mouth. 
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not need to feed but can sunbathe along shorelines and derive its energy photosynthetically (Ryan 2009). 
Another well-documented example of symbiogenesis is the 25,000 known species of lichen. Lichen is the 
combination of fungi with either cyanobacteria or green algae and is not a plant as many botanists once 
believed (Russell et al., 2008 p632-633). 
 
These are just a few simple examples of symbiotic relationships in a field of research that is largely under-
studied but is proving to be of high evolutionary significance. As Margulis argues: 
 
Life evolved in the sea, but the argument is strong that interliving – symbiogenesis – made habitation of the 
hostile new dry land possible for life. Solar ultraviolet radiation, devastating desiccation and nutrient 
scarcity were much more serious problems on land 500 million years ago than they are now. 
Symbiogenesis developed the Earth’s terra firma into occupiable real estate. (Margulis 2001 p134) 
 
Another aspect of symbiogenesis operates at the microbial level. The Endosymbiotic Theory was first 
conceived by Russian botanist Mereschkowski in 1905,35 then popularised and expanded more recently by 
Margulis (1981). Endosymbiosis can be seen as a form of genetic exchange, but the term ‘confederation’ may 
be more appropriate. The theory was received with considerable scepticism by some Darwinists (see Ch.13) 
but is now almost universally accepted and endosymbiosis can be considered to be an aspect of genetic 
fusion that does not conform to evolution by vertical descent. It is now thought that Archaea36 engulfed 
bacteria, confederating its attributes and giving rise to the eukaryotic cell, with nucleus, mitochondria, 
chloroplast and all. This step is seen as of great evolutionary significance, as the eukaryotic cell is the 
foundation to multicellular organisms, such as plants, fungi and animals. Some eukaryotes, called protists, 
remained without tissue development, many unicellular but some also multicellular (Russell et al., 2008 
p559-581) (Protista is no longer considered as a separate taxonomic kingdom). This great leap of 
evolutionary speciation and variation seems difficult to explain in terms of natural selection, be it the 
Malthusian variety or the neo-Darwinian variety based upon a series of mutations gradually accumulating 
favourable outcomes. It seems to be more a matter of biochemical convergence, leading to a new form that in 
turn facilitated more diverse functions such as meiosis.  
 
Horizontal or Lateral Gene Transfer 
 
The earliest occurrence of lateral gene transfer is thought to be at the most primitive stages of life.37 Clues are 
gleaned from the observation of contemporary prokaryotes, which has shown a common process of 
‘conjugation’. This involves a donor bacterium resting alongside the host bacterium, the membranes opening 
at the join and DNA material being transferred as what is known as a plasmid, from the donor cell to the host. 
Another mechanism of transfer is through the medium of a virus. This is often referred to as ‘transduction’. 
The genetic material is thus passed horizontally or laterally and not vertically from parent to offspring. 
Fossilised evidence suggests that these earliest single-cell organisms are three-and-a-half billion years old, 
probably composed initially of RNA which provided the ability of replication (‘RNA world hypothesis’, 
Woese 1968,  Woese and Fox 1977). This situation was then thought to be superseded by prokaryotes that 
                                                 
35 See Khakhina (1993) for an overview of early Russian advocates of evolutionary symbiosis. 
36 This grouping includes methanogens – organisms that require methane rather than oxygen – and numerous extremophiles that can 
survive in austere environments, sometimes at extremely high temperatures, in some cases above 100°C. 
37 Unless otherwise referenced all the empirical data presented here is extracted from Russell et al., 2008. 
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contained DNA. Studies by Woese led to the valuable identification that the prokaryotic world consisted of 
two discrete groups of organisms, the bacteria and the Archaea (Wharton 2002). Evidence for lateral gene 
transfer did not appear until the middle of the last century, when it was discovered in Japan that antibiotic 
resistance could be passed on from one bacterium to another bacterium of a quite different species. Lederberg 
and Tatum received the Nobel Prize in 1958 for discovering, 11years earlier, how the mechanics of plasmid 
gene transfer worked. At the time, there was scepticism because their observations did not conform to the 
prevailing view that genetic material was only passed vertically. Nonetheless, exchanges within both 
prokaryotes and unicellular protists are now recognised and subject to much active research. In fact, as much 
as 25% of a prokaryote genome is thought to emanate from such lateral transfers. This has wreaked havoc for 
the traditional phylogenetic tree, and taxonomy is now more problematic than ever (see Figure 2 later). 
 
Since the time of Darwin, the evolutionary relationships between organisms have been represented as a 
tree, with the common ancestors at the base of the trunk and the most recently evolved species at the tips of 
the branches. Microbiologists have argued for a long time that this representation doesn’t really hold true 
for microbes, which often exchange genes among different species. Their claim has been that the evolution 
of these organisms is better represented by a net. Unfortunately, no-one knew exactly where to draw the 
horizontal lines in this net. (Kunin et al. 2005) 
 
Lateral gene transfer is also an evolutionary factor in other taxonomic kingdoms and evidence is mounting 
that transfer also takes place across the different biological kingdoms. Sequencing the genome has revealed 
unexpected results, including HGT insertion about 400 million years ago for vertebrates which has 
consequences for the development of the immune system in humans. (Park & Deem 2007) Park and Deem 
recall the specialised protein that bacteria use to swap genes. They argue that this is of significant 
evolutionary importance, complementing researches that have traditionally focused on random mutation of 
single base nucleotides or recombination as in meiosis. Recently, scientists at Indiana University 
Bloomington and at the University of Michigan have independently discovered another vector for gene 
transfer between members of different species – parasites: 
 
[Palmer, Stefanovic and Young] report two new examples of horizontal transfer of the important 
mitochondrial gene atp1 from parasitic flowering plants to weeds in the genus Plantago. Three Plantago 
species possess both a normal, functioning copy of atp1 and a second defective atp1 that bears a striking 
resemblance to the atp1 gene found in parasitic ‘dodders’ in the plant genus Cuscuta. Evidence suggests 
Plantago weeds acquired the defective atp1 through horizontal transfer recently – not more than a few 
million years ago. (http://scienceblog.com/4628/gene-exchange-between-species-is-aided-by-parasitism/) 
 
 
64 
 
Figure 1 
Source: http://phys.org/news107702428.html 
 
It has been suggested that the attacking parasitic cells have mechanisms that enable them to penetrate the cell 
of the host, depositing some of its own DNA. Furthermore, this DNA may actively function in protein 
production. Not only plants are subject to parasitic invasion: after much initial disbelief, it has now been 
recognised that many invertebrates may host almost the entire genome of a completely unrelated species, the 
bacteria Wolbachia. This parasite has implanted itself inside the cells of 70% of the world’s invertebrates, co-
evolving with them. There is at least one species where the parasite’s entire or nearly entire genome has been 
absorbed and integrated into the host’s. The host’s genes actually hold the coding information for a 
completely separate species. (Newman 2009.) The ironic thing here was that researchers were not looking for 
such bacterial inclusions, because they were not part of the preconceived expectations. When some strands 
were initially identified, they were dismissed as contamination without any checks to see whether this was in 
fact the case (ibid 2009). Perhaps this is an example of theory ladenness. 
 
Viral lateral transfer 
 
The discovery of retroviruses identified yet another lateral process that added to an organism’s genome. 
Again to everyone’s surprise, retroviruses are understood to make up around 8% of the human genome 
(Shapiro 2011). These viruses can invade a cell, reversing the usual course of genetic code from DNA to 
RNA. This is achieved by deployment of a special enzyme, called reverse transcriptase, that enables it to 
copy itself and then paste its own genes, which it carries in its RNA, into the host cell’s DNA (Temin and 
Mizutani 1970). If the virus infects the germ cells and the newly acquired genetic material is passed on to 
offspring, then the process is known as endogenous. Endogenous retroviruses are generally considered 
harmful to the host. Much cancer research has discovered large quantities within tumour cells, and two forms 
of leukaemia in humans are the result of such invasions. However, such infections are not always harmful; 
sometimes the invasive retroviruses can block attack from even more harmful viruses (Ryan 2004). From an 
evolutionary perspective, it is now thought that endogenous retroviruses are responsible for important 
changes, such as the origin of the placenta (Harris 1998). To summarise, ancestors of mammals laid eggs, but 
at some stage the embryo no longer created a shell but implanted itself within the mother’s womb in a rather 
parasitic manner. It was discovered in the 1970s, again to much surprise, that the layer of tissue that divides 
the womb from the embryo, the placental syncytium, was composed of a protein called syncytin which binds 
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the placental cells together. Moreover, the mechanism employed was precisely the same as that which 
enables retroviruses to bolt on to infected cells. Endogenous retroviruses thus add another dimension to the 
plurality of possibilities for evolution. Ryan is an advocate of what he calls ‘aggressive symbiosis’, arguing 
that a virus can form a permanent relationship with a host organism to the mutual benefit of both. He cites the 
example of parasitic wasps and polydnaviruses: 
 
The partnership has become so intimate that many of the viruses have entered the germ line of the wasps, 
to emerge, as fully formed viruses, when the wasp is laying its eggs. Whether the viruses live around the 
wasp ovaries, or whether they emerge from the wasp genome at the time of egg-laying, they are inevitably 
into the caterpillar prey along with the wasp’s eggs. In normal circumstances the wasp’s eggs would not 
survive – they would be detected and destroyed by the immune system of the caterpillar. But here viral 
aggression comes into play, paralysing the immune system of the caterpillar, and then taking over key 
aspects of its internal chemistry to convert it into a brood chamber for the emerging wasp larvae. The full 
complexity of the symbiosis has proved to be a source of wonder to biologists, with viruses compelling the 
caterpillar to produce sugars to feed the larvae, and even going as far as to disrupt the caterpillar’s 
hormonal system, thereby preventing its natural metamorphosis into a butterfly or moth. (Ryan 2009 p94)  
 
Although this account is quite fascinating and illustrates how unexpected behaviours can occur, the example 
stops short of any speciation event. Rather, the inclusion of the virus confers fitness upon the wasp and the 
death sentence for the infected moth or butterfly. What does seem certain, however, is that we have 
underestimated until recently the many different processes that have contributed to DNA variation and 
richness.  
 
Hybridisation 
 
Another example of under-appreciation, neglect and near dismissal is the process or processes of 
hybridisation. It can be argued that the architects of the modern synthesis saw little of evolutionary 
significance here and focused upon random mutation. This does seem very odd in retrospect, almost, as it 
were, choosing to be blind in one eye. For hybridisation offers excellent empirical examples of evolution in 
action, including speciation. It was the process that most disturbed the religious views of Linnaeus, who 
maintained that there were no new species other than those provided by providence. (Marks 1995 p9-13) 
Darwin wrote extensively on the subject, corresponded with many fellow experimenters and yet failed to give 
it an evolutionary accommodation. He was aware of the earliest experiments carried out by Koelreuter 
(1760), who crossed different strains of tobacco plants, producing viable offspring. The hybrid offspring 
were highly variable and quite unlike the parents, but if the subsequent hybrids were crossed, the features of 
the grandparents could sometimes reappear. Did Darwin exclude hybridisation because he saw evolution as 
only a gradual process slowly leading to new species? Or did he simply see a mass of empirical evidence 
before him that seemed to lack any universal trends or regularities and give the subject up in the genetic 
ignorance of his times? Whatever the reason, his decision had an impact upon the later neo-Darwinists. Mayr 
(1942) argued that the majority of hybrids produced were sterile and therefore of little evolutionary 
significance. Any backcrosses that maintained viability were of an inferior nature and the offspring would 
eventually be eliminated by natural selection. Mayr had reinvented the ‘Biological Species Concept’, first 
introduced by Wallace (1886) seeking to give some coherence to taxonomic endeavours. However, 
hybridisation presents some problems here, as Arnold illustrates: 
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A strict application of the biological species concept negates the possibility of species exchanging genes; 
reproductive isolation defines species and it is thus incorrect to speak of species exchanging genetic 
material. (Arnold 2006 p25) 
 
Today, the Biological Species Concept looks increasingly inadequate. Arguably, Botanists never really 
embraced the idea, because of what was known about greater complexities in the methods of plant 
reproduction and frequent polyploid hybridisation. Take the evolutionary history of wheat, for example. This 
has been the subject of hybridisation on two occasions, doubling its number of chromosomes spontaneously 
so it now stands at 42 (Haung et al., 2002). Another more recent example is that of Tragopogon dubius, 
commonly seen as a weed but nevertheless an instant new species. T. dubius is a 24-chromosome plant 
whose parents are distinct species, T. pratensis and T. porrifolious, which each have only 12 chromosomes 
(Bennett 2004). Plants and fungi, it seems, reproduce in a different manner from animals. Being sessile has 
its consequences, and being less restrictive over genetic exchanges between individuals of different species 
seems to be one such consequence.  
 
What also makes the Biological Species Concept even less credible is that microbiology has no association 
with it, as the creatures of study simply do not reproduce sexually. So it does look a marginalised concept 
oriented in a zoological aspect at the outset. But even here there are now serious doubts: 
 
What is becoming increasingly evident, however, is that hybridisation is not all that uncommon in animals, 
either. In recent years, many cases of substantial hybridisation between animal species have been 
documented. One recent survey indicated that almost 10% of the world’s 9500 bird species are known to 
have hybridised in nature. (Raven et al. 2005 p477) 
 
The authors above note that the work of Peter and Rosemary Grant concerning the famous Galapagos finches 
has identified that up to 2% of the finches had mated with members of finch species other than their own, 
producing fertile offspring and, to date, maintaining viability through subsequent generations. In evolutionary 
terms, this is a very significant figure compared with mutation rates that provide characters that are 
evolutionarily advantageous. Hybridisation is less rare than was previously believed, but even rare events can 
have important evolutionary consequences, as Arnold says the neo-Darwinists have always maintained: 
 
However, it is equally crucial to emphasize that the rarity of a particular event is not predictive of its 
potential evolutionary importance. If it were the case that rarity of occurrence predicted unimportance, then 
mutations that result in an increase in fitness – which of course form the basis for Darwinian or adaptive 
evolution – would be disregarded. (Arnold 2006 p27) 
 
Arguably, hybridisation events are much more prevalent than most biologists thought. The recognition here is 
that interspecific (between species) examples are much more common than intergeneric (between genera) 
examples. Intergeneric hybrids are less frequent, but still highly significant from an evolutionary perspective. 
One accidental discovery concerning salamanders illustrates that hybridisation can result in fertile offspring 
with such hybrid vigour that they became a threat to the existing species.  
 
In the middle of the 20th century, local fishermen who relied on baby salamanders as bait introduced a new 
species of salamander to California water bodies. These Barred Tiger salamanders came into contact with 
the native California Tiger salamanders, and over time the two species began to mate. ‘To give you a sense 
of the difference between these two species, they are about as closely related as humans and chimpanzees,’ 
said UT assistant professor Ben Fitzpatrick. (http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2007-09/uota-
urs091307.php, reporting on Fitzpatrick and Shaffer 2007) 
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Recent research into the Acropora corals of the Indian and Pacific Oceans has suggested that rarer species 
can successfully breed interspecifically: 
 
When we looked at the genetic history of rare corals, we found that they exhibited unexpected patterns of 
genetic diversity. This suggests that, rather than being the dying remnants of once-common species, they 
may actually be coral pioneers pushing into new environments and developing new traits by virtue of the 
interbreeding that has enabled them to survive there. (Richards et al. 2008 pp207–237) 
 
Fungi have also recently been observed to hybridise in their own fashion. Two species of yeast have yielded 
unexpected results in the laboratory. The spores from these two species joined to produce hybrid offspring 
which were then allowed to autofertilize. (Greig et al. 2002) Closer to home, there is evidence of hybrid 
zones among many primate species. The gibbon in particular has been noted and also the baboon. (Lass 
2001)  
 
Olive baboons also hybridize with yellow baboons (P. cynocephalus) in Kenya and Tanzania, most notably 
in Amboseli National Park, Kenya. Historical and long-term crossbreeding of these two species may have 
contributed to the formation of the subspecies P. cynocephalus ibeanus. 
(http://pin.primate.wisc.edu/factsheets/entry/olive_baboon)  
 
Arnold (2006 pp82–108) discusses and gives examples of hybrid fitness from micro-organisms to plants to 
animals, arguing that such products are of equivalent fitness ceteris paribus to other novel genotypes. Mallet 
(2008) argues that we could have easily underestimated the degree of hybridisation in the wild; most research 
is ‘based on morphological identification of hybrids in hunted or museum specimens’ and therefore it is 
possible that some hybrids are erroneously recorded. Further, he laments ‘as far as I know, there has been no 
concerted genetic study to verify interspecific hybrids across a large faunal group.’ From Mallet’s own 
research, he estimates recorded instances of hybrids as a percentage for species to be 25% for plants in the 
UK, 16% for butterflies in Europe, 9% for birds worldwide and 6% for mammals in Europe. 
 
On the other side of the species boundary, hybrids between many pairs of animal species (as well as plant 
species) are also known. These hybrids are often (though by no means always) fertile enough to backcross 
to the parents. Genetic studies have shown that hybridization can be evolutionarily important, leading to 
limited gene flow or introgression among species, and sometimes to hybrid speciation. (Mallet 2008) 
 
The Implications for Phylogeny 
 
Arnold has argued that our method of taxonomy based upon the phylogenetic tree is a poor representation 
and should be replaced with a web-like or mosaic model. It should be stated that Arnold is not attempting to 
replace ‘evolution by mutation’ by ‘evolution by genetic exchange’; the latter is seen as a supplement, adding 
to evolutionary richness. 
 
In the past decade, numerous research groups – studying a wide array of species complexes – have reported 
findings that indicate an evolutionary pattern best described as a web rather than a bifurcating tree … 
Because these examples include viral, bacterial, plant and animal species or variants. (Arnold 2006 p21) 
 
If genetic exchange is as pervasive as Arnold declares (and the evidence does seem fairly formidable even 
though the subject matter has not been the centre of active research), then the evolutionary implications are 
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large and none more so than those concerning phylogeny.38 Conventional ideas on taxonomy and the 
Biological Species Concept look increasingly under threat. Furthermore, it does not seem that genetic 
exchange can be easily accommodated by the inclusive fitness concept and early thoughts on the motivation 
implied by biological relatedness. All these aspects demand much consideration and evaluation to maintain 
coherence in our biological and philosophical studies.39 If the virus, the bacterium and the parasite (and 
possibly the prion) can all act as vectors of genetic exchange across kingdoms, then how would a 
representation be plotted? Kunin et al. (2005) have produced one perception of a prokaryotic tree of life, 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Source: Kunin et al. 2005 
Image: A bird’s-eye view of the tree of life, showing the vines in red and the tree’s branches in 
grey [Bacteria] and green [Archaea]. The last universal common ancestor is shown as a yellow 
sphere. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The discoveries of the last fifty years have increased our understanding of the many pathways that shape 
evolutionary change and provide novelty in both genome and phenotype. Genetic exchange takes many 
forms, from conjugation at the level of the micro-organism to hybridisation at the level of the more complex 
eukaryote. The researchers who first reported these observations were treated with much scepticism and, in 
some cases, hostility. Although acceptance was gradually accorded, the full impact of this combined research 
has only been appreciated by a few. It can be argued that Hybridisation mistakenly remains unrecognised for 
                                                 
38 See Garvey (2007 pp152–156) for a philosophical scrutiny of the taxonomic problems connected with hybridisation. 
39 See also Schilthuizen’s (2001) contribution to the empirical evidence for hybridisation. He also considers whether the many 
subspecies in nature are the result of introgression. 
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its evolutionary significance by many zoologists. Reflecting on all the recent researches and evidence 
discussed, one must ask whether a considerable revision of the Darwinian paradigm is required in order to 
accommodate these pluralistic modes of evolution. The idea of evolution moving gradually by tiny 
increments, with bifurcation into shapely branches, has never sat well with the episodic evolution suggested 
by the palaeontologists. Nor has it more recently been seen as compatible with our understanding of 
prokaryotic evolution. There are advantages in recognising evolution not as monolithic gradualism but as 
pluralistic combination of pathways capable of both slow and rapid evolutionary change. This recognition 
would do much to negate the pseudo-science of creationism, which appeals to the ‘weakness’ of the fossil 
record in an attempt to refute evolutionary theory. On the other hand, those who cherish ideas of inclusive 
fitness will be under pressure to resist the full implications of genetic exchange, for the two perspectives 
seem contrary rather than compatible. The model of genetic relatedness, it could be argued, relies heavily 
upon an oversimplified Mendelian method of inheritance and overlooks many of the complications illustrated 
here. 
 
There are several questions to be addressed in the light of all these now-recognised evolutionary processes. 
For instance, what is the relationship to natural selection? Is this evolutionary pluralism subject to natural 
selection or is each evolutionary process, as Darwin believed, distinct from natural selection? Has the 
identification of these many aspects of evolutionary change made any explanatory power of natural selection 
redundant? In the final stages of this thesis, issues of explanation and causation will be discussed in order to 
clarify the matter. 
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Form, Function and Order 
 
Chapter 8: The Constraints: Symmetry, Asymmetry and Patterns in Nature 
 
The issues of constraints can be viewed from two different perspectives. One could ask, how is natural 
selection constrained? Alternatively, how are the features of life constrained? In the former, there is the 
presumption that natural selection is the dominant factor when explaining evolutionary change. The latter 
makes no such assumption; the question addressed is the physical limitations of biological form. Regardless 
of natural selection, in our present understanding there are considered to be limits to sizes, combinations, 
speeds and processes, which it would be impossible to exceed. Gould observes that constraints can be 
positive or negative. He gives the following as an example of a negative constraint: ‘we toss a group of 
miscreants into a jail cell in order to keep them close and restrict their movements’; and the increased speed 
of fluids forced into narrow tubes as an example of a positive constraint (Gould 2002 p1026). There could be 
a problem with this distinction, however: one might ask why the increased speed of water is seen as positive 
and the reduced movement of cellmates as negative. It seems a little arbitrary; for reduced movement could 
be seen as positive and increased speed as negative under some circumstances. Despite this philosophical 
problem, seemingly all agree there are constraints of some form. The controversy begins when one assesses 
their prevalence and importance. It will be helpful to outline the basis for any claims before making any 
evaluation. To elucidate the situation, one might consider why it is that in nature there are no flying 
elephants, fire-breathing dragons or any animals that have evolved with wheels as appendages. The laws of 
aerodynamics and gravity and the physical relationships of the relevant anatomy will provide the obvious 
answer and ensure that dragons, elephants or pigs will never fly. The question concerning the evolution of a 
biological wheel is less straightforward. The difficulty arising, therefore, is just how far natural laws will 
restrict the amount of variation within nature. 
 
Structuralism as an alternative explanation to neo-Darwinism is in its formative and tentative years and not as 
yet known to a wide audience. It is important then to elucidate the main themes that underlie this perspective. 
As the name suggests, Structuralism addresses principally questions of structure, why it is that this object 
takes the form it does. This enquiry applies to all objects from a snowflake to an elephant. The objective is to 
identify recursive patterns and shapes that run through nature. Rightly or wrongly, Structuralism sees an 
evolutionary link between the inanimate and the animate, one of a natural order that constrains all form.    
Any understanding of the importance of the constraints that exist in nature must begin at the fundamental 
level, that of space. ‘Of all the constraints of nature, the most far reaching is imposed by space. For space 
itself has a structure that influences the shape of every existing thing.’ (Stevens 1974 p4) Stevens illustrates 
how Einstein and other non-Euclidean geometers changed our perceptions of space and its effects on form 
and patterning. Space is no longer seen as a neutral, passive background to life but as an integral part of 
nature’s mysteries: 
 
It turns out, however, that the backdrop, the all pervading nothingness, is not so passive. The nothingness 
has an architecture that makes real demands on things. Every form, every pattern, every existing thing pays 
a price for its existence by conforming to the structural dictates of space. (ibid. p5) 
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It was Mendeleev (1834–1907) who perhaps first broke the Kantian conceptual deadlock. His discovery of 
the periodicity of the elements led him to speculate that space was not nothingness, an empty background in 
which objects could be placed, as Kant had argued. Space was actually tiny particles that the senses could not 
directly apprehend. Arguably, this perception has been endorsed by modern physics. That space has shape 
has fundamental consequences in nature; it constrains and dictates form and pattern. ‘Nature too is similarly 
constrained. She makes cups and saddles not as she pleases but as she must, as the distribution of material 
dictates.’ (Stevens 1974 p9) Stevens outlines how the growth and development of an object (biological or 
non-biological) will conform to certain shapes dependent upon the point at which the growth begins. For 
example, if a centre grows faster than a perimeter, then the shape of a bowl or saddle will occur. A bowl or 
saddle shape will also occur if the perimeter grows more quickly than the centre. However, if the centre and 
the perimeter grow at the same speed, then a plane figure will be maintained. With this and other such 
principles in place, one can continue to an understanding of how the complex forms found in nature might 
develop. Stevens gives the examples of the mollusc shell and the human ear: 
 
Since the perimeter of the shell grows at a faster rate than the centre, the perimeter curls and wrinkles. No 
genes carry an image of how to place the wrinkles; no genes remember the shape of the shell: they only 
permit or encourage faster growth at the perimeter than at the centre. 
 
The convolutions of the outer ear arise like the convolutions in a piece of paper that has been sprinkled 
with water. The living tissue and the paper both bend and warp in accord with the differential expansion of 
their surfaces. (Stevens 1974 p9) 
 
In the inanimate world, things are different from in the animate world. The inanimate follows clearly defined 
geometric principles. For example, are there inanimate forms that exhibit five faces of symmetry? Is any 
snowflake or crystal is ever pentagonal?  It is only the animate that exhibits more complicated forms with 
five equal sides. However, in nature, these forms are rarely perfect and they often reduce to the best economy 
in the circumstances, but always within the limited ways in which matter can be distributed in space. 
 
The players perform a limited repertoire: pentagons make most of the flowers but not of the crystals: 
hexagons handle most of the repetitive two dimensional patterns but never by themselves enclose three 
dimensional space. On the other hand, the spiral is the height of versatility, playing roles in the replication 
of the smallest virus and in the arrangement of matter in the largest galaxy. A look behind the footlights 
reveals that nature has no choice in the assignment of roles to players. Her productions are shoestring 
operations, encumbered by the constraints of three dimensional space, the necessary relations among the 
size of things, and an eccentric sense of frugality. In the space at nature’s command, five regular 
polyhedrons can be produced, but no more. Seven systems of crystal can be employed, but never an eighth. 
Absolute size decrees that the lion will never fly nor the robin roar. Every part of every action must abide 
by the rules. (ibid. p4) 
 
In nature, there are limited possibilities, favourites often reoccurring in different guises, meeting economy 
and fitting the circumstances. How far does this determinism pervade? Is life as we know it consigned to no 
other choices? Do the fundamental regularities explain convergence in biological forms? At this point, it is 
appropriate to examine some identified regularities in nature and to determine whether they impose any 
constraints upon evolutionary changes. Graham Scarr (2012) considers the geometrically constrained 
Platonic solids to be some of the fundamental building blocks of nature and biological form- 
   
The ancient Greeks considered that just five shapes could describe everything in the universe because they 
were pure and perfect; they are the basis for understanding more complex forms in biology. The platonic 
solids naturally form in 3-D through the efficiencies of geodesic close-packing and principles of 
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symmetry. Three spheres pack together to form a triangle and four spheres as a tetrahedron. Adding more 
spheres allows other shapes to emerge because of the similar packing arrangement. The outer faces of each 
one are all the same with just 3, 4 or 5 sides and each vertex is formed from 3, 4 or 5 faces. The models 
shown here are made from ping-pong balls or ball bearings joined with magnetic sticks; the magnets 
represent the energy bonds that join them into a lattice.  
 
  
Figure 3. Source: Scarr, 2012. http://www.tensegrityinbiology.co.uk/geodesic.html. 
Indeed, to summarise Scarr, the 3D or topological is constrained at this level but combinations of these forms 
can begin to explain the more complex forms one finds in nature and life. The icosahedron for instance can 
combine to form a helix, which is fundamental to DNA and protein structure. Spheres, when packed in fours, 
form the shape of a tetrahedron which when further combined can form lattice structures and helixes that 
could be left or right handed. Chirality is fundamental to stereochemistry and biology. (See below) 
 
What is Symmetry? 
 
Lima-de-Faria’s (1988) challenge is that the concepts of symmetry and asymmetry are fundamental to 
evolutionary change. This perspective has recently been embraced by molecular biologists Li and Bowerman 
(2010). Symmetry is precursory for form but asymmetry is necessary for change. Symmetry must be broken 
before evolution can begin40. These concepts may seem far removed from our biological concerns, so it will 
be instructive to see why they are thought by some to be related. Symmetry has long been recognised in the 
arts as something desirable and aesthetically pleasing. In geometry and topology, it has been observed as a 
fundamental quality.41 
 
Modern physics has confirmed that at its deepest levels, the universe runs on symmetric lines. Principles of 
symmetry govern the four forces of nature (gravity, electro-magnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear 
forces that act between fundamental particles); the quantum mechanics of elementary particles; the nature 
of space, time, matter, and radiation; and the form, origin, and the ultimate destiny of the universe. We 
don’t know why but we are pretty sure that it is so. (Stewart 1998 p38) 
 
Symmetry suggests equality, consistency, invariance and regularity in pattern. These descriptions apply not 
only to physical objects but also to the more abstract applications of mathematics and theoretical physics. In 
symmetry’s purest form, one might think of a perfect sphere placed upon a table. If one were to observe the 
sphere from one end of the table then proceed to observe the sphere from the opposite end of the table, one 
would notice that, from whichever perspective one took, the sphere would always remain the same. This 
invariance is attractive to those who maintain that the laws of nature do not vary from context to context. 
                                                 
40 For a recent discussion of the relevance of symmetry breaking for biology see Werner (2012).  For a more fundamental philosophical 
discussion see Chalmers (1970).  
 
41 Its practical implications, however, were not recognised until the nineteenth century, with Louis Pasteur discovering its significance 
for chemistry. This observation was followed, chronologically, by mathematicians in the 1920s, who were trying to come to terms with 
the new challenges of quantum theory. From exercises in Babylonian quadratic equations, they were able to formulate what is known as 
group theory. This work, grounded in principles of symmetry, facilitated the equations of the mathematician/physicist Paul Dirac. 
Without realising, at first, the potency of his equations, Dirac had predicted the existence of anti-matter, opening a new era in particle 
physics. Physics flourished with the patterns that symmetry yielded. See Farmelo (2009). 
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These laws are said to be ‘invariant’, meaning that, whether applied yesterday or today, they will still apply 
in the future; or further, that they will apply equally in different geographical locations, be it the village hall, 
the North Pole or the centre of a black hole. This contention may not be entirely without controversy, for 
some have raised the spectre of ceteris paribus (Cartwright 1980). However, this consideration need not 
concern us for the present purposes.  
 
 
Figure 4 
Source: http://www.goldenmeangauge.co.uk/platonic.htm 
The platonic solids are all said to be symmetric because each has faces that are equal in every 
measurement. Curiously, there are only the five despite attempts by the ancient Greeks and 
others to discover more. It is now realised that further such solids would be geometrically 
impossible to form: nature constrains at the deepest levels. 
 
A sphere, then, is an example of symmetry at its purest, but this is not so for a circle drawn on a piece of 
paper and placed horizontally on the table. If one observed the circle from directly above, it would maintain 
the form of a circle; but if one stepped to the side and viewed the paper from an angle, then one would 
observe an elliptical shape. This does not mean, however, that the circle is asymmetrical, because symmetry 
can take other guises. The circle is said to contain axes of symmetry. This means that if one were to cut the 
circle with any straight line going through the centre, then the resulting two halves would be identical in 
every respect. 
 
An oval plane does not afford the infinite number of equal divisions of the circle: only two lines of axis are 
possible with this figure, one through the centre vertically and the other through the centre horizontally. An 
equilateral triangle has three axes but an isosceles triangle only one. Consider the capital letters. Many of 
them have at least one axis; for example, the letter A can have one axis from the apex dropping vertically, but 
the letter D must be cut horizontally to achieve two symmetrical parts. The letters F G J L P Q R are all 
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asymmetrical. The importance of these fundamentals is not initially obvious when considering biological 
issues, but their value becomes more apparent when one considers bilateral and mirror symmetries.  
 
Mirror Symmetry 
 
Looking in a mirror gives a reflection of oneself. However, the image is not the image that others see in 
everyday acquaintance. To see how one looks to others, an interesting simple experiment is to place two 
mirrors at right angles and then look at where the mirrors join. The image now seen is horizontally opposite 
to the one normally seen in the single mirror. This is how the world sees you. Mirror symmetry reverses any 
left-to-right bias. A mole or freckle on the left cheek will be on the right cheek in the reflection. Holding up 
the open left hand to the mirror gives a right hand in the reflection. Apart from the left-to-right ordering, 
everything else remains the same; the overall dimensions and the relationship between the parts are identical.  
 
Not all things in nature have a right–left bias. The starfish is said to have fivefold symmetry, but in a mirror 
reflection it looks exactly the same. In both the organic and inorganic world, symmetries up to thirteenfold 
can be detected. It is worth noting, however, that unlike the perfect sphere, things in the natural world are 
never perfectly symmetrical. Nature comes with imperfections and each imperfection locks away a hidden 
history. It is tempting to say that symmetry is the default position and the rigours of life inflict the toll of 
imperfection.  
 
In the nineteenth century, Pasteur (1822–95) discovered attributes regarding the symmetry of crystals within 
chemistry that would later have enormous implications for biology and, in particular, human welfare. Pasteur 
followed on from the work begun by Hauy (1743–1822), originally a botanist, who turned his attentions to 
physics and chemistry. Hauy wanted to know whether the regular patterns and geometric structures bursting 
forth in the plant kingdom every spring could indicate similar laws of nature for minerals also. (Later 
thinkers, such as Turing and Lima-de-Faria, asked the opposite question: can the study of minerals yield 
answers in biology?) 
 
How does the same stone, the same salt, assume the form of prisms or of the needles without changing its 
composition by one atom, while the rose always has the same petals, the acorns the same shape, the cedar 
the same height and the same development? (Reprinted in Debre 1998 p35) 
 
The following historical sketch summarises Debre (1998}. Hauy found his answer quite by accident, when he 
dropped a piece of calcareous spar that had crystallised into prisms. He observed that the geometric structures 
of the fractured parts were exactly the same as those of other crystals he was already familiar with. By way of 
this insight, he smashed open his entire collection to discover that all contained the geometric shape of a 
rhomboid. Hauy had discovered a symmetrical law that explained certain form or structure. The principle of 
symmetry in science took a great step forward. However, it was not long before an anomaly perplexed those 
in the field and threatened to undermine all that had been achieved within chemistry. It was noticed that 
tartaric acid polarised light in a certain direction but paratartaric acid did not. The curious thing was that both 
acids had exactly the same chemical composition and crystalline form. So why did one polarise light and the 
other not? Pasteur was familiar with the work of Hauy but his brilliance went further, with an intuition 
relating geometric form to chemistry. In an experiment, Pasteur isolated right- and left-handed crystals in 
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separate prepared solutions. Shining a light through both, Pasteur’s intuitions proved correct: the right-
handed crystals polarised light to the right and the left-handed crystals exactly the opposite. Pasteur had 
discovered the principle of molecular asymmetry that established the concept we now call stereochemistry. 
The foundation of stereochemistry by Pasteur has proved to have enormous implications not only for our 
health and diets but also for the evolution of biological forms. As Close (2000 p69) puts it, ‘Handedness 
pervades the living world and has some bizarre manifestations. We can smell it and taste it, while forensic 
science and the whole pharmaceutical industries rely on it.’ 
 
What does this entail? Well, an example is the drug thalidomide that was given to pregnant mothers during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s to reduce morning sickness. The results were a disaster, with huge numbers of 
fetal deaths and the surviving babies born deformed, many with no limbs. It was not realised at the time that 
the molecular structure of the drug comes in both left- and right-handed forms. One form is pernicious to the 
human body but the other is not and is actually now prescribed to treat leprosy42. Organic bodies such as 
humans have evolved to interact with compounds of a particular hand.43 Close gives the example of how our 
noses perceive things. The nose itself is constructed of proteins that are themselves mirror asymmetric, which 
enables us to distinguish between left- and right-handed molecules. Carvone comes in two handed forms: our 
olfactory organs identify one as caraway and the other as spearmint. Another example is the nature of sugar. 
Dextrose is a sugar from grapes that polarises light to the right, whereas levulose or fructose is found in fruit 
and polarises light to the left.44 Although the molecules are identical, our bodies interact differently with each 
enantiomorphic form. (Gardener p119) Moreover, both forms taste the same but dextrose can be harmful in 
large quantities to diabetics. Dextrose is also more easily converted to energy, whereas levulose is more 
beneficial for those attempting to lose weight. Levulose is noted to do less damage to teeth, as it does not 
interact with the harmful bacteria that have co-evolved in our bodies. The question is, ‘why can we 
accommodate molecules of one hand but not the opposite hand?’ or even ‘why can we not interact with both 
handed forms of molecules?’ The answer is intriguing and revolves around the concept that Lord Kelvin 
named as chirality.45 
 
Since every asymmetric molecule has a mirror-image stereoisomer, there is no reason why all life on earth 
could not function just as well if all organisms were suddenly transformed into their mirror images. Of 
course, if only a single organism, say a man, were reflected, he would probably not be able to survive. 
(Gardner 1990 p133) 
 
One suggestion is that, just as it is postulated that symmetry at the time of the Big Bang required an 
asymmetric breaking, life also required its own asymmetry. Once an asymmetry is established, it begets 
further asymmetries and this process is ongoing. However, it should be remembered that asymmetries can 
also be manufactured from symmetric origins. Gardner (p53 – 63) observes that plants are capable of 
converting compounds that can be symmetric, such as carbon and water, into compounds that are 
asymmetric, such as starches and sugars. Another clue to the relationship between the symmetric and the 
asymmetric might be gleaned from a transformation after death: living bodies are a community of left- or 
                                                 
42 The dark story of thalidomide and the medical aftermath are discussed by Stephens,T and Brynner (2001). 
43 See also Buckingham (2005 p215) for a modern chemist’s discussion of handedness of DNA. 
44 Dexter and laevus are Latin for right and left respectively. 
45 From the Greek for hand – kheir. 
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right-handed compounds and helices that exert a bias; however, this all changes after death, when symmetry 
is eventually realised. 
 
When an organism dies, the molecules of certain of its amino acids start to ‘flip’ (change handedness) at a 
very slow but fairly uniform rate. After millions of years, these amino acids eventually become racemic, 
containing about an equal proportion of left and right molecules. (ibid. p119) 
 
Chirality, then, is lost after death. Does this mean therefore that chirality is a necessary condition for life?46 
What is important here is that, once organisms are locked into a particular chirality, all subsequent 
reproductions will also follow that form until death. This fundamental constraint has profound implications 
as to how organisms and species will interact within the world and any future evolution. McManus is aware 
of these fundamental issues and ponders the example of the amino acids that persist in all organisms, 
touching on constraints within nature: 
 
The genetic code and the entire translation machinery are based on L-amino acids. As far as we can tell, 
that is true for every organism on this planet. Such a complete dependence on L-amino acids raises many 
fundamental questions for biology, the answers to which stretch beyond biology itself, both outside our 
solar system and deep into sub-atomic physics. (McManus 2002 p128) 
 
One has also to be cautious and not overestimate the significance of chirality. For example, after the 
thalidomide disaster, further tests demonstrated that the drug is not a teratogen in the majority of species 
tested, which includes closely related primates. (Stephens and Brynner) This is odd and one now has to 
explain why human chirality is different from the chirality of our closely related species. 
 
Bilateral Symmetry 
 
It has been seen how organisms show a bias internally, possessing chirality, but this is not the case for the 
external body form. Nearly all Chordata display a bilateral symmetry. The symmetries are never perfect: for 
example, in humans, one foot may be a tad larger than the other, one ear slightly higher, one arm fractionally 
longer. Some minor asymmetries can be difficult to explain: for instance, the testes of the human are at 
different heights and there seems to be no clear agreement over which spacing is most common; however, 
equal height is very rare, but once again there is no clear consensus why this is so. (McManus 2002 p94) 
 
Bilateral symmetry, or near symmetry, is near ubiquitous among higher animals but there are some 
fascinating exceptions. Wherever there is a limb on one side of a body, there is nearly always a 
corresponding limb of equal proportions on the other side. Consider any creature that flies, be it an insect, 
bird, bat or pterosaur: all have symmetrical wings. It could be argued that symmetry here is essential for 
flight, which may be true, but one must remember that flightless birds also have symmetry of wing. (The 
following summarises Blackstone 2007, Close 2000,  DeSalle and Schierwater 2007). Wherever there is a 
pair of horns in ruminants, say, they are equal in proportions. It should also be noted that these near 
symmetries are not just features of contemporary life but have persisted through millennia going back to the 
Cambrian. Even the pre-Cambrian has examples of bilateral symmetry in certain fauna, with other life forms 
                                                 
46 Gardner suggests that this change from chirality could be a useful tool in prediction, as there is a regularity that would lend itself to 
the dating of fossils. One problem he concedes, however, is that external rigours in the immediate environment could disrupt uniform 
transitions. 
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exhibiting radial symmetry. It is not only the appendages that constitute symmetry; most body plans also 
conform to such regularities. Consider the head, thorax and abdomen of insects, the cephalothorax and 
abdomen of Chelicerata (arachnids, horseshoe crabs and sea spiders) or the arrangement of the anatomy of 
vertebrates. Colour can manifest itself bilaterally (think of the butterfly wing, chiclid fish, the zebra, the tiger, 
a peacock’s tail and so forth). The organs of perception, be they auditory, olfactory or visual, nearly always 
come in pairs located bilaterally. Further, are there any examples of asymmetric dentures? One is hard 
pressed to think of a creature that does not have teeth aligning both sides of the mouth. Even the shapes of 
tongues, tails and flagella conform to this topology. Also, the vast majority of plant leaves are symmetrical 
when folded along the centres. Despite this prevalence of different forms of symmetry in nature, this 
topology is not universal. Why is it, then, that most organisms conform to some form of symmetry but a few 
do not? Trees and bushes are often ascribed symmetry to their overall form but it does seem to invite the 
criticism that this ascription goes beyond any meaningful definition of symmetry. Many trees take quite 
irregular overall shape, especially the deciduous, either temperate or tropical. A hedge loses symmetry all too 
soon after trimming. The asymmetries of life and some of the explanations put forward for them will now be 
considered, before a discussion of consistent growth patterns, including phyllotaxis. 
 
Asymmetries in Nature 
 
Just as one begins to think there are some underlying universal laws that might account for a variety of 
phenomena, one discovers in nature an anomaly that seems inconsistent with the observations. The narwhal 
provides such a case. First, it best be noted that the narwhal’s ‘horn’ is not a horn at all, but a tooth of great 
size, reaching up to eight or nine feet. It manifests itself in the male, but also, very rarely, two tusks have 
been found on both male and female narwhals. The anomalous feature of these dual tusks is that they are not 
symmetrical: the screw-threaded nature of the tusk runs the same way in each – they are not mirror images of 
each other. (See Thompson next chapter). 
 
 
Figure 5 
Source: http://www.curiousexpeditions.org 
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Second, all ordinary teeth in other creatures have a natural curvature, which becomes evident with growth. 
Not so the narwhal: its tusk remains straight, albeit with a right-handed, low-leaning screw or helix with 
several threads. Furthermore, these tusks are seated in the socket or alveolus of the upper jaw and are 
protected from many external physical forces. So how does one explain these singularities? Thompson 
(1961) suggested several hypotheses but admitted none was conclusive.  
 
(The details in the following paragraph are summaries from Gardener 1990, Riehl 2100) Porifera is the 
phylum of the sponges which inhabit mostly the marine, but some 150 species have taken to fresh water.47 
They first appeared up to 650 mya, surviving the five great mass extinctions. Their bodies are without 
distinct tissue or organ, taking the form of an asymmetrical sack with an internal cavity. Their porous bodies 
admit water and nutrients. Fungi and lichen both manifest irregular form in many instances, lichen invariably 
so. The popular image of the mushroom or toadstool obscures the many asymmetrical forms of fungi, as 
illustrated by the fungi that live on tree trunks, such as Pleurotus ostreatus, often referred to as the oyster 
mushroom. Truffles and morels from the group Ascomycota rarely exhibit symmetrical features and members 
of the group Chytridiomycota take a form very similar to that of a plant with branching at regular angles. 
Coral exhibits similar form to both fungi and sponges, branching in some instances. These sessile creatures 
seem not to have acquired bilateral symmetry. Among the molluscs, many of the Gastropoda shells curl, 
twist and spiral, often taking the most delightful shapes. The shell of the nautilus has intrigued and tantalised 
both biologists and mathematicians with its logarithmic spiral and fidelity to the golden number. However, 
one must remember that the creature living inside retains symmetrical proportions whilst the shell builds by 
uneven incremental deposits.  
 
Similar to the narwhal, the male fiddler crab displays an unusual asymmetrical feature, this time in the form 
of a rather extraordinary front claw. This disproportionate claw is unique in its size amongst crabs, but the 
ghost crab also sports an asymmetrical, although smaller, front claw. Another peculiar feature of the fiddler 
crab is that if the large claw is lost, then another large claw grows on the opposite side, although not 
necessarily as large as the original. (Zhong 2009) 
 
 
Figure 6 
Source: http://etc.usf.edu/clipart/8200/8250/fiddler_crab_8250.htm 
 
                                                 
47 Porifera is taken from the Latin porus for ‘pore’ and ferre for ‘to bear’. 
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Explaining Symmetry and Asymmetry 
 
Following this rather brief sketch of the features in this investigation, one can reasonably ask why it is that 
the varied forms of symmetry are so pervasive in nature, with asymmetrical forms being very much in the 
minority. One explanation draws on the influence that gravity exerts upon all forms. This argument was 
articulated by Thompson (1961), but here Gardner picks up the thread: 
 
On another planet, as on earth, the same factors would operate to produce such symmetry. Gravity would 
provide a fundamental difference between up and down. Locomotion would create a fundamental 
difference between front and back. The lack of any fundamental asymmetry in the environment would 
allow the left and right symmetry of bodies to remain unaltered (Gardner 1990 p59). 
 
Gravity influences the vertical but has no influence upon the horizontal, or at least not directly. There is no 
bias here, so one would expect both sides of a body to result with similar features. It is argued that the 
relationship between locomotion and gravity partly determines the form. Gardner does not state whether he 
believes this manifestation of bodily form to be a direct adaptation (following Thompson), caused by gravity 
or an adaptation caused by natural selection.  It is apparent that groups such as the Porifera, lichen and 
certain fungi (mentioned above) share sessile and asymmetric qualities. Their stationary status means they 
are susceptible to physical forces other than gravity that may act upon them. Water turbulence in the form of 
currents, erosion or rainfall is an obvious example. A creature not anchored to the ocean floor would find 
itself swept along with the ebb and flow, assuming a more spherical symmetry which conforms to the radial. 
Indeed, the empirical evidence supports such relationships in many cases but not quite all. The free floaters 
of the seas – such as jellyfish and members of the Eleutherozoa, including starfish – all conform, but the sea 
anemone is sessile and yet of radial symmetry. In the quotation above, Gardner says that ‘locomotion would 
create a fundamental difference between front and back.’ However, it could also be argued that the causal 
chain was the other way around, with the advent of front and back facilitating locomotion, as sessile 
organisms such as the phoronids possess a front for feeding. The colonisation of land that followed the 
emergence from the marine was thought to endorse the bilateral status of motile life. On land, the effects of 
gravity are not mitigated by buoyancy as they are in the sea; any directed locomotion requires appendages 
and hence particular forms of anatomy. As an illustration of this point, consider the whale, a mammal that 
returned to the sea some 50 million years ago. 48An examination of its vertebrae shows how 
disproportionately small the bone structure is in relation to overall body size. (Thompson 1961 p25) Compare 
this with the whale’s closest living relative, the hippopotamus, or the whale’s ancestor Pakicetus, both 
terrestrial and under the influence of gravity without any counteraction from buoyancy. Their proportion of 
bone relative to overall size is far greater. Further, the whale has retained certain vestigial features such as the 
pelvis, hind legs and hands; these too are all disproportionately small. 
 
If gravity is a plausible explanation of bilateral symmetry, how does one explain the asymmetry of the 
narwhal or the fiddler crab? One could argue the claw of the fiddler crab resulted from female sexual 
selection. Assumedly, the female crab noticed a small increment in size of the particular claw, which itself 
was the result of a mutation, and gave preferential mating to the mutated male. This in turn allowed the 
feature to be passed on to later generations. At some stage, another mutation led to a further increment in size 
                                                 
48An excellent site for quick reference of evograms: http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/evograms_03 
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and this too was seized upon by the female … and so forth, resulting in the asymmetry that is manifest today. 
However, there are several problems with this explanation. Why, for example, does the crab grow an 
asymmetrical claw on the opposite side if the original claw is lost? Also, why is the second growth rarely as 
large as the first? Is there a well-documented fossil record of crabs with claws at the intermediate stages of 
evolution? A further constraint seems not to be explained by sexual selection: the asymmetrical claw grows 
in accordance with the laws of allometry. (The subject of allometric growth and scaling will be considered in 
Chapter 10.) There is also a deeper problem for advocates of sexual selection, if it is argued that both sexes 
strongly select for symmetry rather than asymmetries, which deviate from the norm and may not promise 
reproductive success. Why does the female crab break from the safer option of symmetry? Trying to explain 
the asymmetry of the fiddler crab claw by means of sexual selection unfortunately raises more problematic 
questions than it solves. The situation of the narwhal is even more bizarre and elusive of explanation, for it is 
sometimes the female that manifests the second asymmetrical horn-like tooth. Is there then a more 
satisfactory explanation? 
 
Maybe the reasons behind these asymmetries are not known. Sessions and Ruth (1990) had become 
perplexed by the fairly sudden occurrence of limb anomalies amongst both frogs and salamanders. In some 
extreme cases, the asymmetry included three limbs to one side and nine to the other. Examination of the pond 
water demonstrated that adulteration from toxins could not be held responsible. It was discovered later that 
both species were infected by a parasitic flatworm, leaving metacercarial cysts that interfered with the normal 
development of limb buds.  
 
A wide range of limb abnormalities are seen, including duplicated limb structures ranging from extra digits 
to several extra whole limbs. We hypothesize that these limb abnormalities result from localized regulatory 
responses of developing and regenerating limb tissues to mechanical disruption caused by the trematode 
cysts. We have tested this idea by implanting inert resin beads into developing limb buds of frogs and 
salamanders. Since this treatment can cause supernumerary limb structures, our hypothesis is sufficient to 
explain the naturally occurring extra limbs. (Sessions and Ruth 1990 abstract) 
 
It is not, of course, being suggested that the asymmetries of the narwhal and the fiddler crab are the result of 
parasitic infection, but merely that physical causes from perhaps environmental factors can precipitate 
morphological changes. Indeed, other studies have witnessed similar rapid asymmetrical limb developments 
but without any evidence of the presence of the trematode flatworm. 
 
Another difficult problem for both the structuralist and the selectionist is that although most external features 
of Animalia conform to bilateral symmetry, some internal features do not. Many vertebrates have their organs 
distributed asymmetrically – in humans, for instance, the heart and stomach are to the left and the liver to the 
right. This arrangement contrasts with that of invertebrates whose organs follow the central line, the famous 
drosophila being entirely symmetrical but for its penis which rotates clockwise during development. 
McManus sums up the evolutionary stages of symmetry: 
 
The body plans of animals have therefore evolved in three distinct phases. The first stage, the simplest, 
shows only radial symmetry. The second stage shows bilateral symmetry, the organs being arranged 
symmetrically to right and left of the mid-line. The third stage, characterised by the vertebrates, involves an 
external symmetry coupled with a gross internal asymmetry of the viscera. (McManus 2002 p95) 
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How does one explain asymmetries such as the heart being located to the left in humans? Further, how was 
symmetry broken internally in the evolution of vertebrates? One cannot argue that the human heart functions 
with advantage to the left side, for a few people have their internal organs in the opposite mirror position and 
they live quite normal lives, with their fitness unaffected. However, it is more difficult to explain why 
asymmetrical positioning for some internal organs is the norm for vertebrates but not for invertebrates.  
 
In summary, one can conclude, that symmetry is pervasive, featuring in a range of fields from mathematics to 
complex biological forms. It is the asymmetries that provide the mystery and the challenge. What should be 
taken as evolutionarily significant are the internal asymmetry and chirality, which is a fundamental constraint 
and determines how our handed bodies interact with external handed molecules. 
 
Patterns in Nature 
 
It can be argued that entropy rebuts evolutionary changes, but this assertion seems to rest upon a 
misunderstanding that biological entities operate within closed systems. In fact, there is only one closed 
system and that is the entire cosmos. So, to the contrary, entropy is a necessary ingredient for evolutionary 
change and complexity. 
 
A useful way to think about symmetry is in terms of structure and complexity. The more symmetry a 
system possesses, the simpler and less structured it is: compare, for example, the symmetric figure of a 
circle with an irregular polygon. Raising the temperature of a physical system reduces structure and 
destroys complexity: think how much simpler a glass of water is than a tumbler full of ice cubes. (Davies 
2007 p183)  
 
The very early universe was so hot that everything we know was literally in the melting pot (well, the 
vaporization pot). All the richness, diversity and complexity of the universe we now see lay in the future: 
uniformity was the order of the day. (ibid. p184) 
 
The universe at its origins was at its most symmetrical but, as the second law of thermodynamics dictated, 
temperatures decreased, entropy ensued and expansion was inevitable. Although symmetry was broken, it did 
not mean there would be no further symmetries; neither did it mean there would be an absence of regularities. 
In fact, in the complexities that followed, there are many patterns and regularities, but they are not 
necessarily symmetric. Consider the spirals that exist at the macro level with galaxy formation or at the micro 
level with the helical structure of DNA. A brief outline of some of the major pattern formations in nature will 
help elucidate the structuralist thesis. 
 
Phyllotaxis 
 
Phyllotaxis is derived from phyllon, a Greek word for leaf, and taxis, meaning arrangement or order. The 
diversity of plant life can be quite surprising, considering that the leaves around a stem are nearly always 
arranged in one of only four basic ways. In distichous phyllotaxis, leaves or other botanical appendages grow 
successively, each at 180 degrees from the previous one. This is common amongst grasses. A more frequent 
pattern consists of whorls (circles), two or more of which grow at the same point on the stem. Their number 
can vary from species to species, but can also vary within a species or even within an individual specimen. In 
some instances, there can be clusters of six at one point and up to twenty at another point. These outgrowths 
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are evenly spread and the next layer always situates midway between the earlier configurations. Multijugate 
phyllotaxis includes two or more appendages that grow at the same point. These parts of a whorl are spread 
evenly around the stem and each whorl is at a constant divergent angle from the previous one, which can give 
a misleading appearance of spiral patterning. The most common formation is the spiral. Leaves or other 
elements are sequentially placed, normally at a consistent divergent angle of 137.5 degrees. This is close to 
the ‘golden angle’ giving rise to the Fibonacci sequence. The golden angle has special importance for 
mathematicians but also has implications for biological structures. For a seed head to maximise available 
space and retain energy efficiency, sequential numbering such as the Fibonacci sequence is requisite. 
(However, nature is not confined to this sequencing; the Lucas sequence can also occur, but more rarely.) 
The Fibonacci sequence contains the numbers 0 1 1 2 3 5 8 13 21 34 55 89 144 and so forth. Each number is 
achieved by adding the two previous lower numbers: as an example, 13 is the sum of 8 and 5; then 13 added 
to 8 produces the next number in the series, 21. Significantly, these numbers occur in many structures in 
nature not by chance but as an integral part of the topology. Many plants conform to these numbers with the 
arrangement of their petals within the flower. The lily and iris always have three petals, the primrose and 
buttercup five, and so forth.49 
 
Fibonacci numbers are not an accident; they are consequences of universal geometry, the crystallography 
of plant structures. Indeed plants can no more avoid Fibonacci numbers than salt crystals can avoid being 
cubical. (Stewart 1998 p130) 
 
50This is probably not quite strictly true because the Fibonacci sequence is not universal to all plant life, but 
what is important is that once a plant begins its growth, say, with three buds then any further buds at the same 
locus will conform to an arrangement of five, eight, thirteen and so forth. Smaller pine cones begin with a 
spiral bud arrangement of five in one direction and eight in the opposite direction, whereas a larger pine cone 
will always conform to eight and thirteen spirals. Once a plant is locked into a Fibonacci or, for that matter, a 
Lucas sequence, it always conforms to the numbers dictated by the laws of topology. Some observers have 
extended the importance of Fibonacci numbers within nature to a relationship with proportions related to 
what is known as the ‘golden section’. Dividing any Fibonacci number by the number immediately below it 
in the sequence always results in 1.62 (rounded up). This is known as Phi, the ‘golden number’ 
(1.6180339887…), which has almost mystical connotations in some circles. More significantly, the number 
has a widespread presence, permeating geometry, mathematics, music, cosmology, architecture and design. 
The biological world also feels its influence, with some arguing that morphology often follows proportions 
related to Phi. Are these relationships simply correlations with Phi, or is there an explanation for its great 
frequency but not universal occurrence? To date, no one has solved this question satisfactorily, but it is 
generally accepted that the answer lies outside any genetic explanation. The formation of the spiral shells of 
molluscs such as the nautilus can be seen to follow a patterning that includes the golden angle and an 
expression of Phi through the ‘golden section’. Ball (1999) noticed that the physicists Douady and Couder 
also demonstrated how spiral patterns could be achieved by dropping tiny droplets of magnetic liquid onto a 
disk with a film of oil covering it. Depending upon the speed of dispersal, the droplets formed the same 
divergent angles that one sees in rare leaf formations or spiral phyllotaxis. Ball said of these experiments: 
 
                                                 
49 See Jean (1994) for an in-depth view on the subject from a mathematician. 
50 The details for this paragraph, unless quoted otherwise, are summarised from Vajda (1989) 
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Their findings imply that a plant need not somehow ‘know’ from the outset that the 137.5 degree spiral 
phyllotaxy is the best choice – on the contrary, the dynamics of the growth process automatically select this 
angle. (Ball 1999 p108) 
 
Ball also discounts a genetic explanation for phyllotaxis: 
 
Phyllotaxis, therefore, contains a hidden mathematical pattern for which we are unlikely to find an 
explanation by rooting around in the genetics of plant developmental biology. It seems there is some more 
universal basis to these observations. (ibid. p107) 
 
 
Figure 7 
Source: http://ceng.calpoly.edu/ 
When a golden rectangle is progressively subdivided into smaller and smaller golden 
rectangles, a pattern is obtained. From this, a spiral can be drawn which grows 
logarithmically, where the radius of the spiral, at any given point, is the length of the 
corresponding square to a golden rectangle. 
 
Early in the twentieth century, Thompson sought to provide explanations of form that could be understood 
through mathematics and physical forces. He was sceptical that Darwinism and explanations based upon 
genetic considerations were sufficient to explain many of the structures in nature. One of the many examples 
he employed was the explanation of the formation of the spiral shape of the mollusc shell. The shell is dead 
organic matter but its shape conforms to the golden number that the spiral shape can be plotted on the 
intersections of a series of rectangles conforming to the golden section (see Figure 7). 
 
Stripes, spots and dappling 
 
Much has been said by zoologists about the value of animal colouration and its advantages of camouflage 
and physical attraction. However, these considerations do little to illustrate how stripes, spots and dappling 
originated. In the 1950s, Turing, famous for his work on mathematics and computation turned his attention in 
that direction. He sought to provide a ‘mathematical theory of embryology’ that would explain gastrulation, 
polygonally symmetrical structures such as the starfish, leaf arrangement, colour patterning and the 
patterning of near-spherical structures such as radiolaria. To Turing, the diversity of patterns was a challenge, 
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a code hidden in nature waiting to be deciphered and broken. Strongly influenced by Thompson’s Growth 
and Form 1917 edition, and appreciative of Schrodinger’s contemporary contribution What is Life, Turing 
wanted to complement these works with a mathematical account of how chemical solutions might diffuse and 
react with each other to form a pattern.  
 
Turing produced a paper entitled ‘The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis’ (1952) to answer the mysterious 
question of what he referred to as ‘gastrulation’. Turing thought that the principles involved could also 
explain the phenomenon of phyllotaxis and its relationship with the Fibonacci sequence. This is of interest 
because Turing also discussed and incorporated symmetry – how it may be broken and the patterning that 
follows. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a possible mechanism by which the genes of a zygote may 
determine the anatomical structure of the resulting organism. The theory does not make any new 
hypotheses; it merely suggests that certain well-known physical laws are sufficient to account for many of 
the facts. (Turing 1952 p37) 
 
Turing’s ‘reaction–diffusion model’ was more of a theoretical contribution rather than a workable model. It 
postulated, for example, morphogens that represented the chemicals involved without being able to identify 
them; these could include enzymes, genes and skin pigments. Similar to the processes involved in 
crystallisation, a chemical substance P is able to produce more P auto-catalytically. Substance P can also 
produce, under the same principles, substance S. Substance S, however, will inhibit the continued production 
of substance P at some point. Turing applied some complex mathematics to give the model predictive power 
concerning areas of high or low concentration of substances and subsequently pattern formation. After 
Turing’s death, the reaction–diffusion model suffered its own demise. Biologists could not distinguish the 
proposed morphogens, and attentions were taken, with the new understanding of the double helix in 1953, in 
the direction of genetic fundamentalism. The hypothesis languished in obscurity for over thirty years, but 
revival of interest began in the 1990s with the advancement of both chaos and complexity theory. Advances 
in computer technology had enabled Turing’s complex mathematical equations to be realised, at least in 
patterns of simulated images. In 1998, Meinhardt (see Gilbert 2003) successfully applied Turing’s principles 
to reproduce a computer model of patterns that bore a remarkable similarity to those found on the snail Oliva 
porphyria. Today, morphogens are recognised as physical entities and employed in the vocabulary of 
developmental biology.  For a more in depth portrayal that goes beyond the parameters of this thesis see 
Tabata and Takei (2004). 
 
There were more surprises. Researchers within developmental biology had dissected the embryos of mice 
and frogs at a very early stage of development. They then put them back together but not in the original order 
– where the component for the head had been, the legs were now placed, and vice versa. Much to the 
amazement of all, the embryos developed with the normal arrangement of limbs. Somehow, the cells 
involved had arrived at a regular body plan despite the jiggling of their inherent order, but how was this so? 
One explanation put forward by Wolpert (1996) suggested that cells contained ‘positional information’. This 
‘information’ comes in the form of gradients of chemical concentration, a revised version of Turing’s 
morphogens. There is still debate over this explanation and what morphogens actually are. Stewart (1998 
p154) agrees that there is very good circumstantial evidence but doubts if Wolpert’s interpretation could 
explain the complicated patterns of a zebra. Nevertheless, Gilbert (2003) argues that, with the use of 
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computer simulations, certain patterns can be predicted if one engages the Turing reaction–diffusion 
equations. This can explain the stripe patterns of the three known zebra species; further, by altering the 
parameters, the pigmentation patterns of angelfish can also be predicted. Evolutionary developmental biology 
now employs the term ‘morphogen gradient’ to refer to specific amounts of soluble molecules and the term 
‘morphogen’ to refer to the particular soluble molecule. Commentators seem to be of the opinion that, 
although the Turing reaction–diffusion model in its original form lacked specific details, it was correct in 
principle and is supported by some quite compelling recent research. The mathematician Stewart (p138) 
endorses this view: ‘Turing’s equations do not match biology precisely; they are best viewed as a particularly 
simple example of the kind of mathematical scheme that must govern pattern formation in animals.’ Both 
Ball and Stewart see Turing’s contribution as a synthesis of mathematics, chemistry, physics and genetics 
that can explain diversity of patterning across a wide spectrum of species. In some ways, it answers some of 
the manifestations of convergence that perplexed Mivart. Stewart sees explanations purely based on DNA as 
quite inadequate: 
 
In the same manner, an organism cannot take up any form at all: Its morphology is constrained by its 
dynamics – the laws of physics and chemistry – as well as by its DNA instructions. Still, the DNA 
instructions can make arbitrary choices among several different lines of development that are consistent 
with the dynamic laws. The new mathematical models are finally beginning to put these two aspects of 
development together. DNA alone does not control development – nor do dynamics alone. (Stewart 1998 
p157) 
 
These views represent a revision of the neo-Darwinian thesis, moving from a genetically determined 
perspective to a perspective that recognises a greater role for mathematics and physical laws. The problem 
for such a revision, however, is being able to quantify the extent that the latter perspective erodes the 
province of explanation that endorses accumulated genetic mutation through heredity and natural selection. 
In fact, Ball in a later work demonstrates just how difficult a task this is: 
  
In other words, seeking a ‘biological’ (which is to say, an adaptive) explanation for all patterning and 
collectivity in animal populations runs the risk of invoking a contingent evolutionary explanation for 
something that is in fact an immediate consequence of the ‘physics’ of the situation. (Ball 2004 p152) 
 
Conclusions 
 
It has been observed that the shapes and forms in all aspects of nature conform to symmetries, regularities 
and patterning, much of which can be measured mathematically. Nothing escapes the influence of the fabric 
of space, and when irregularities or asymmetries occur, an explanation is sought within physical causation. 
The cell, the chromosome, the gene and the protein – all important players in the story of life – must conform 
to the dictates of the physical dynamics of the situation. Ball and Stewart presented compelling arguments for 
this. However, they diverged in opinion from the structuralists to be considered in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 9: D’Arcy Thompson and Lima-de-Faria 
 
Beyond Natural Selection: The Structuralist Alternative Takes Shape 
 
Ball and Stewart sought to accommodate natural selection within their thesis; in contrast, an examination is 
imperative of those who see little role for this feature of Darwinian interpretation. At the outset, it is perhaps 
best to say that the entire Darwinian programme is not rejected; the principles of descent with modification, 
for example, are accepted but seen more as a given rather than something that illuminates explanation. It is 
the factors that cause and constrain the modification part of the theory that prove controversial. Just how far 
are these modifications canalised by natural laws? A short summary of D’Arcy Thompson’s major 
contribution will be followed by an outline of the major work of Lima-de-Faria. Both see physical law as 
primary in evolutionary explanation. Interestingly, both are polymaths but whereas Thompson sees no 
explanatory place for the gene, Lima-de-Faria sees the gene as explanatory necessary.  
 
Thompson (1860–1948) produced what some believe to be one of the great classics of English written 
scientific literature, On Growth and Form. Unfortunately, this work never received the full recognition those 
familiar with it thought it deserved. His academic background was unusual in that he was a Greek scholar, a 
mathematician and a naturalist, a combination that yielded unorthodox insights. It has been suggested that he 
should be considered the father of the fairly recent discipline of biomathematics. Thompson’s ambition was 
to explain the many forms in nature through the use of physical causation and ultimately mathematics. This 
ambition did, however, recognise its limitations. The introduction of the first edition of On Growth and Form 
states: 
 
Consciousness is not explained to my comprehension by all the nerve-paths and neurons of the 
physiologist; nor do I ask of physics how goodness shines in one man’s face, and evil betrays itself in 
another. But of the construction and growth and working of the body, as of all else that is of the earth 
earthy, physical science is, in my humble opinion, our only teacher and guide. (Thompson 1917, reprinted 
1942, extracted from http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Biographies/Thompson_D'Arcy.html) 
 
Thompson’s priority was to distinguish the relevant physical causation behind morphologies. He despaired at 
the tendency amongst so many biologists to replace religious teleology with the teleology of the survival 
imperative. The finger of God had been replaced by dictates of ‘fitness’. Teleology, whatever form it may 
take, was seen as an obscurant of the mechanistic processes that offered such rich explanation. It was not that 
teleology should be expunged in its entirety – there was a place for it – but the mechanics of the situation 
should be sought and addressed first. ‘In Aristotle’s parable the house is there that man may live in it; but it is 
also there because the builders have laid one stone upon another.’ (ibid. p6.) Final causes and the physics 
could then be appreciated and evaluated to discover whether they were commensurable. However, if 
Thompson did see a place for teleological considerations, it seems highly unlikely that that he considered 
‘fitness’ the appropriate candidate, as he treated natural selection and all its implications with extreme 
scepticism. Typical of his concerns are the following passages. The first addresses the fact that the same form 
of shell has manifested itself independently on several occasions; the second passage casts doubt upon the 
explanation by natural selection: 
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It leads one to imagine that these shells have grown according to laws so simple, so much in harmony with 
their environment, and with all the forces internal and external to which they are exposed, that none is 
better than another and none fitter or less fit to survive. It invites one also to contemplate the possibility of 
the lines of possible variation being here so narrow and determinate that identical forms may have come 
independently into being again and again. (Thompson 1961 p198) 
 
Again, we find the same forms, or forms which (save for external ornament) are mathematically identical, 
repeating themselves in all periods of the world’s geological history: and we see them mixed up, one with 
another, irrespective of climate or local conditions, in the depths and on the shores of every sea. It is hard 
indeed (to my mind) to see in such a case as this where Natural Selection necessarily enters in, or to admit 
that it has had any share whatsoever in the production of these varied conformations. Unless indeed we use 
the term Natural Selection in a sense so wide as to deprive it of any biological significance … (Thompson 
1942 p849) 
 
The last sentence anticipates Popper’s dichotomy discussed in Chapter 2. These concerns also echo those of 
Mivart (1871 & 1876), who some fifty years earlier thought natural selection inadequate to answer the 
problems posed by convergence. Moreover, both Mivart and Thompson had recognised those biological 
attributes that lack any apparent adaptive value. But whereas Mivart could not supply an answer to those 
missing factors that shaped evolutionary change, Thompson takes a slightly different tack: explanations of 
form and growth need not necessarily take an historical perspective. For example, he notes that amongst the 
unicellular microscopic organisms, the radiolaria, there is a great multiplicity of forms and yet, despite these 
complex configurations, there is an unusual appearance of geometric regularity. He draws comparison with 
the snow crystal, which also boasts many thousand forms but also conforms to a symmetrical repetition of 
one single crystalline form. Furthermore, there are skeletal similarities between snow crystals and the 
radiolaria. Thompson considers the geometrical forms of many unicellular organisms and arrives at this 
conclusion: 
 
We begin by an easy and general assumption of specific properties, by which each organism assumes it 
own specific form; we learn later that throughout the whole range of organic morphology, there are 
innumerable phenomena of form which are more or less simple manifestations of ordinary physical law. 
(Thompson 1961 p171) 
 
However, there are organisms that do not conform to the above view and the physical forces that might 
influence form are, for the moment, kept locked as a secret by Mother Nature. ‘Many a beautiful protozoan 
form has lent itself to easy physio-mathematical explanation; others no less simple and no more beautiful 
prove harder to explain.’ (Thompson 1961 p171) Throughout On Growth and Form, Thompson gives many 
physio-mathematical accounts of the structure of biological characters, arguing that these explanations (even 
if often incomplete) give more explanatory satisfaction. However, he does not entirely rule out a place for 
modification by descent: 
 
It would, I dare say, be an exaggeration to see in every bone nothing more than a resultant of immediate 
and direct physical or mechanical conditions: for to do so would be to deny the existence, in this 
connection, of a principle of heredity. (Thompson 1961 p265) 
 
Despite this concession, Thompson’s focus is directed like the engineer’s, recognising that any construction 
must take account of certain factors, such as the relevant stresses and strains, the compensations necessary 
amongst the proportions of the components of a body, and the effects of velocity upon growth in any 
dynamic system. Conversely, the engineer or the aeronautic designer can glean many lessons from the study 
of nature, such as the shape of the wing or the construction of load-bearing limbs. Indeed, it was this 
 
89 
engineering approach that led to Thompson’s novel work on transformations, which many consider his 
greatest contribution. With the ingenious use of a Cartesian grid, he painstakingly plotted out the structure of 
an organism by hand and then, by changing the mathematical coordinates, was able to demonstrate related 
forms (see Figure 8). This method of coordinates Thompson called the ‘Theory of Transformations’. Its 
significance was not only that form could be interpreted and understood mathematically but also that the 
method demonstrated the range and limits to possible configurations. Thompson thought this methodology 
could be of value to the palaeontologist. For example, if one was seeking to identify an intermediate form 
between two specimens that were considered to be related, then transformations within the Cartesian grid 
could predict the morphology of any intermediates. Interestingly, Thompson could not produce a 
transformation from a Homo sapiens to a Homo neanderthalensis, an issue of relationship that has vexed 
anthropologists. Another aspect of significance was that he felt that the transformations he was able to 
demonstrate were an endorsement of homology: nature was continually using the same materials and 
methods over and over again. 
 
 
Figure 8. Transformations on fish 
Source: Thompson 1942 p299 
 
Thompson’s claim was that if one pursued the mathematics of the situation rigorously, then one could unlock 
many secrets of nature and move beyond mere description and the act of categorisation. However, he 
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recognised suspicion and reluctance amongst naturalists to embrace mathematical methodology and that they 
preferred to explain things through adaptive terminology. In some ways, this could be understood because the 
task of the biologist was so much more difficult in an arena of complexities where one is forced to look at the 
specifics. Whereas the physicist could describe and elucidate a wave in general terms, Thompson thought it 
was another kettle of fish when it came to describing a particular wave. Nevertheless, he was dismayed by 
many of the adaptive explanations purporting to ‘explain’ a wide range of biological phenomena, perceiving 
them as rather fanciful, unscientific and little better than the theological attempts of earlier times. In many 
ways, Thompson anticipated the reforms of Gould and Lewontin some sixty years later, in the now famous 
paper alluding to the spandrels of San Marco. This paper sought to exorcise what have become known as the 
‘just so’ stories of biological explanation. To Thompson, any appeal to adaptations required that the 
adaptation went beyond mere hypothesis and faced the ‘questions of mechanical efficiency where statical and 
dynamical considerations can be applied and established in detail.’ (Thompson 1942 p961) Aerodynamic 
flight of birds and the streamlined bodies of fish were examples of adaptations that passed such criteria. 
Many of the adaptive explanations that sought to explain the colouration of insect, bird or mammal were, to 
Thompson’s mind, little more than speculation: 
 
With regard to coloration, for instance, it is by colours ‘cryptic,’ ‘warning,’ ‘signalling,’ ‘mimetic,’ and so 
on, that we prosaically expound, and slavishly profess to justify, the vast Aristotelian synthesis that Nature 
makes all things with a purpose and ‘does nothing in vain.’ Only for a moment let us glance at some few 
instances by which the modern teleologist accounts for this or that manifestation of colour, and is led on 
and on to beliefs and doctrines to which it becomes more and more difficult to subscribe. (Thompson 1942 
p958) 
 
In an examination of the different structure and form of birds’ eggs, Thompson gives an example where 
adaptive explanations can be quite contrary. The pointed conical egg of the guillemot is said to be an 
adaptation because its shape is less likely than a spherical egg to run or roll from the bird’s preferred laying 
area, such as a narrow stone ledge. However, when considering the pointed conical egg of the sandpiper, who 
lays her eggs in a different environment without the spectre of the egg rolling into danger, the supporter of 
adaptation ‘elicits another explanation, to the effect that here the conical form permits the many large eggs to 
be packed closely under the mother bird.’ (ibid. p936.) Thompson saw these as speculative explanations and 
obscurant when determining the physical causes of the shape of the egg. To understand the egg shape, one 
has to consider the journey from conception through the oviduct. At the early stages, the membrane is a soft 
pliable tissue that is shaped by the muscles of the oviduct pushing the egg along the passage. As the 
membrane slowly hardens, the result is the rounded end of the egg proceeding with the pointed conical shape 
at the rear. Oviducts, however, vary in size and the more spacious oviducts, relative to the size of the transit 
egg, can give rise to more spherical final eggs. Thompson notes that, in general, smaller birds produce more 
spherical eggs than larger birds. Further, a young bird laying an egg will produce a more spherical egg than 
the egg she might produce when she is older. The asymmetry is determined by the relative size of the 
oviduct.  
 
The importance of this example is worth deeper consideration. Thompson is arguing that the question ‘Why 
are eggs of a particular shape?’ is answered by explanation in terms of physical forces. The adaptationist 
outlook, however, seems to bypass the immediate chain of physical causation and provide an answer to a 
slightly different question. The question the adaptationist is addressing seems to take the form ‘Why are eggs 
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of a particular shape preserved through history?’ Some have defended this subtle adjustment to the original 
question, claiming that the adaptationist account provides a more ‘fundamental’ or ‘primitive’ explanation in 
ancestral terms, and thus an evolutionary explanation. If we overlook, for the time being, all the problems 
involved in testing such explanations, there is still little detail provided as to how the particular shapes of 
birds’ eggs originated, before natural selection is said to operate. While examining this dichotomy of 
explanation, it may help to look at a recent example that also concerns birds’ eggs. There has been 
controversy for some time over what some have called the ‘paradox of the speckled egg’. In traditional 
adaptationist terms, the phenomenon was explained by suggesting that the speckled colouration in the 
eggshell provided the advantage of camouflage in certain environments where the predator risk was high. 
The ‘paradox’ was said to arise because speckled eggs were also laid in areas where the predator risk was 
very low. Gosler observed the white and reddish-brown speckled eggs of the great tit (Parus major), 
suggesting that the distinctive colouring did little for protection and even that a ‘blind weasel could not miss 
them’. Following an intuition on egg thicknesses, Gosler and his research team conducted an intensive study: 
 
This, together with more detailed investigations undertaken with students, has revealed that the spot 
darkness is inherited on the female lineage only, that spots mark thinner areas of eggshell and the degree of 
thinning is reflected in the spot darkness, that the overall spread of pigment is related to eggshell thickness, 
and that both are closely related to calcium availability (reflected in soil calcium and snail abundance) near 
to the nest-site. (Gosler 2008) 
 
In this instance, the research suggests that the colour and thickness of the eggshell are determined by diet and 
the availability of calcium. Such determinism should not be too surprising: Carson (1962) brought it to 
attention that the often profligate use of DDT was having disastrous effects on bird populations. This 
pesticide proved to be a teratogen causing birds’ eggs to become thin and brittle, preventing successful 
reproduction. The lesson to be appreciated, at least according to Thompson, is that when explaining the 
nature and form of organisms and their characters, one should always examine the local causes before 
invoking ancestral causes. The latter, being so much harder to identify and then test in an objective manner, 
are also apt to distract from scientific procedure. In his classic work to explain features of the biological 
world, Thompson also gives other accounts, such as the Fibonacci numbers and phyllotaxis (now mainstream 
botany), the role of symmetry and the mathematics behind the equiangular spiral. These features were 
discussed in Chapter 8, so now consideration will be given to other aspects of his work that further illustrate 
the influence of constraints.  
 
The Shapes of Horns, Teeth and Tusks 
 
Once again, the shapes of the various types of horn, teeth and tusk are determined by physio-mathematical 
laws. Three types of horn are examined by Thompson. The horn of the rhinoceros is the most simple, being 
physiologically akin to a mass of consolidated hair, which is non-living and added by increments. Its 
elliptical shape is easily accounted for: 
 
Its longitudinal growth proceeds with a maximum velocity anteriorly, and a minimum posteriorly: and the 
ratio of these velocities being constant the horn curves into the form of a logarithmic spiral in the manner 
we have already studied. (Thompson 1961 p202) 
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The sheep, goat or ox horn is essentially the same shape but shorter. These horns are paired and hollow. The 
structure has a bony core covered by skin, which is fed on its internal side with nutrients from blood vessels, 
whereas the external side of the skin (the epidermis) is formed from a fibrous material similar to consolidated 
hairs, the result being a sort of horny sheath. The growth of the horny sheath is symmetrical in the pair but 
not continuous. It is the periodic production of the hair-like chitinous material that leads to the formation of 
rings and Thompson says that some have claimed that it is possible to tell the age of the animal by counting 
the rings. Deer antlers are much more complex in shape and it is therefore much less easy to explain the 
direction of growth and the forces that determine the final outcome. They are also different in nature from the 
mollusc shell, for when the material is first laid down in forming the horn, it is slightly flexible so it can still 
bend, fold or wrinkle, whereas the deposit that makes up the shell is calcareous and immovable during 
growth. The symmetry of horns is essential in accommodating the weight: the head of the ram Ovis poli has 
to bear 50 to 60 pounds in weight; any imbalance would render this task nigh impossible. The heavy horn can 
also have a bearing upon the set of the head. For example, an Indian buffalo tilts his muzzle higher than a 
cow and a stag carries his head higher than a horse (Thompson 1961 p.214). Thompson continues in great 
detail to explain the complex curvature of the various horns, which is fascinating in itself but not necessary to 
elaborate on here. The main point of interest is that the formation is a product of physical forces acting upon 
biological deposits, each variation requiring its own particular elucidation. The difficulty is summarised: 
 
The distribution of forces which manifest themselves in the growth and configuration of a horn is not 
simple nor merely superficial matter. One thing is co-ordinated with another; the direction of the axis of the 
horn, the form of its sectional boundary, the specific rates of growth in the mean spiral and at various parts 
of its periphery – all these play their parts, controlled in turn by the supply of nutriment which the character 
of the adjacent tissues and the distribution of the blood vessels combine to determine. (Thompson 1961 
p213) 
 
After all this investigation, elucidation and appreciation of the complexity behind the issues of form and 
growth, one senses the frustration and dismay Thompson felt. Consider the following statement, which 
concerns the explanatory power of natural selection and carries over from the previous quotation: 
 
To suppose that this or that size or shape of horn has been produced or altered, acquired or lost, by natural 
selection, when so ever one type rather than another proved serviceable for defence or attack or any other 
purpose, is a hypothesis harder to define and to substantiate than some imagine it to be! (ibid. p213) 
 
Concerning tooth, beak and claw in general, these structures follow the growth and form described earlier for 
shell and horn. Once again, the equiangular spiral is implicit, with its asymmetrical growth leading to fine 
curvatures. The curvatures are slight and less easy to detect in short growth but they manifest themselves as 
the structure grows. For example, as a ‘bird grows older, or the beak longer, the spiral nature of the curve 
becomes more and more apparent, as in the hooked beak of an old eagle, or in the great beak of a hyacinthine 
macaw’ (Thompson 1961 p215). 
 
Thompson was familiar with Bergmann’s Rule, a topic to be discussed when biological scaling is examined 
in Chapter 10. Importantly, Thompson gives many examples of the limitations to sizes and the implications 
that sizes have for function and behaviour. For example, the smaller the animal, the greater is the heat loss, 
which must be compensated by greater calorie intake. In a day, a human male requires a fiftieth of his own 
body mass in food whereas a mouse requires half its own body weight.  
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A warm blooded animal much smaller than a mouse becomes an impossibility: it could neither obtain nor 
yet digest the food required to maintain its constant temperature and hence no mammals and no birds are as 
small as the smallest frogs or fishes. (ibid. p26) 
  
Thompson was not quite correct about the smallest possible animal;51 however, the principles of heat loss 
relating to body size and respiration are generally thought to hold. Insects are also constrained by maximum 
sizes; the following is a modern endorsement: 
 
The respiratory system of insects comprises a network of fine ducts (tracheae) that deliver air directly to all 
parts of the body. Although the system works well on a small scale, it cannot be expanded to serve the 
respiratory needs of large animals. The size constraint imposed by the tracheal system explains why insects 
have been unable to exploit the advantages of gigantism during their long evolutionary history. (McGowan 
1999 pp13–14). 
 
Returning to summarise Thompson, amongst mammals, size also has its consequences. The larger the animal, 
the larger is the proportion of bone: a mouse skeleton makes up 8% of the bulk, whereas a dog skeleton 
comprises 14% and a human approximately 18%. One of the major determinants here is gravity. Growth in 
marine creatures is facilitated by the buoyancy that is afforded by the fact that water is 800 times denser than 
air, thus counterbalancing the gravitational effect. (Thompson suggests that the earlier large reptilian fauna 
were semi-aquatic.) Thompson asks what would be the effect of gravitational changes: 
 
Were the force of gravity to be doubled over, bipedal form would be a failure and the majority of terrestrial 
animals would resemble short-legged saurian, or else serpents. On the other hand, if gravity were halved, 
we should get a lighter, slender, more active type, needing less energy, less heat, less heart, less lungs, less 
blood. Gravity not only controls the actions but also influences the forms of all save the least of organisms. 
(Thompson 1961 p32) 
 
Arguably, gravity is a phenomenon that is rarely discussed in biology textbooks. There might be a short 
recognition of its influence concerning bilateral symmetry or the occasional reference to insect navigation. 
Botanists have accorded it some importance regarding plant growth (geotropism) and developmental 
biologists have recently realised its force during gastrulation. However, one could argue that evolutionary 
biologists have paid it little regard, probably because gravitational forces are seen as a constant or a feature in 
the background that has no direct influence on evolutionary changes. There is an interesting division between 
the perspectives of Ball/Stewart on the one hand and Thompson/Lima-de-Faria on the other. The former do 
not seem to include gravity as a factor of evolutionary change, whereas the latter two see gravity as more 
than a constraint but also a determining factor. To add spice to this debate, there is a group of scientists who 
contend that gravity is not a passive bystander of evolutionary change but an active ingredient. The scientists 
of the NASA research centre have obvious reasons for studying the effects of gravity and they have arrived at 
some unusual perspectives on this subject. This research will be scrutinised later, but now consideration is 
given to Lima-de-Faria.  
 
                                                 
51 The smallest known living mammals now are the bumblebee bat from 29mm across the wings and the pygmy shrew from 52mm nose 
to rear, both at 2.0 grams. The smallest reptile, Jaragua sphaero or dwarf gecko, measures just 1.6 centimetres and from 129 milligrams. 
The frog species Paedophryne amauensis is the smallest amphibian, measuring a mere 7 millimetres and weighs from 20 milligrams. 
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Form, Function and Evolution 
 
It was observed earlier that Thompson attempted to explain form by way of a physics/mathematics 
perspective, which was essentially an ahistorical account. The exclusion of any reference to genes can be 
seen as a weakness of the overall thesis. Although Thompson greatly adds to the understanding of growth and 
form, the thesis still lacks an account of the changes that take place within different lineages. This indeed can 
be seen as a serious omission and challenges the coherence of the overall structuralist argument. An 
examination of the work of Lima-de-Faria is indicated, to see whether this gap can successfully be plugged. 
The following two quotations represent the direction of the next few pages: 
 
One of the central themes of this book is that all non biological and biological phenomena are homologous. 
There are no accidents in nature; neither are there analogies. All processes represent homologies. It is only 
the degree of homology that varies. In other words, every biological pattern and every biological function 
has its predecessor in the mineral, chemical and elementary particle world. (Lima-de-Faria 1988 p21) 
 
The gene and the chromosome do not create. Their intervention is important but only at a secondary level, 
deciding only what variant of form and function will become fixed. The roles of the gene and the 
chromosome appear mainly in locking a condition that has arisen from a series of a limited number of 
combinations. (ibid. p30) 
 
Lima-de-Faria has spent most of his academic career at Lund University as a geneticist and is a leading 
authority on the subject of the chromosome. His principal and most important work is arguably Evolution 
without Selection, published in 1988. Regretfully, this work has received little attention in Anglo/American 
circles but is more widely acknowledged in Scandinavia and on the Continent. The volume is erudite and 
scholarly, with over 600 scientific references, drawing on not only genetics but also physics and chemistry to 
explain evolutionary change. The task ahead will be to extract the underlying principles of relevance from 
this, perhaps controversial and difficult work whilst maintaining a fair appreciation. If Lima-de-Faria is 
correct or even partially correct, then our perspectives on evolutionary change will never be quite the same. 
Much of Lima-de-Faria’s thesis is in accordance with Chapter 8, which outlined some of the fundamental 
constraints. The universe is seen as homologous, deterministic and affording patterns and regularities that 
pervade not only the particle and chemical realms but also the more complex biological. For this reason, 
biological evolution cannot be divorced from general evolution, for here it is firmly embedded. Failure to 
consider the evolutionary transition from the chemical elements of the primordial soup to the first biological 
structures, and all that went before, will result in a limited understanding of evolutionary change.  
 
The Relationship between Symmetry, Form and Function 
 
Lima-de-Faria observes the experiments first carried out by Pasteur (see Chapter 8) that demonstrate how 
crystals can be altered from their symmetric form to asymmetric forms, one left-handed and the other right-
handed. It then followed that the left-handed crystals would rotate the plane of polarised light to the left and 
the right-handed crystals would do the opposite. The rotation would not occur if the symmetry were 
maintained. This fundamental observation has wide-reaching implications. Pasteur went on to observe that 
functions such as fermentation required asymmetry, as quoted by Lima-de-Faria:  
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This evidence leads me to postulate that asymmetry creates function whereas symmetry creates form. In 
other words, when a phenomenon is in its symmetric state, it appears as form, when the same phenomenon 
is in an asymmetric condition, it appears as function. (Lima-de-Faria 1988 p86) 
 
Nothing in nature has perfect form or function. Lima-de-Faria notes that we never observe a perfect sphere in 
nature or a fully symmetric insect or snow crystal, because life is dynamic with function always present. ‘The 
symmetry is continually being made asymmetric and the asymmetry is continually reverting to the symmetric 
condition. Matter, minerals and living organisms are the products that are being squeezed out of this original 
and permanent dilemma’ (Lima-de-Faria 1988 pp86–87). In a cautious tone and as a preliminary approach, 
Lima-de-Faria suggests there may be a relationship with energy- 
Function is energy in a state of flow between two or several structures. It results in a canalization of 
dynamic processes. Asymmetry appears as an obligatory component of this state. All matter is plunged in 
an energy-exchanging system. This is why form and function cannot be easily separated. (Lima-de-Faria 
1988 p87) 
 
Lima-de-Faria introduces the term ‘isomorphism’. Concisely, this is the underlying patterns, shapes and form 
that pervade not only biological phenomena but also subatomic particles, crystalline structures and minerals. 
In fact, it is argued, all forms are homologous, form is not analogous, and there is only variety within 
homology. All biological form arose from earlier non-organic form but not in a random or accidental process. 
This is essentially an evolutionary account of the structure of form. To Lima-de-Faria, there are four stages of 
evolution, each autonomously following or obeying physical laws. The first of these stages saw the 
establishment of elementary particles, providing a physical imprint. The second stage resulted in 
combinations of elementary particles to create more complex forms, beginning with hydrogen and furnishing 
a chemical imprint. Third, one can witness the mineral imprint based on crystallisation systems, which are 
relatively few. Each evolutionary stage determines the subsequent evolutionary stage, culminating in the 
fourth stage – biological evolution. Lima-de-Faria gives many examples of the same, or extremely similar, 
forms occurring in nature, with each having a completely different chemical composition. One example of 
such regularity is horn formation. This manifests itself in the vertebrate as the horn of the wild sheep Ovis 
ammon, in the invertebrate as the shell of the mollusc Vermetus dentiferus, in the plant as a unicellular hair of 
Althaea rosea and in the mineral as curved stacks of chlorite crystals. The argument is then that isomorphism 
pervades nature. There are distinguished shapes that appear in crystals, minerals, viruses, plants and animals. 
Even in plant cells, crystals are common. Further, crystalline patterns occur in the plant membranes of the 
chloroplasts. Whole chromosomes, at certain stages of their development, assume crystal shape. 
 
… living organisms are using the simple chemical processes used in the organic world to build their 
crystals during the initial stages. The bio crystals are formed in the cell following the same atomic 
principles which lead to the crystallisation of calcium carbonate and phosphate on a Petri dish. It is only 
later in development that the cell uses the molecular messages from the nuclei to transform the crystals into 
novel configurations. (Lima-de-Faria 1988 p94) 
 
The last sentence in the quotation above also illustrates Lima-de-Faria’s contention that the cell’s molecular 
material is constrained, playing a secondary role in organisation. Further, many of the shapes and forms in 
the biological world can be seen earlier manifested in the inorganic, constructed prior to and without any 
influence of genetic material. Moreover, it is argued that DNA, often seen as unique and peculiar to the 
biological world, itself has its own antecedents of shape and replication processes. 
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One usually thinks of DNA replication, i.e. the growth of a new DNA molecule, as a strictly biological 
phenomenon. However, the molecular analysis has revealed that DNA replication is preceded by the 
formation of an RNA primer, i.e. a small piece of RNA that is formed first and later discarded and which 
allows the DNA growth to start (Dahlberg 1977, Kornberg 1980). Hence, DNA is a prisoner of the process 
of crystal formation that occurs at the underlying level of evolution. (ibid. p121) 
 
In fact, Lima-de-Faria claims that mineral evolution must have occurred for cell evolution to occur, i.e. it is a 
necessary condition. Biological evolution is facilitated by an earlier general evolution, but this general 
evolution always maintains a presence, constraining and shaping the evolution of life. (Stevens (1974) 
observes, as discussed in Chapter 9, that the patterns of nature follow only a few formal themes, restricted by 
three-dimensional space but nevertheless producing great variety.) It was also argued earlier that form and 
function are two aspects of the same phenomenon. For a function to occur, however, an asymmetry in 
molecular arrangement is necessary. This pervades not only the mineral world but also the biological. 
Functions are the results of evolution. Lima-de-Faria gives the example of insulin, whose molecules changed 
their functions over time. 
 
The evolution of insulin represents a similar shift in organ type. Insulin was present in nerve cells before it 
became produced by an endocrine gland (Faulkner et al 1984). Moreover, insulin has changed its function 
during evolution. It occurred in insects before it appears in vertebrates. In Drosophila it is present in the 
larval haemolymph where it functions as a hormone that enhances cell differentiation, whereas in 
mammals, it regulates glucose metabolism (Seecof and Dewurst, 1974). (ibid. p151) 
  
Not only do functions change their roles over time but also old functions can combine to produce novel 
functions. Lima-de-Faria gives the example of the stapes bone found in fish and amphibians. At one stage of 
its evolution, this bone is part of a gill and used for respiration; at a later stage, it is part of a jaw and 
functions in food ingestion; then again, it is part of the hearing system. ‘This means that this one, by 
combining with other organs, acquired completely new functions’ (Lima-de-Faria 1988 p151).  
 
Lima-de-Faria (1988) continues that eukaryotes have telomeres at the ends of their chromosomes, which 
enable single strands, whereas prokaryotes have no telomeres and the chromosomes are circular.52 The 
telomeres together with centromeres determine the organisation and position of DNA sequences within the 
chromosome. This ordering was further canalised with dependence upon protein and RNA. None can 
function without the other. This canalisation means that the gene has a limited number of alternatives that 
follow an order already observed in minerals. 
 
The basic shapes of leaves are already found in minerals, just as the basic shapes of animal vertebrae are 
found in minerals. The gene only fixes and perpetuates one of the alternatives, making the vertebra long or 
short. (ibid. p319) 
 
To Lima-de-Faria, the symmetries and asymmetries in life forms are already canalised in the physiochemical 
forms of minerals. This self-assembly of elementary particles, atoms, molecules and cell organs is the basis 
of ‘auto-evolution’. This is broadly a deterministic account and would include such auto-catalytic processes 
as were considered earlier in Turing’s reaction–diffusion model. Also, ‘self-assembly’ – a ‘term created by 
biochemists to describe the ability of macromolecules to organise themselves spontaneously’ (Lima-de-Faria 
1988 p179) – is thought to pervade at all levels, from the particle to the society. Subsequently, there is no 
                                                 
52 Recent research has discovered bacteria with linear chromosomes and telomeres. 
See: http://www.sci.sdsu.edu/~smaloy/MicrobialGenetics/topics/chroms-genes-prots/chromosomes.html 
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privileged status for any biological components: the gene, the chromosome, the protein etc. are all locked 
into a symbiotic relationship and heavily, although not entirely, canalised.  
Lima-de-Faria rather surprisingly thinks that it is the physicist who must change approach to biology rather 
than the biologist who should change approach to physics. Many physicists, it is suggested, have 
misinterpreted Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, introducing an unnecessarily random or probabilistic 
aspect to all levels of nature. However, the situation is changing: 
 
Physicists are now recognising that randomness does not occur in nature. They are coming to the 
conclusion that in physics, like in biology, randomness is synonymous with ignorance of the phenomena 
involved at levels lower than those accessible to experimentation. (ibid. p300) 
 
The second law of thermodynamics does not escape criticism either. Lima-de-Faria notes that unlike other 
laws of physics, this second law has a most ambiguous nature and he lists three different formulations.53 As 
understood by Nicolis and Prigogine (1977, quoted by Lima-de-Faria), the law contains randomness that fails 
to explain the ordered properties of living organisms. Organisms are built by self-assembly, Lima-de-Faria 
continues, and energy transportation is canalised within open systems, processes incompatible with the 
second law of thermodynamics as it stands in its three interpretations. 
 
Critical evaluation 
What does one make of this unique work? Does this account provide the answer to the problem that was 
levelled against Thompson – the lack of any explanation for evolutionary changes? One of the difficulties 
here is that very few biologists and philosophers have encountered this work and the seemingly one review of 
the book is rather short and superficial (Korthof 2011). This might be expected, as the project draws on a 
mass of detailed genetics together with an understanding of chemistry, mineralogy and physics, both 
Newtonian and quantum.  The implications are clear: if Lima-de-Faria is correct, then the brand of 
Darwinism that seeks to explain evolutionary change primarily through natural selection and adaptationism is 
under threat. Indeed, he states this as his target in the opening chapters. Kauffman has for many years held an 
interest in self-organising systems and may agree with many of Lima-de-Faria’s arguments. Kauffman too 
steps outside a purely biological perspective and embraces auto-assembly, together with the concept of ‘free 
energy’ in Schrödinger’s thermodynamics, but nevertheless retains natural selection. Lima-de-Faria contends 
that nature is an ordered affair and to support this argues that physicists are ‘recognizing that randomness 
does not occur in nature’ (p200 1988). However only one example of such physicists is referenced and one 
might easily doubt this claim. Another contentious claim concerns the second law of thermodynamics; it 
could be argued that the open systems identified in biological processes are indeed compatible with this 
second law. In the later stages of ‘Evolution without Selection’ (p291) there is a chapter that argues in favour 
of Sociobiology but from the perspective of ‘autoevolutionism’. This consideration goes beyond the 
parameters of this work. Nevertheless, sociobiology is a controversial subject and one has to question 
whether sociobiology is worthy of being rescued. 54  
 
One fundamental question that comes to mind concerns the term ‘auto-evolution’ employed by Lima-de-
Faria to describe the physical basis of evolution. How does ‘auto-evolution’ differ from the plain word 
                                                 
53 Some commentators have listed 21 variants to the law. See Čápek and Sheehan (2005). 
54 See David Stove’s (1995) critique of the relationship between neo-Darwinism and Sociobiology for a lively account. 
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‘evolution’? Would anyone deny that evolution has a physical basis? It will be argued later that the 
explanation of evolution is better characterised in terms of ‘natural processes’ rather than ‘auto-evolution’ or 
‘natural selection’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The foundations to the structuralist alternative were laid out and elaborated in a bid to answer that which lies 
beyond the scope of natural selection. Thompson and Lima-de-Faria share a deep scepticism over natural 
selection and adaptive reasoning. Symmetries, for example are seen as phenomena that precede and constrain 
biological form. This contrasts with the view that symmetries exist in animate nature because they are 
beneficial to the function of organisms. For instance, mobility is easier for an organism with an even number 
of legs or wings than an uneven number. Any organisms possessing such asymmetries would be at a 
functional disadvantage and selected against. This purports to explain why bi-lateral symmetry is so 
pervasive amongst Animalia. The simplicity of such lines of reasoning are easy to apprehend and can be quite 
seductive. However, there are serious questions that face the selectionist.  First, is there any evidence within 
the fossil record to suggest that a selection process took place? In other words is there any evidence of extinct 
fossils with an uneven number of legs? Second, when asymmetries do arise in nature, as with the fiddler 
crabs, why is it that such an asymmetric creature manages to survive and reproduce seemingly just as well as 
their symmetrical colleagues? Third, for any selection to take place there must by definition be some 
variations of fundamental form. How does the selectionist account for fundamental form? Is it that space, 
gravity and the laws of topology constrain nature tightly or is it that things are not so invariant as a 
Structuralist might claim? 
 
Both men also see a wider role for the physical forces, with Thompson providing many mathematical 
explanations and Lima-de-Faria giving novel explanations from a detailed genetic base. Where Thompson 
seems to lack an account of evolutionary change, Lima-de-Faria presents a bold prognosis that biological 
evolution is embedded within general evolution. Despite a few quibbles the account is found to be a coherent 
one that does not require any selectionist import. Moreover, the account provides an important continuation 
between general evolution and biological evolution, consolidating a causal relationship between physics, 
chemistry and biology. The evolution of the universe can be considered to be of four stages, with each stage 
leaving an imprint in the subsequent stage. Under these circumstances, convergence, which so perplexed 
Mivart (Ch.1), can be perceived to be less surprising. The ordered imprinting is also said to explain the 
recursive patterns and regularities that manifest in the biological and non-biological realms. The deterministic 
nature of the thesis, which embraces such concepts as canalisation, auto-assembly and an understanding of 
the relationships between form and symmetry on the one hand and function and asymmetry on the other, does 
seem consistent with much of modern physics. However, denial of randomness conflicts with the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The perspective concerning the relationship between form 
and function is intriguing and deserves further consideration. Stephen J Gould once said, counterfactually, 
that if one were able to re-run the story of life starting from the same origins, one would probably witness 
biological forms quite unlike those of today. Both Lima-de-Faria and Thompson, one suspects, would take 
the converse view and expect to see the same forms, or nearly so, given the same conditions. Conway Morris, 
in a more recent contribution, goes so far as to argue that “something like a human is an evolutionary 
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inevitability”. Life’s Solution (2003) is probably the most comprehensive study of convergence to date, going 
far beyond the scope appreciated by Mivart (Ch.1). Although Conway Morris considers himself a neo-
Darwinist there is a remarkable absence in this work to explanation in terms of selection. There is no appeal 
or index to adaptive reasoning, natural selection or selection pressures which one would expect in a neo-
Darwinian text. In fact all explanation to convergence appeals directly to natural law, an essentially 
structuralist approach. Indeed he states that the explanation to the main principle of evolution is beyond 
selection and adaptation and found “relying on the tried and trusted building blocks of organic architecture” 
(Morris 2003 p8).  Contrary to Gould’s randomness, Conway Morris considers that the ordering within 
nature allows opportunity for prediction, a view shared by those who work closely with scaling laws and 
discussed in the following chapter.  
 
So far, consideration has been given to constraints at the fundamental level, including symmetry, geometry, 
topology and the mathematics behind patterning. Now this thesis will outline proposed further constraints, 
before committing to any philosophical assessment. 
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Chapter 10: Constraints or Determinants: Gravity, Temperature, Nutrition and Size 
 
Gravity 
 
In the previous chapter, it was observed that both Thompson and Lima-de-Faria saw gravity as a determining 
factor for form and hence subsequent related functions. Thompson even claimed that the direct and 
permanent effect of doubling the gravitational power would be that previously upright organisms would be 
resigned to quadrupedalism, with heavy bone structures and large hearts, whereas a reduction in the 
gravitational pull would facilitate slender bipedal bodies with lighter frames and smaller hearts. Is there any 
evidence to support this claim and, if there is, what are the implications for evolutionary changes? One 
person who supports this hypothesis is Morey-Holton of the NASA Ames Research Centre: 
 
As species on land increased in size, they required support structures appropriate for the loads imposed. 
Species that crawled along the ground didn’t need the same mechanisms for countering gravity’s effects as 
those species alternating between horizontal and vertical positions. The latter species required more 
complex systems for balance or gravity sensing, fluid regulation, and locomotion. So, gravity, though 
constant, may have played a major role in evolution as species crawled from the sea and began to populate 
the land. (Morey-Holton undated) 
 
To understand how these conclusions were arrived at, it is necessary to elucidate the physiological changes 
that take place in micro or reduced gravity, such as in the weightlessness of space. It is important to 
recognise, however, that the astronauts floating within their spacecrafts are not entirely free of gravitational 
influence. At 400 kilometres up, gravity is almost 90% that at the Earth’s surface. This height corresponds to 
the usual orbit of a space shuttle. The force of the Earth’s gravity at an altitude of 100 kilometres is only 3% 
less than it is at the Earth’s surface. 55Even with these small reductions in gravitational pull, the physiological 
changes that take place in organisms can be quite dramatic. Take humans in space. The first symptoms 
observed by those entering space are of nausea, headache, vomiting, vertigo, body ache and general malaise. 
Vision can also flip temporarily 180 degrees. This is known as space adaptation syndrome (SAS) and 
normally lasts for little longer than 72 hours. The long-term effects, however, are much more serious and of 
interest here. These include muscle atrophy, loss of body mass, osteopenia (loss of bone mineral), slowing of 
the cardiovascular system, reduced heart size and reduced production of red blood cells. To minimise and 
prevent further such adverse effects, a regular daily regime of intense exercise is necessary. Conversely, 
astronauts returning to earth suffer orthostatic intolerance, unable to stand unassisted, fainting after only 10 
minutes. Under the Earth’s gravitational pull, breathing and locomotion are very difficult for them. These 
symptoms take several weeks to disappear fully and it is said that astronauts age more quickly even in a short 
period in space (Versari et al 2013). It is not clear that a prolonged existence in space would be conducive to 
survival on return to earth. It is important to recognise here that all the major long term physiological 
adaptations, both in space and when returning to earth, have taken place without altering the astronaut’s 
genetic constitution.  
 
The biochemical reactions in altered gravity are an area of active research within the field of gravitational 
biology. NASA is keen to appreciate the implications of extended space flight and for the viability of 
colonising other planets. Astrobiologists take an interest in evolutionary forces and the necessary conditions 
                                                 
55 All the empirical details concerning physiology in space were extracted from Lujan and White (2009) unless otherwise referenced. 
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to sustain life. The impact of gravity is seen as fundamental, as it plays a crucial role in convection, nutrient 
availability, sedimentation and waste control. It was once believed that the gravitational force was too weak 
to influence the behaviour of cells, but studies of many organisms in space and on earth, by using centrifugal 
force, indicate a different story.56 It seems there are limits to the amount of gravitational strength that life can 
withstand, and this differs according to the type and size of organism. Micro-organisms, for example, can 
survive at much higher gravitational strengths than do rats, with humans being even more sensitive, expiring 
at strengths one-third those that rats manage to survive. Morey-Holton considers whether life can exist on 
planets with greater gravitational fields: 
 
The ability to evolve under increased gravity appears related to size. Single cells and nematodes 
withstand105-G for brief periods, young plants easily cope for 10 minutes at 30–40-G without noticeable 
structural changes, rats withstand 15-G for 10 minutes while 20-G is lethal, and humans are capable of 
tolerating only 4–5-G for 10 minutes. Gravitational levels, like other physical environmental factors, 
appear to determine the boundaries for life. (ibid.) 
 
The measure for the Earth’s gravitational field is given a benchmark of 1-G at sea level. Morey-Holton 
observes that it is not only organisms that respond to gravitational changes; as much as 40% of equipment on 
initial flights failed to function as expected. This too suffered from convection problems and other factors 
such as air bubbles impeding fluid flow in piping. Morey-Holton sees the insights gained from research 
conducted in ‘weightlessness’ as highly significant for understanding the factors that shape evolution, 
maintaining that the influence of gravity had previously been masked, as it was always seen as a constant and 
neutral. Her perception endorses that of Thompson in appreciating that gravitational factors had a bearing on 
life emerging from the aquatic and becoming terrestrial: 
 
Gravitational loading acts on all masses at the Earth’s surface and defines the weight of each object. 
Weight is the product of the object’s mass times the force of gravity, which on Earth is equal to 1G. 
Weight drives many chemical, biological, and ecological processes on Earth. Altering weight changes 
these processes. Given these facts, one should not be surprised that changes in gravity could alter life, as 
we know it. If gravity causes changes to biology, then gravity, per se, must be a major physical 
environmental force shaping life on Earth. (ibid.) 
 
The lessons to be gleaned here demonstrate that an environmental feature, such as increased or reduced 
gravity, can have a very dramatic impact directly on the organism, but more so on those of larger mass. 
Moreover, any organism that remains within that changed environment will maintain those physiological 
changes and this will also apply to any offspring. One can predict that if humans of the future were to seek 
out an existence of continuous space travel, then they would look morphologically quite different from at 
present. The principle establishes that the environment can determine biological form directly in a non-
Darwinian and non-Lamarckian manner. In light of this, we can better understand the vestigial features of 
creatures, such as the whale, that swapped a gravity-strong terrestrial environment for an aquatic environment 
with reduced gravitational effects afforded by buoyancy. 
 
Morey-Holton talks of gravity as being a constant force, omnipresent and unchanging. However, this requires 
some qualification. It has already been observed that an organism migrating to or from the sea or a large body 
of water will experience different gravitational effects. In this sense, the gravitational field varies because of 
                                                 
56 Of the four fundamental ‘forces’ of nature, the nuclear weak force is measured as 10–14 whereas gravity is a mere 10–40. 
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the buffer that water affords. But what if an organism migrates from one part of the globe to another? It was 
assumed that the gravitational field was only stronger at the poles than at the equator, but recent very 
accurate measurements have demonstrated that matters are much more complicated. Figure 9 reproduces an 
illustrated gravitational field map produced by two GRACE (Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment) 
satellites. The dark blue areas show where the gravitational field is at its weakest, through to the dark red 
representing areas where it is strongest. The observed anomalies are a measure of the mass beneath the 
Earth’s surface. The measurement is achieved by the deployment of two satellites following the same orbit 
around the globe. The first satellite speeds up when it approaches an area beneath of greater gravitational 
strength, putting a greater distance between itself and the following satellite. Constant circumnavigation 
enables the researchers to plot an amazingly accurate map of the Earth’s gravitational anomalies. This has 
been extremely useful in locating different metals and sources of energy such as coal and oil 
(http://science.nasa.gov/missions/grace/ 2009). 
 
 
Figure 9 
Source: http://www.csr.utexas.edu/grace/gallery/gravity/03_07_GRACE.html 
 
All organisms have a tolerance range with regard to gravitation; too much or too little could spell disaster. 
However, between these ranges, homeostasis of endotherms or ectotherms acts accordingly in attempting to 
stabilise the situation. It is not yet known how sensitive the internal cell is to very slight changes in this force, 
nor is it fully understood how gravity triggers a response. Morey-Holton thinks that rather than a ‘direct’ 
response, ‘reduced gravity more likely initiates a cascade of events – the altered physical force leads to an 
altered chemical environment, which in turn gives rise to altered physiological response.’ In more recent 
work, Ingber (2011) has demonstrated that the skeletal structure of cells feels the effects of gravity and 
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responds in unexpected ways. Moreover, cytoskeletons give cells their shape, help cells move and hold the 
nucleus in place, but they respond to gravity through the interface with proteins known as integrins. 
‘Tickling’ the cytoskeleton can make cells switch between different genetic programmes. Moreover, there is 
a relationship between the topology of cells and their functions. Cells that are flat and stretched tend to 
divide, cells that are round and cramped tend to die. Changing the shape of the cytoskeleton serves as a 
switching mechanism. Ingber (2011) argues that, ‘By pursuing the question of [how cells sense] gravity 
we’ve uncovered entirely new aspects of cell regulation’.  
 
Research into the effects of a gravity-free environment upon the development of zebra fish demonstrated that 
the critical period was disrupted, producing serious and permanent functional deficits (Moorman 2011). It is 
also now known, from research in developmental biology, that 1-G gravity plays an important role in axis 
formation in the chick embryo. Here the radially symmetrical blastoderm is converted to a bilateral 
symmetric structure. (Gilbert 2003 p360.) More evidence of cell sensitivity is observed in the cells of plants: 
there is a positive gravitropic response in downward root growth and a negative gravitropic response in 
upward stem growth (Chen et al 1999). Plant roots placed horizontally in a contrived environment grow 
towards the earth even if a nutrient and moisture rich soil is arranged above the root to prompt upward 
growth. It is not clearly understood why this is the case. However, the statolith theory postulates that plants 
‘sense’ gravity in special cells (statocytes) located at the tip of the root and containing heavy particles of 
starch called amyloplasts. (Kumar et al 2008) At one stage, it was believed that the primary factor 
determining the upward growth of a stem was phototropism, which could include attraction to some forms of 
artificial light as well as sunlight. Charles Darwin and his son Francis (1880) conducted some early 
experiments that demonstrated that stem growth would incline toward a light source even if the source were 
set at an angle and not directly above the plant. However, they also discovered that if they cut and removed 
the tip of the stem, the plant would grow vertically and not towards the light source. 
 
It may very well be the case that gravitational influence has been grossly underestimated. One has only to 
consider that small variations in the Earth’s gravitational field can have the effect of accelerating a satellite 
500 kilometres above sea level. Therefore it does not seem outrageous to consider whether small anomalies 
in the gravitational field have an impact upon the deposition within cells during the early stages of 
development. This question is not to be answered here obviously, but the potential explanatory power of such 
a theory would be enormous. There would also be a downside. One of the things gleaned from operating 
GRACE satellites for many years is that anomalies in the gravitational field are not constant but shift over 
time. 
 
Gravity anomalies are often due to unusual concentrations of mass in a region. For example, the presence 
of mountain ranges will usually cause the gravitational force to be more than it would be on a featureless 
planet – positive gravity anomaly. Conversely, the presence of ocean trenches or even the depression of the 
landmass that was caused by the presence of glaciers millennia ago can cause negative gravity anomalies. 
(http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/GRACE/page3.php) 
 
If gravity were an important factor for evolution, then there would be many problems historically correlating 
any relationship between impermanent gravitational anomalies and nature most diverse.  
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Gravity and altitude 
 
Before the relationship between gravity and altitude is considered, one point requires slight clarification. It is 
not the case that the proportion of oxygen changes, it remains at just under 21% whether measured at sea 
level or atop Everest. If there is a compositional change, then it’s the isotopes that change, Oxygen16 is more 
prevalent at higher altitudes than Oxygen 18 owing to the small difference in masses. (Helfand 2009 Ch.4) 
What does vary, however, is the air pressure, which changes with height, following Boyle’s Law. The cause 
of the differential pressure is gravity: air pressure increases with gravitational pull, which is greater nearer the 
centre of the Earth. These physical laws have implications for the physiology and structure of any organism.  
 
If you were to analyze the body shape and composition of a Peruvian mountain dweller you’d find some 
striking differences from someone who has lived all his or her life at sea level. For one thing, the mountain 
dweller would be somewhat short, have a barrel-chested appearance, have more red blood cells, more 
blood in the circulation, and more blood vessels in his lungs. (Widmaier 1998 p62) 
 
To summarise Widmaier: The less pressure there is, the harder it is to drive air into the lungs and then force it 
across the lungs into the blood capillaries. The shorter stature and expanded chest of a mountain dweller 
facilitate larger lung capacity, which in turn facilitates increased blood cells, which in turn offers greater 
haemoglobin and hence the ability to derive oxygen from a less pressurised environment. Such mountain 
dwellers also have proportionately larger hearts. Moreover, cells contain more mitochondria, which in turn 
contain more of the enzymes that are required to produce energy. Widmaier observes that similar capacities 
to cope with oxygen deprivation are present in diving mammals and concludes that ‘without these remarkable 
abilities, all mammalian life would be confined to a narrow range of terrestrial altitudes’ (Widmaier 1998 
p64). This is undoubtedly true, but one must be careful when universalising biological attributes. Beall 
(2007) points out that the physiological characteristics of the high-altitude Andean are not the same as the 
characteristics of the high-altitude Tibetan. It seems that the Tibetans have evolved through different 
pathways and are able to cope with diminished oxygen pressure: 
 
In summary, measures of oxygen transport reveal that Andean and Tibetan populations have large 
quantitative differences in numerous physiological and molecular traits involved in oxygen delivery. The 
hypothesis is that evolutionary processes have tinkered differently in the two founding populations and 
their descendents, with the result that the two populations followed different routes to the same functional 
outcome of successful oxygen delivery. (Beall 2007) 
 
This study illustrates how pluralistic evolution can be. The search for a fundamental mechanism that 
underlies all evolutionary change may prove as fruitful as the search for El Dorado. Nevertheless, the 
gravitational biologist has witnessed that rapid changes to form will occur universally under changed 
conditions of gravity. These changes are permanent as long as the individual remains in that environment. 
  
Gravity and the relationship of parts 
 
The previous chapter mentioned that Thompson had recognised that gravity plays a determining influence 
over the size of physiological features, bone structure, organs etc. Some recent observations by Lavers (2000) 
have expanded this perspective concerning the relationship between different parts of the body. For instance, 
Lavers notes that no animals with big heads can have long necks. Because of gravitational forces, large heads 
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such as those of the elephant and the hippopotamus can only be supported by a short neck. Animals with long 
necks, such as the giraffe or the huge dinosaurs from the past, all have relatively small heads. The 
relationships go deeper still: the giraffe’s head is further from the ground than that of most animals; therefore 
the energy required to pump blood to it is greater. To counter gravity, the giraffe must have a heart that is 
capable to pump the blood the longer distance. Indeed, the giraffe has evolved a heart with much thicker wall 
on the left ventricle and an increased blood pressure. The important lesson here is that one cannot adjust or 
alter one part of a body significantly without a corresponding adjustment elsewhere in the body. As the 
giraffe evolved a longer neck, it was not only the heart that changed; longer legs evolved to facilitate access 
to water at ground level and the longest known nerve cells stretch from its brain to its limbs. One must be 
wary if one is given to explaining features by recourse to the selection of particular traits, such as the long 
neck. For traits are rarely particular and any analysis, selectionist or structuralist, must bear this in mind.57  
 
Conclusion 
 
The influence of gravity in evolutionary matters has been little discussed until recent years. On the rare 
occasions it has been discussed by those of a neo-Darwinian persuasion, gravity has been perceived as a 
constraint that set the boundaries for an arena for natural selection to work within. However, in the quest to 
understand how life might endure for long periods in space, it was witnessed that profound changes to the 
form of any organism are induced very quickly under conditions of reduced gravity and the weightlessness of 
free-fall. Moreover, those non-genetic, physiological changes prove permanent whilst those conditions 
remain. Interestingly, the full impact of gravity can be softened by continuous exercise of bodily parts – in 
other words, ‘use it or lose it’. Gravity, then, has a direct impact upon every organism’s physiology and 
constitution. The precise causal processes are little understood but increasingly of interest and under study. 
For the purposes here, it is important to recognise that gravity must be a key factor when it comes to 
understanding form. It impinges upon overall body size, the skeletal structure, the convection and distribution 
of fluids, the size of the heart and other tissues, the relationship between parts, the external bilateral 
symmetry, the nature of the cell and production of proteins (Blaber et al. 2010). Gravity may also play 
largely in self-assembly self-stabilising structures that form spontaneously at every scale (Bhattacharjee 
2012). One must remember the importance of gravitropism in plants and the influence of gravity upon the 
configuration and formation of the body axes in the development of the embryo.  
 
One might accept that gravity does indeed have an influence over the form of organisms but still wonder why 
it is that organisms take on all manner of sizes, from the microbe to the blue whale. If gravity is so 
significant, why are organisms not all the same size? Well, apart from differential effects of gravity, such as 
the marine and the terrestrial, there are many other factors that impinge directly upon the organism. 
Temperature and nutrition will now be considered and appraised as important parts of the jigsaw puzzle of 
life. The pieces, however, are not distinct and unrelated: gravity, size, temperature and nutrition all go hand 
in hand and form an evolutionary perspective which may come to life when considered in the context of 
development.  
                                                 
57 For a modern holistic account of form in reference to the giraffe see Holdrege (2005). Holdrege asks, did the giraffe evolve longer legs 
first? (Which facilitated faster fleeing from predators.) If so, did the evolution of the long neck follow, which enabled the giraffe, now 
with long legs, to reach essential water? 
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Temperature 
 
The last section demonstrated that gravity is a major determining factor of an organism’s form. From the 
perspective of this work, this is an important consideration because gravity impinges on all members of any 
population directly. However, gravity alone leaves many unanswered questions, so it is essential to consider 
other factors that might also have a direct influence upon the organism. The influence of ‘temperature’ will 
now be considered, in particular its relationship with homeostasis and the scaling of body size. The 
implications of scaling and size for aspects of general behaviour and the importance of nutrition will then be 
examined. The particulars are diverse and complex, but the aim is not only to demonstrate that gravity, 
temperature, scaling and nutrition are factors that impinge upon the overall form and behaviour of all 
organisms but also to demonstrate that these factors are inextricably related. To elucidate all of this, however, 
one must go back to the earliest forms of life. 
 
Prokaryotes have dominated the planet since the first proto-cell four billion years ago. It took over two more 
billion years before a new life form emerged in the shape of a eukaryote and it was this later group that gave 
rise to some cells combining and forming multicellular organisms (Smith and Szathmary 1995). Prokaryotes, 
it seems, are not normally conducive to multicellularity, although it is not entirely unknown (Russell et al., 
2008 p535). The transformation from the single cell to the multi-cell is one of the major evolutionary steps in 
the formation of life as we recognise it, but how this came about is still a mystery and subject of much 
research and speculation. Attention here, however, will be directed to the consequences that face 
multicellular organisms, the avenues that are opened and those that are closed. Our focus here will be on 
mammals and the rigours of homeostasis.  
 
One could argue that, whereas the single cell is largely governed in its geographical location by the elements 
– wind, tide, current etc. – the advent of appendages, facilitated in most instances by multicellularity, allows 
these organisms freedom from such restrictions. Moreover, this new freedom required precise internal 
interactions and coordinations. Locomotion opens new vistas for the multicellular but is dependent upon 
specialised cells, tissues and organs. These specialised features must themselves be protected from the 
elements if they are to function and produce locomotion. It is further suggested here that the formation of 
protective skin or shell enables a safe internal environment for cells to interact. However, internal operations 
can never be entirely divorced from external events: the proteins, which are the workhorses in the 
mammalian body, are themselves influenced by physical and chemical conditions. These include such 
conditions as salt concentration, carbon dioxide levels, oxygen concentration, the acidity or alkalinity of 
solutions (pH) and, as is central for the perspective here, temperature. The internal temperature of a human, 
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for example, must fall within strict parameters, between 36 and 39°C, if it is to survive and function.58 How, 
then, is this narrow constraint achieved and what are the consequences? Certain mechanisms, which will now 
be examined, are required to achieve thermal homeostasis. 
 
59Generally, biochemical reactions within an organism work at a faster rate in warmer temperatures and slow 
down as temperature cools. If the temperature becomes too high, then enzymes will expand and unfold, 
ceasing to function. Further, membranes will become more permeable, losing protective advantage. On the 
other hand, if the temperature drops dramatically, the whole biological machinery could come to a halt as the 
cells literally freeze. One can draw the analogy for thermal homeostasis with a heated room or office. To 
maintain a fairly constant temperature, a thermometer is needed to obtain current information; in biology, this 
is known as the receptor. The receptor is not an organ but the chemical processes that slow or speed in 
response to temperature change. These chemical changes lead to further chemical changes known as the 
comparator; in the room analogy, this is the thermostat. The thermostat (comparator) will activate the 
‘effector’, which could be the biological equivalent of a heater or a cooler. In an animal, it works something 
like this: Beginning with normal body temperature, there is an increase in the external temperature which 
begins to speed up the chemical activities in the body. This causes an area at the base of the brain, behind the 
mouth and known as the hypothalamus, to activate cooling mechanisms, such as capillaries close to the skin 
surface filling with warm blood and sweat glands activating to help evaporative cooling. As the body 
temperature cools, the comparator (thermostat) turns off the cooling mechanisms. On the other hand, if 
temperatures drop, then slowed activity in the hypothalamus leads to muscle contraction, shivering and blood 
vessels constricting until things warm up again. It is important to appreciate that these are all inevitable 
chemical processes interacting with changing thermodynamics. ‘Inevitable’, that is, until something goes 
awry. For instance, it was discovered that animals with a damaged hypothalamus cannot enjoy the benefits of 
homeostasis. Chemical changes in the hypothalamus can also be caused by bacterial invasion. A part of the 
defence within the immune system is to raise body temperature when under attack from pathogens. 
 
Creatures that possess the homeostatic system outlined above are typically endotherms. The maintenance of 
such a system is dependent upon metabolism and the conversion of sugars to energy. Ectotherms, such as 
fish, amphibians and reptiles, have a more direct relationship with the external environment; their internal 
body temperatures do not have the same constancy as those of endotherms but reflect external temperatures. 
The ectotherm can gain part of its energy directly from various sources of heat including the sun, with its 
metabolic rate increasing as temperatures rise and dropping as temperatures fall. Endotherms also see an 
increase in metabolic rate when external temperatures increase. The ideal external temperature for an 
endotherm is for it to be the same as its normal body temperature because then the extra work involved in 
metabolism is not necessary. Because ectotherms have a direct relationship with external temperature, their 
range of behaviours and geographical locations is constrained. If the temperature is too high, ectotherms must 
seek shade or water to avoid overheating. If the temperature is too low, they fail to function; persistent severe 
cold leads to death. Both ectotherms and endotherms have evolved a few other physiological means of 
controlling temperature; take the example of icefish: 
                                                 
58 This range is similar for most active lizards, snakes and larger flying insects. Passerines, however, only survive in a higher 
temperature range of 40–42°C. The parameters are 34–36°C for marsupials such as the kangaroo and 30–32°C for monotremes such as 
the duck-billed platypus. (See Akin 2011). 
59 The empirical details concerning thermoregulation and homeostasis are a summary from Locker (1973). 
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The fish completely lacked red blood cells, the pigmented oxygen-carrying cells that, until the discovery of 
these Antarctic icefish, had been found in every living vertebrate. Indeed, no other case of bloodless 
vertebrate has ever been discovered outside the fifteen or so species of the icefish now known. (Carroll 
2009 p22) 
 
The icefish do have a nearly transparent liquid in their veins but it lacks the haemoglobin molecule that gives 
the normal red appearance. Carroll explains this novel feature by the loss of one globin gene and the erosion 
of another that has left it useless, ‘similar to a fossil’.60 
 
Metabolism and scaling 
 
Life is amazing. Even the smallest bacterium is far more complex in its structure and function than any 
known physical system. The largest most complex organisms, large mammals and giant trees, weigh more 
than 21 orders of magnitude more than the simplest microbes, yet they use basically the same molecular 
structures and biochemical pathways to sustain and reproduce themselves. (Brown, West and Enquist 2000 
p1) 
 
Interest in scaling began at the start of the twentieth century with Thompson (1917) and Murray (1926). The 
theme was developed further in the 1930s by Kleiber (1932) and Huxley (1932), the latter introducing the 
term ‘allometry’. Interest declined after this, with the focus directed toward molecular sciences, but it 
flourished again in the early 1980s, only to stall once again. The arrival of the twenty-first century has seen a 
revival of the study. Why is biological scaling important when understanding evolution? To answer this, one 
must consider the two familiar themes in evolutionary explanations – function and form. Sometimes, these 
themes have been perceived as antagonistic, sometimes as divorced and irrelevant to each other. Scaling 
biology, however, demonstrates relationships between them, illustrating some of the physical constraints on 
evolutionary variability. Further, the size of an organism requires that its components observe proportional 
relationships. If the relationship is not ‘correct’, with one of the components becoming too large or too small, 
then the risk is that the organism in question will no longer be able to function. 
 
Even the simplest organism is an extremely complex system, which depends for its existence and 
reproduction on the integrated performance of its many component structures and functions. As organisms 
vary in size, these structures and functions, and the integration of all of them, must be preserved within 
narrow limits. (Brown, West and Enquist 2000 p9) 
 
The scaling of organisms does not follow simple geometric scaling such as one might see in a series of 
Russian dolls. Metabolism – the conversion of external sources to provide energy for the organism – plays an 
essential role in scaling. The metabolic rate for all mammals scales as the three-quarter power of body mass 
(M3/4), which indicates that smaller mammals have disproportionately faster metabolic rates than larger 
mammals (Brown et al 2000 p87, 114). Another example of differentiated scaling is that as a mammal 
increases in size, its bones must become disproportionately larger to provide the necessary mechanical 
support (ibid p1, 14, 299). Biological scaling is not confined to mammals but stretches across all the 
kingdoms of life. For example, as a tree increases in size, its trunk grows not at a geometric rate of 2M/3 but 
                                                 
60 However, this may be an oversimplification of the events, as other researchers discovered ‘surprisingly, a phylogenetically derived 
icefish species, Neopagetopsis ionah, possesses a complete, but non functional, adult αß-globin complex’. This icefish retains the genetic 
material thought responsible for haemoglobin, but this remains unexpressed, and an example of two pseudogenes. It is something of a 
mystery why expression does not take place. (Cocca et al. 1995) 
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at a faster rate of M3/4 (ibid p167, 199). This applies to all trees. Failure to conform to this pattern of growth 
would result in the tree buckling under gravity or strong wind.  
 
The implications 
 
Imagine taking a cake from the oven and placing it on a cooling tray. Half an hour later, the cake is cool on 
the outside but still warm at the centre. Now imagine taking a cake from the oven, cutting it into quarters and 
placing it on the cooling tray. This time, the cake is evenly cool half an hour later. The simple laws of 
thermodynamics dictate that a large body retains heat and energy better than a smaller body. Cutting the cake 
into quarters greatly increased the surface area, facilitating heat loss. 
 
All living systems must keep their temperature within a certain range to function; failure to do so could lead 
to death. Large endotherms (warm-blooded animals) such as elephants living in the tropics run the risk of 
overheating and have to continually seek shade or cool themselves in water. At the other end of the 
endothermic scale, a mouse or a shrew has the opposite problem (McGowan 1999 p65). Like the quartered 
cake, these small creatures suffer a much faster heat loss relative to their size. In order to maintain their 
temperature, they must replace the energy lost through the surface with energy from consuming food. This 
conversion determines the metabolic rate (ibid p18, p22). The smaller the organism, the disproportionately 
faster is the metabolic rate (ibid p28). Smaller endotherms are unable to accommodate large hearts within 
their bodies, so their hearts must beat faster to supply the whole body with blood. A shrew’s heartrate is 700 
times a minute compared with an elephant’s 35–40 beats per minute. Humans have a heartrate of 65–70 beats 
per minute (ibid p8) 
 
.  
Figure 10 
Source: http://universe-review.ca/R10-35-metabolic.htm 
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In 1932, Kleiber drew graphs to demonstrate allometry across a wide taxonomic range, from unicellar 
organisms, to vascular plants, to poikilotherms (ectotherms) to endotherms. See Figure 10 for a more recent 
illustration. Later, it was noticed that this same power of scaling could apply to the components of the cell: 
 
When extrapolated back a further twenty orders of magnitude, this fit coincides with the respiratory rate 
not only of mammalian mitochondria but even with that of molecular respiratory complex and terminal 
oxidose molecular units within mitochondrial membranes! (Brown, West and Enquist 2000 p88) 
 
The authors above claim allometric scaling laws provide one of the rare examples of universal quantitative 
laws in biology. Indeed, their model extends to explain the circulatory and respiratory systems of both 
mammals and vascular plants. They argue that, fundamentally, the architecture of all the transport systems 
that provide essential nutrients is linear with hierarchical branching. Within the physical and geometric 
constraints these systems must observe, the energy required for transportation is minimised. 
 
Thus, for example, the architecture of both mammalian arteries and plant xylem are both fractal – like 
branching ‘trees’ even though the former is driven by a pulsating pump (the heart), which propels blood 
through vessels of decreasing size, while the latter consists of an osmotic pump, which draws fluid through 
many parallel micro capillary tubes (ibid. p92) 
 
The authors claim that the evolution of both large mammals and trees has been largely influenced by the 
hydrodynamic and biochemical constraints imposed by resource networks. Brown et al.’s prediction within 
mammalian cardiovascular and respiratory systems has correlated remarkably well with the empirical data. If 
these patterns of scaling are held to be correct, then many predictive possibilities arise. This 
biological/mathematical approach has not escaped the attentions of physicists working in the fields of 
complexity and chaos theory. Indeed, Strogatz (2008) is convinced that the fractal nature of organs such as 
the pulmonary arteries, the heart and the smallest capillaries lends itself to mathematical scaling and perhaps 
even explaining some of life’s biological mysteries when considered in a relationship with metabolism and 
mass. Some enigmatic questions arise. Why is it that species have the life spans they have and not a longer or 
shorter life span? Why is it that a mouse, composed of a very similar set of molecules and genetic make-up to 
a human, only lives for one or two years but a human for 70 or 80? Indeed, this whole area of research 
touches on some very curious regularities and correlations that have deemed to be unrelated in the past. For 
example, take any animal, be it an ectotherm or an endotherm, and given its normal number of years, all will 
enjoy the same number of heartbeats: 1.5 billion in fact, Ceteris paribus (McGowan 1999 p57-59). It was 
mentioned above that the scaling model promises predictive advantages. One is that once the average mass of 
an organism is known, its probable lifespan, its metabolic rate, its necessary calorific intake and even perhaps 
the limits to any reproduction rates can be inferred. Brown et al. postulated that the scaling model could 
predict the minimum size for a mammal, which they suggested would be approximately 2 grams – a figure 
that was established in Chapter 9 when consideration was given to Thompson. Another prediction resulting 
from the model that has recently been confirmed was that a mammalian cell’s metabolic rate is related to the 
geometric size of the organism (West et al 2002). 
 
However, one needs to be cautious and not be swept away seductively by these promising symmetries that 
seem to both explain and predict facets of biology and a range of evolutionary possibilities. There are 
asymmetries that do not conform so neatly. For example, humans live for longer than the model would 
predict and this cannot be dismissed as simply the ‘noise’ to be expected with some statistical compilations. 
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A similar problem arises with micro-organisms: the model predicts that the smaller the organism, the lower 
its longevity, and this does seem mostly true. However, in a recent study, Stewart Johnson et al. (2007) 
collected soil samples in the permafrost of the Yukon, Canada and found bacteria that were half a million 
years old. These cells still maintained metabolic functions, clearly contrary to what one would expect from 
the scaling model. Should the scaling model be cast aside on this evidence? Supporters argue no, saying that 
one would expect to find such anomalies in the biological world and the model should be seen as a tool for 
prising out asymmetries. Furthermore, it is the asymmetries uncovered in nature that are of interest and 
should be the focus of further research. This does seem a reasonable response and when one sees the 
mechanisms behind the unusual behaviour of other microbes that induce dormancy, it is clear why there is an 
anomaly. The example of the human anomaly is more difficult to explain and no doubt subject to debate. 
However, it must also be respected that the presence of any such anomalies does render any predictive 
powers less assured and here one must tread with more caution. 
 
Temperature, size and the distribution of species 
 
This scaling has some interesting and unexpected effects on human society as well. For example, the grain 
storage buildings constructed by the Inca civilization at low altitudes were fashioned from rocks that had 
been laboriously shaped by pounding with river rocks until they could be fitted tightly together. On the 
other hand, the grain storage buildings at high altitudes (up to 5.5 kilometers, or 18,000 feet!) were simply 
rough shelters covered with a roof. Why the difference? One reason was that small, warm blooded, grain 
eating animals such as rats and mice can not survive at high elevations because they lose body heat too 
fast. Therefore there was no need to construct buildings with closely fitting stones to keep these animals 
out. (Barnes 2009) 
The considerations of temperature, size, scaling and the distribution of species are inextricable. It is arguably 
uncontroversial that climatic conditions determine the scope and quality of the flora and fauna globally and 
not by accident that a disproportionately large number of species occupy the equatorial regions compared 
with the cooler climes. The rainforests make up only 6% of the land surface and yet are home to half of the 
world’s terrestrial plants and animals (Cox and Moore 2010 p149, 1311). One striking example is that in a 
single square mile of rainforest, there can be 1,200 species of butterfly, which is more than the number of 
butterfly species in the whole of the USA and Canada combined (Raven 2010). The marine is an example of 
temperature limitations on life: in warmer waters, oxygen levels decrease, limiting the abundance of life 
(Kaiser et al. 2005 p281). In the depths of the abyssal, where there is no light, nothing exists; but at depths of 
2,500 metres, an entire ecosystem exists independently of photosynthetic processes. The thermal energy of 
the rocks heats the surrounding waters to 350°C and bacteria are able to practise chemosynthesis within the 
tissues of the clams, mussels and large red-plumed worms that cluster around the heated vents, providing 
energy in a symbiotic relationship (ibid. p58-60).  
61On land, the abundance of life decreases dramatically, for example, to the far north and the form of 
organisms is affected. Apart from the wood frog and the common garter snake living in the most southerly 
part of the Arctic, there are no known amphibians or reptiles. In the Arctic itself, there are no trees; some 
shrubs can exist, but they never reach more than two metres in height. The pioneers of terrestrial life – 
mosses and lichen – can be found in the tundra, but vascular plants are largely non-existent; only a few 
survive, living in close proximity to each other, near to the ground, their growth checked by the harsh winds. 
                                                 
61 The details of arctic biodiversity outlined in this paragraph were extracted and summarised from Huntington (2001). 
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The arctic willow has very small roots and its leaves turn a curious crimson colour in late summer, giving the 
appearance of a large carpet. No adaptive advantage of colour is present here. This plant is the food of the 
hare, the Peary caribou and musk oxen. Small mammals are a rarity. As indicated in the quotation above, heat 
loss is a major factor, and the smaller the mammal, the higher is the proportion of body exposed to the 
elements. These smaller mammals operate homeostasis by hibernating in the coldest periods or, in the case of 
lemmings, by burrowing underground. Characteristic of larger animals are smaller extremities and shorter 
and often thinner limbs than those of their relatives in warmer climates. One interesting example is the 
comparison of foxes’ ears. The arctic fox has the smallest ear, the fox of temperate region has a middle-sized 
ear and the desert fox has a much-elongated ear. Arctic foxes also have denser, shorter, softer hair than their 
relatives in warmer climes. Snowshoe hares, lynx, mink and baby seals have similar hair.  
Are these differences explained sufficiently by the relationship between the homeostasis of the organism and 
the long- or short-term temperature? Is it necessary to posit explanation through appeal to some form of 
adaptationism? Can a more parsimonious explanation be achieved by simply examining the physical 
causality outlined above? Prior to Darwin, many naturalists had accredited variations to changes in 
environmental features such as climate, humidity and the importance of diet (Kropotkin 1995 reprint).  
Bergmann’s Rule (1847) considered some of what is said above concerning the relationship between form 
and homeostasis, whereas Gloger’s Rule (1833) considered the role of humidity in relation to pigmentation in 
endotherms. Whilst Darwin was still alive, Allen’s Rule (1877) was posited to explain the relationship 
between heat loss and the length of bones and other appendages such as the ear. One could argue that these 
‘rules’ appealed to few biologists, being seen as rule-of-thumb curiosities whose generalisations were not 
without exception. Explanation through adaptation was the popular ideology of the twentieth century and any 
research that suggested direct physical causation was thought by many to be evolutionarily insignificant.62 
However, this new century has already witnessed some radical changes to our thinking and researchers have 
looked again at the importance of temperature and Allen’s Rule. Serrat, King and Lovejoy (2008) discovered, 
both in vitro and in vivo, that the growth of appendages of mice was directly sensitive to temperature 
differences: 
 
The mechanism by which environmental temperature modulates extremity growth has remained elusive. 
Understanding growth plasticity is critical to basic evolutionary analyses, because many characters that 
have long been hypothesized to be adaptations may instead be partial or even entirely effects of ambient 
temperature. (Serrat, King and Lovejoy 2008) 
 
This research is consistent with work from the 1960s in which two groups of pigs were reared at different 
temperatures, 25°C and 35°C. At the higher temperature, the pigs developed longer extremities and less hair 
than the controls, even though body weights were similar (Weaver and Ingram 1969). Weismann, back in 
1875, (Quoted in Gilbert 2005) observed the effect of temperature upon the colouration of the wings of the 
butterfly Araschina levana. Such was the difference between the eclosing of spring and summer that 
Linnaeus believed two separate species were evident. It is now known that changes in day length and in 
temperature trigger the amount of the hormone ecdysone in the larva. Gilbert (2005 pp66–72) sees this as one 
example of several that illustrate how the environment can induce differentiation in gene expression, leading 
                                                 
62 See Kropotkin’s collection of articles reprinted in 1995 for an insight into the evolutionary debates in the Victorian era. 
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to phenotypic variation. Temperature does not only induce the activity of the gene but can also affect the 
final protein in other ways. Gilbert provides the following example: 
 
When discussing environmental regulation of gene expression, it is important to keep in mind that gene 
activity does not necessarily mean gene transcription. The regulation of the gene product can occur at other 
points along the pathway to make a functional protein. One of the best-documented cases of temperature 
affecting protein activity and normal phenotype production is the temperature sensitive tyrosinase found in 
Siamese cats, Himalayan cavies, mice, and guinea pigs (see Schmalhausen 1949). Some families of 
humans also have this condition, caused by a temperature sensitive tyrosinase enzyme. Under normal 
(high) body temperatures, this enzyme is folded in a manner such that it becomes unstable and remains in 
the ER-Golgi apparatus to be degraded. However, at slightly lower temperatures – that of the ears, nose 
and extremities of the limb – the enzyme folds properly and is able to function. (Gilbert 2005 pp68–69) 
 
Indeed, it has been demonstrated that if one were to shave the white fur of a Himalayan rabbit and then apply 
an ice pack on the naked skin, the resulting regrowth of fur would be black.63 The term ‘phenocopy’ was 
coined by Goldschmidt in 1935 and is illustrated by much of the above.  
 
Size, Speed and the Correlation of Parts 
 
One can argue that the size, shape and mass of an organism have consequences not only for its metabolism, 
longevity and reproductive rates but also for its locomotion and aspects of its behaviour. One must remember 
that organisms are constituted of smaller components, down to the smallest of particles, and continuously 
interacting with the extrinsic. Just like the electron or the neutrino, they are subject to laws that determine the 
relationships between mass and motion, and it is worthwhile giving a brief overview of such relationships. 
The smallest of particles, the photon, travels (in a vacuum) the fastest; as particles increase in mass, their 
potential velocities slow accordingly (Close et al. 1986). This pertains through to the molecular, but very 
large objects such as planets and stars proceed at enormous speeds, far greater than those of any molecules or 
living organisms (Bonner 2006). Movement within molecules is determined largely by temperature: high 
temperatures excite the atoms, with progression to gas, whereas cooler temperatures lead to less activity, 
retaining solidity. At the point of the smallest of organisms and of the largest of molecules, there is a curious 
equivalence in motion (ibid. p137-146). 
 
It is generally true with organisms that the smaller the organism, the slower the speed. The smallest microbes 
are the slowest movers and the virus, if it can be considered an organism, is a virtual non-mover (ibid p137-
146). Fortunately for birds, most travel at greater speeds than insects, and penguins are generally faster than 
most small fish.64 The general rule does not always hold: the elephant cannot muster much more than 15mph, 
the anomaly here being the effect of gravity. Compare this with the blue whale, a creature that can outstrip a 
speedboat (Reisner 2009).Is it not the case that size and speed are major considerations for behaviour? Take 
again the blue whale: its source of food is largely krill, which it engulfs in the manner of a trawler, mainly 
because it is faster than its prey. Although larger sea life would provide a welcome diet, the size of the blue 
whale means that momentum in one direction precludes any quickness in changing direction that would be 
needed to catch smaller fish of lesser speed but greater mobility.  
 
                                                 
63 For a detailed modern exposition of the genetic explanation see Baum el al. (2010). 
64 The world’s fastest animal is the peregrine falcon, diving at speeds of 200mph, with the swift reaching lateral speeds of approximately 
100mph. This compares with the 80mph of the cheetah. (Reisner 2009) 
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65The largest dinosaurs were all vegetarian, too cumbersome for mobile prey to be of any interest. This is not 
the case with the smaller Tryannosaurus rex or Spinosaurus, both massive creatures coming close in weight 
to the elephant but, unlike the elephant, carnivorous and dependent upon speed. This was achieved by 
counteracting the gravitational force through enormous and powerful hind legs, but the dynamics of this 
inevitably resulted in compensatory much reduced forelimbs. One might wish to consider this as an example 
of Darwin’s correlation of growth or as a more modern author suggests: 
 
It is clear that size, from the pure point of view of physics, has an enormous effect on living organisms. It 
constrains, or even controls, the shape of an organism, including its internal structure. It determines what is 
possible and what is impossible. And as we have also seen, it can effect the behaviour of animals as well as 
their locomotion. (Bonner 2006 p49) 
 
Arguably, the amount of energy an organism can take in is limited to its size; therefore the conversion of 
Adenosine-5'-triphosphate (ATP) can only fulfil certain tasks. It follows that an individual cannot be a fast 
runner, adroit swimmer and soar in flight amongst the clouds. Energy constraints ensure that specialisation in 
one area entails deficiency in another.66 If the size of an organism changes, then other matters must follow. 
Therefore, does one need only explain this by parsimonious means of direct causality? Neo-Darwinists would 
disagree, perhaps even arguing there is a Prima facie ‘no’ here. Structuralists do however argue in favour of 
direct adaptations. Taking a unique perspective on this point Reiss (Ch.12) argues that we should abandon the 
concept of ‘adaptation’ altogether, but more on this later. 
 
There is another form of constraint that can be observed at the macro level. If predators are dependent upon 
their prey then this has implications for the distribution of species. There can never be more carnivores than 
omnivores. There can never be more omnivores than plants or fungi. All of these groups are also completely 
dependent on micro-organisms, but these micro-organisms can survive, and did so for many years, without 
the existence of multicellular life. None of this ordering necessitates adaptive explanations or an appeal to 
natural selection.  
 
Nutrition – We Are What We Eat 
 
It can be argued that life as we know it is composed of stardust, where all the components of an organism are 
the products of the Sun. The dominant constituents are carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and hydrogen, plus a little 
phosphorus, potassium, sulphur etc. (Gribbin & Gribbin 2009, Berkowitz 2012, Hazen 2012). Altogether, 
there are thought to be 30 elements that constitute the human body, for example. (See Appendix 2.) What 
contributes to the various forms of life is the quality of the elements taken in by an organism through 
breathing, absorption and diet. For instance, the mineralisation of soft-bodied animals to those of skeletal 
animals could only have taken place if the minerals were available for acquisition. As an example, the quality 
of human bone and teeth is determined largely by the quality of the materials consumed. In fact, by analysing 
the isotopic ratios in a bone, forensic palaeontologists can discover not only the organism’s diet but also the 
elements absorbed from the environment (Lewis 2007). From this, these elements can even be matched to 
particular environments. Such acquisitions are fundamental therefore for a complete understanding of form. 
                                                 
65 The details concerning the physiology and behaviour of the dinosaur were extracted from Colbert et al., (2001). 
66 For a recent consideration of the importance of the correlation of parts, see Lockley (2007) and Schad (1977). 
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Changing the quality of the acquisition could also have evolutionary consequences. It is worthwhile 
considering other examples, one of which has a relationship with a scaling model. 
 
One form of scaling not mentioned so far is the relationship between body size and brain size. Brain size has 
been found to reflect body size: elephants have the largest terrestrial brains on the planet and the mouse 
lemur (Microcebus murinus) of Madagascar, which weighs 2 grams, the smallest (Hart et al. 2001). However, 
the scaling is not directly proportional but follows a 2/3 power law (Ew(brain) = 0.12w(body)2/3). The 
correlation holds well as a general rule but, as one might expect in biology, there are anomalies. The 
encephalisation quotient (EQ) measures any divergence in brain size from the expected norm (Foley and 
Lewin 2004). Porpoises, dolphins and humans have high EQs because their brain mass exceeds the 2/3 scaling 
with their respective body mass. So why is it that humans have a much greater EQ than their closest 
evolutionary relations? How does one explain this phenomenon of great evolutionary significance? Just how 
did the human cerebral neocortex come to be the mass it is? 
 
Anthropologists have sought to explain this rapid evolutionary novelty in two distinct ways. The first 
explanation focuses upon the importance of bipedalism, which facilitated freedom of the upper limbs to 
engage in social activities such as tool-making and hunting (Foley and Lewin 2009, Stanford 2004), In turn, 
these activities would exercise neural cells, leading to more complex neural connections and development of 
the frontal lobes. This has certain plausibility but one must recognise that the mechanism described here is 
essentially Lamarckian. It follows from Lamarck’s ideas of use, entailing the activation of organs which, if 
continued over many generations, would result in acquired characteristics. Darwin also posited this type of 
explanation on many occasions if he felt there was no evidence of Malthusian struggle or sexual selection at 
play (Ch.1). The second anthropological explanation postulates that the quality of the nutritional intake can 
change an organism’s form. Focus here is placed upon the diet of our hominid ancestors. (Striedter 2005) 
One explanation is that the meat appropriated on the savannah provided the energy necessary for cortex 
growth (Bunn 2006). An alternative explanation is that fish was the important protein factor, for it contained 
docosahexaenoic acid (DHA), a major chemical substrate for the brain (Crawford 2008). Crawford and 
Marsh (1989) perceive evolution as ‘substrate driven’ where a change in diet leads to an evolutionary change 
in brain architecture in a way that is not dependent upon the chance mutation process.  Again, Darwin (1868) 
saw that nutrition could produce evolutionary change but carefully distinguished such a process from his 
Malthusian natural selection. 
 
Researchers are quoted in Gilbert and Epel (2009) as saying that a particular diet can ‘cause changes in jaw 
structure of mammals and fishes’ without any alteration in the genetic sequencing of the individuals under 
study. This type of morphological change and many others are referred to as processes of ‘phenotypic 
accommodation’.  
 
Another contrast between the direct effect of diet explanation and the chance mutation explanation can be 
seen with flamingos and other birds such as the house finch (Carpodacus mexicanus) and the canary, which 
is the domesticated form of the serin (Serinus canaria) originating in the Canary Isles (Hill et al. 1994). How 
does one explain the plumage colouration of such birds? Take the flamingo: the chick default colour is white, 
but within three years or so the bird becomes the striking pink. However, this is not always the case; certain 
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zookeepers found that their flamingo chicks remained white when they developed into adults. This was 
discovered not to be albinism or genetic mutation but simply the result of changing diet. For such birds 
require a carotenoid-rich diet such as shrimp, seeds, vegetables, fruit and insects that contain the necessary 
pigments (ibid Hill et al). It does not follow, of course, that if birds of other species were fed such a diet, they 
too would change colour. For a colour change to manifest itself, certain genes must be present. The important 
point here is that, to understand form fully, one must consider any possible environmental interaction with an 
organism’s biochemistry. A permanent change in environmental factors could produce a permanent change in 
an organism, so it is very problematic to assume any default position. One classic example to illustrate these 
considerations further is that of the queen honeybee: a diet of protein-rich ‘royal jelly’ is required to increase 
hormone levels to the levels necessary for the formation of fertile queens; if the diet is insufficient, then the 
larvae become sterile worker bees (Seeley 1996).  
 
Conclusion 
 
There are many factors, other than heredity and changes in gene sequencing, which shape the form of living 
things. Indeed the structure of DNA itself is subject to the laws of physics and topology.  Temperature, 
gravity and nutrition are factors that have been discussed here, but this list is far from exhaustive. 
Consideration could also be given to the influences of humidity, precipitation, the cycles of light and dark 
that come from a revolving planet and electromagnetic interactions, to name a few. Organisms are not 
divorced extrinsically: changes in external factors can effect changes in the organism and these could subsist 
from generation to generation. This direct causality could also impinge upon the biochemical changes that 
lead to mutation in the chromosome. The subtle but influential relationships between gravity, size, 
temperature, homeostasis, growth, locomotion and behaviour have perhaps been under-appreciated. These 
factors combined impinge upon the organism constraining and determining the products of the cell and its 
components. The interactions are complex and difficult to elucidate, the variables are many and unfortunately 
do not conform to a convenient equation.  One might argue that all the phenomena above could be addressed 
from the perspective of selection. Indeed, one could do so but then the question arises- would such an 
approach be parsimonious? What is the point of icing a cake twice? 
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 Explanation and Evolutionary Pluralism 
 
Chapter 11: Explanation in Evolutionary Biology 
 
In this chapter, explanation in evolutionary biology is considered. There are many difficult obstacles, for 
explanation in general is a live philosophical issue with little consensus. There will be no pretence to resolve 
this situation here, but existing arguments within evolutionary biology will be assessed for validity. The type 
of explanation employed within evolutionary theory and where it is that natural selection can be legitimately 
engaged are of particular interest. There have been many advances empirically within evolutionary biology 
during the last 15 years or so. The recent evidence impacts upon the issue of natural selection and it is 
valuable to examine new interpretations or refinements that have been suggested. It is of paramount 
importance to be clear as to what exactly the explanandum is. Without this, the spectre of anomalous 
selection is lurking and predisposed to undermine evolutionary theory. 
 
What counts as a good explanation in evolutionary biology? Is explanation in evolutionary biology of the 
same form as explanation in other parts of biology or the physical sciences such as physics and chemistry? 
What counts as an explanation in ordinary day-to-day life? The issue is a vexed and complex one that has 
occupied the minds of philosophers and scientists probably since the pre-Socratics of ancient Greece. Would 
it be that unfair to suggest that the issue is still open-ended with no likelihood of an imminent consensus? 
Needless to say, perhaps, there will be no attempts within this work to add anything novel to this debate, for 
this would transcend far beyond the chosen parameters. Nevertheless, it is important to consider some of the 
principal ‘explanations of explanation’ in the context of this study.  
 
Generally speaking, when one asks for explanation one is indicating that there is some matter not understood, 
perhaps partially or fully. The explanation that follows is intended to clear the matter so that it can be 
understood. This may take several forms. A school teacher may be asking for an explanation from a boy who 
is late for class and the pupil’s explanation takes the form of a description of events that led up to his being 
late. Or perhaps the pupil explains that the bus broke down and that ‘caused’ him to be late. Explanations can 
also take the form of definitions: one may not know what a bachelor is, but the definition ‘unmarried man’ 
may be more familiar. Translations from one language to another can explain also, if one is not familiar with 
a particular language. The use of analogies can illustrate a difficult point; Darwin (1859) used the analogy of 
artificial selection to explain his concept of natural selection. Use of analogy can be misleading, however, as 
an analogy is not a simile and, under closer examination, some purported analogies are actually in part 
disanalogous. ‘Models’ can also be developed to simplify complex situations, particularly where mathematics 
is not easy to comprehend or visualise. This method of explanation can also be misleading on occasions, 
sometimes purely because of a poverty of language to represent abstraction. If one cannot understand the 
drawings of an architect, then a small cardboard model of the project will help illustrate or explain what is 
intended. Nevertheless, the model will lack many of the details contained within the drawings and one has to 
take care. 
 
Traditionally, in scientific explanation there have been two main approaches to explanation, with other 
approaches deemed more peripheral. The first major recourse is an appeal to causality, often embodied in 
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Mill’s method (1843). The causes need not be singular in origin, but several factors could combine to 
produce a phenomenon. One could argue that this recognition is often cited within complexity theory. The 
alternative to causal explanations is the empiricist approach. Following the problems Hume (1777) exposed 
with ‘necessary connexions’, regularities and uniformities are sought in nature and then, in some instances, 
treated as universal laws. The formal structure of this approach was laid out by Hempel (1942) and is 
famously known as the Deductive-Nomological Model, or DN model. After the rise of quantum mechanics, 
some laws became of a probabilistic or stochastic nature. The DN model, however, has been much debated, 
one of the major problems being that a strict application accommodated explanation in the ‘hard’ sciences, 
such as physics and chemistry, but failed to accommodate the explanations emanating from ‘softer’ sciences, 
such as evolutionary biology and psychology. The ambition has been to discover universal or invariant laws 
that are conducive to accurate and reliable prediction (Popper 2007). Cartwright (1980) and others have 
alternatively argued that universal laws are hard to establish and if they are to work, do so only under highly 
specified conditions. The view is controversial and there are concerns that one might overly idealise the 
structures of scientific explanation (Feyeraband 1975, 1978). One thing that can be assumed, even if there are 
concerns over universalisation, is that the ‘hard’ sciences are more likely to come within reach of this ideal 
than the ‘softer’ sciences. This is largely because there are far more variables within biology, for instance, 
than within physics or chemistry. With quantum mechanics or the periodic table, one can get good 
mathematical handles on the material, which in turn provide highly accurate predictions. Ironically, quantum 
mechanics is the most precise science mathematically and yet it is extremely difficult to conceptualise and 
describe in words. For instance, it is very difficult to conceptualise a photon as both particle-like and wave-
like or to conceptualise a universe of 10 dimensions. Biology, however, struggles to achieve the advantages 
that mathematics has to offer, despite some recent advances in systems biology. Evolutionary biology is even 
more disadvantaged, having to carry the weight of history with subsequent recourse to semantic narrative. 
How then does biology explain matters when the nature of the beast restricts the advantages available to the 
hard sciences?  
 
Another concern of philosophers is that science should deliver more than mere description and taxonomy. 
There should be, one might argue, ‘structure’ underlying such explanation. Without it, there is a concern that 
pseudo-sciences may qualify equally alongside the established sciences: astrology could compete with 
astronomy and creationism could compete with evolutionary theory and geology. (One might argue that 
creationism would contradict all science.) On the other hand, it could also be argued that too much ‘structure’ 
in explanation could lead to teleology, a sensitive issue in evolutionary biology. Of course, the call for 
structure is not without difficulty itself, especially when it comes to demarcating what counts as structure and 
what does not. Perhaps it is the case that there is no single method of scientific explanation but several. If this 
is so, then what are these methods? Unificationists, such as Kitcher (1989), have argued that scientific 
explanation should provide a unified account of a range of different phenomena. However desirable this 
suggestion, it seems that biologists employ a wide variety of explanatory devices, with very little consensus 
as to which approach is the most suitable. One recent approach that may be accessible to evolutionary 
biologists is that suggested by Salmon (1984). If universal laws are unavailable for this discipline, then one 
might consider Salmon’s causal mechanisms or processes, sometimes referred to as the CM model. The idea 
is of causality having a physical nature – one of spatio-temporally continuous causal processes and 
interactions. In theory, one could identify all the relevant factors and describe any interactions that may have 
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taken place in a chronological manner.67 For Darwin and Wallace, this would unfold as a population of 
organisms increasing in numbers but faced with diminishing food supplies; only the fittest secure enough 
food, while the unfit fail to survive. These interactions between growing populations and scarcity of 
resources would persist over the generations etc.  
 
One can see that the CM model might be attractive to evolutionary biologists, but even this is not without 
problems. There is biological explanation that does not fit the CM model: for instance ‘scaling laws’. 
Although ‘scaling laws’ are not laws in the sense required by the DN model, they nevertheless play an 
important role in explaining many relationships and also offer rule-of-thumb predictions. Another issue is 
how to explain the prevalence of the different forms of symmetry. The neo-Darwinist might appeal to 
explanations of functionality or sexual selection, but the structuralist might argue that symmetry is more 
fundamental than biology and appeal to physics for an explanation. However, it is not clear that the physicist 
can provide an explanation for symmetry or would even attempt to do so. A strictly empirical physicist would 
not attempt to answer such ‘why’ questions and might say that is just the way the universe is. But is such a 
negative response better than that proposed by the neo-Darwinist? However poor the structuralist believes 
that neo-Darwinian explanation to be, is any explanation better than no explanation? 
 
The structuralist does have another explanatory card to play and this involves what one might call ‘negative 
prediction’. This concerns the issue of constraints and what can be said of form and function. An example of 
negative prediction could be ‘no creatures with neck length x could support a head size z’ or ‘creatures of size 
y could only function and survive in environment w’. One can continue to build upon these constraints 
imposed by the ‘forces’ considered in Chapter 10 – gravity, temperature, nutrition, magnitude, metabolism 
etc. One could also include the intrinsic constraints associated with phylogeny, genetics, development etc. 
When considering these in totality, the window of opportunity for selective explanation diminishes. In a logic 
puzzle, one might follow and build upon one negative clue after another. There comes a point when only one 
possibility is left. Astro-biologistsi68 do indeed employ such methodology when calculating whether a planet 
supports life. The ‘habitable zone’ is determined not only by considering the necessary conditions but also by 
delineating the negative factors. For instance, the gravitational pull may be too great or too small, or the 
prevailing temperature extreme. 
 
The idea of negative prediction may tie in well with Schaffer’s proposal of ‘contrastive causation’. This takes 
the form: c rather than c* causes e rather than e*. To understand the significance of this, one can draw 
relations with the selectionist first; that is, that c rather than c* causes e. To make this less abstract, c could 
be an organism with certain qualities that organism c* does not possess, therefore leading to e, which is 
greater reproductive success. If this is so, then it could be that e* need not be considered. However, the 
tension from the structuralist is represented by e*. To make this less abstract too, e* could represent all the 
constraints and direct impact of physical forces that may impinge upon an organism and/or its components. 
Now it may be the case that e* is so strong (negative constraints and/or direct influences) that c rather than 
c* is no longer an option for e or that only c is applicable or only c* is applicable. In other words, the 
                                                 
67 See Weele (1999 pp49–53) for a discussion and comparison of Salmon with other philosophical perspectives on explanation within 
evolutionary biology. 
68  See  Woodruff T. Sullivan III and John Baross (2007)  for an exposition of exobiology and astrobiology. 
 
 
120 
selectionist is so constrained by what physics and chemistry put on the table that there is little or no work for 
natural selection. On the other hand, it could be argued that e* is not relevant in some circumstances and that 
matters can be settled by simple application of c rather than c* to determine e. One does need to be clear also 
about what c rather than c* is to entail. For instance, does it entail that one organism is fitter than another 
through virtue of some particular trait or might it entail that an organism is able to survive rather than not 
survive? Clarity is important here; one has in mind the application of the term ‘selective pressure’ and its 
ambiguous nature. One might also be alluding to c rather than c* as competition between groups or 
populations for resources.  
 
Another concern to be aware of is the chronological nature of the aetiology. It must be remembered that 
before one can consider c rather than c*, one has to account for c and c*.These do not appear by magic and 
any causal account must begin with e*. In neo-Darwinian terms, variation must precede selection. Therefore, 
it is stressed that the particular aspect of evolution must be clearly identified and its place in the causal chain 
ascertained prior to assessment of contrastive causation; otherwise, conflation of causes may ensue.  
 
One can conclude that there is no simple or singular mode of explanation that fits either biology or, 
especially, evolutionary biology. Explanations such as the CM model or contrastive causation can only be 
touched upon lightly here. To give full justice to their significance requires deep analysis but may open a new 
philosophical enquiry in its own right. 
 
The Explanandum and the Explanans 
 
In evolutionary theory, it seems there are two main issues to be addressed. The first is what is it that is to be 
explained, what is the explanandum? Once this is identified or established, the second issue is how does one 
explain the explanandum, what is the explanans? It is important here to draw this distinction and address both 
issues, for there seems to be a tendency to commit oneself early and discuss the explanans before the 
explanandum has been established. This oversight can cause much confusion and two interlocutors in 
disagreement might simply be talking at cross-purposes. What, then, is to be explained here? With the 
exception of a fringe group of religious scientists, there is a broad consensus that naturalistic evolution has 
occurred over billions of years and explanations for this should be sought. But what aspects of naturalistic 
evolution are to be addressed, what are the main foci? Speciation? Adaptive traits and behaviour? 
Demographic changes in population numbers? Extinction and fitness? The great diversity of forms of life that 
has emerged? The origins of life in the primordial soup? The periods of stasis when no significant evolution 
is said to have occurred? The bilateral body plan? And so forth; the more one examines evolutionary theory, 
the more one appreciates the number of evolutionary issues to be explained. Should all of these issues be 
addressed or just some? The first question to ask, however, is ‘Is there one broad explanation to all of these 
distinct phenomena or does each phenomenon require its own distinct explanation? Or is it even that one 
explanation covers some phenomena but not others?’ 
 
One might argue that when one is introduced to evolutionary theory, one gains the impression that ‘the’ 
explanation for all aspects of evolutionary theory can be put down to natural selection. If this is so, then one 
could argue further that an oversimplification of natural selection has proved enormously popular and has 
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permeated many areas outside evolutionary theory, including the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ sciences. Looking 
deeper into the matter of natural selection, one realises the complexity involved. How is it, for instance, that 
the term ‘natural selection’ was introduced by its creator as a metaphor to explain a limited range of 
biological phenomena (Ch.1) but that it can also be seen by some to explain such diverse things from aspects 
of cosmology to aspects of ethical theory? (Ch.5). Under these circumstances, one needs to disambiguate the 
term ‘natural selection’. The main ambition of this work has been to establish first the ontological question of 
natural selection and only then to attempt to provide guidelines as to what one can legitimately explain. What 
is of interest is the historical analysis presented earlier. This illuminates how the explanandum has changed 
over time. It was observed that the proto form of natural selection, prior to Darwin and Wallace, recognised 
that favourable traits could spread through populations and unfavourable traits would not survive. All of this 
occurred without any consideration of speciation, or transmutation as it was then known. All was within the 
concept of the fixity of species advocated by Linnaeus, Paley et al.69 and accepted by virtually all the 
scientific community and the general public. At least, this was so in Britain, even if it was not so 
consolidated on the continent. Darwin and Wallace went boldly, arguing that the explanandum was 
principally transmutation or the origin of de novo species and characters and also their eventual extinction. 
The explanans was the earlier concept of favourable traits spreading through a population but now coupled 
with the Malthusian element. Darwin coined this process ‘natural selection’ (Ch.1). The ‘mystery of all 
mysteries’, on page one of the Origin, was the principal explanandum but the issue of adaptation was a 
secondary explanandum. Further, Darwin (although not Wallace) thought that some adaptations, such as the 
giraffe’s long neck, could not be explained exclusively by natural selection (Darwin 1900 p279). Darwin also 
invoked Lamarckian processes (Appendix 2). By the mid-twentieth century, arguably this situation was 
inverted: adaptationism was the principal explanandum and many neo-Darwinists argued that natural 
selection was the exclusive explanans (Block and Kitcher 2010, Coyne 2010, Futuyma 2006, Pigliucci,  
2009)  Speciation became the secondary explanandum. Problems arose, however, with evidence from 
palaeontology indicating that the fossil record demonstrated mass extinctions followed by periods of 
speciation, which in turn were followed by long periods of stasis (Gould and Eldredge 1977). Episodic 
evolution was a new explanandum but what was the explanans? Natural selection had been devised by its 
creators to explain a gradualist perspective of evolution, step by step, small incremental changes scrutinised 
every second, every minute. How does one explain the long periods of stasis when there was little of 
evolutionary significance? Seemingly, neo-Darwinists were loath to abandon the cherished principle of 
natural selection that they had championed with almost ubiquitous explanatory powers. Rather than accept 
the possibility that evolutionary explanation could be pluralistic, new variants of natural selection were 
termed to ‘explain’ new phenomena. ‘Balancing selection’ and ‘stabilising selection’ are terms used to 
explain the long periods of stasis. The terms ‘relaxed selection’ and ‘lifted selection’ are employed to explain 
evolutionary radiations or periods of fairly rapid evolutionary change. (See below).  The situation has grown 
bizarre: this latter addition completely inverts the rationale of Darwin and Wallace, who proposed natural 
selection as an explanans for evolutionary change. Under the new terminology of lifted or relaxed selection, 
evolution is said to occur when natural selection is absent. 
 
Putting aside, for the moment, this problem of anomalous selection, focus will now be directed to evaluating 
the argument that natural selection is the best and even the only explanation of adaptation.  
                                                 
69 See Bowler (2003) for an excellent discussion of the problems of fixity for early evolutionists. 
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Cain – Selection is Everywhere 
 
To Cain (1997 pp132–134), many of the examples that purport to demonstrate the instantiation of 
evolutionary drift are, under closer inspection, really the subject of selection. Traits or characters that, on the 
surface, seem to have no functional value do, in fact, have a value if the researcher is prepared to investigate 
long enough. This perspective clashes with the earlier views of Dobzhansky (1937). Part of the problem, 
according to Cain, is that researches in the laboratory do not embrace the full rigours of selective forces; 
therefore fieldwork is essential when testing for drift or selection. 
 
Looking at skins of closely related species of bird reposing on a museum tray, one might well be at a loss 
to produce an explanation for some of their interspecific differences: but a stuffed bird on a museum tray is 
not in the best position to show what it does with its characters. Extensive field work may be necessary 
before their significance is realized, even if it is great. In fact, every case which has been carefully 
examined, the supposed influence of random drift, postulated on the basis of insufficient knowledge, has 
been greatly reduced or actually disproved for the characters under consideration. (Cain 1997 p132) 
 
To Cain, it is selection alone that determines gene frequency. He admits there are studies that seem to suggest 
that random processes affect frequencies.  
 
But these studies do show, as do so many other studies on genes in the wild, that merely to fail on a casual 
inspection to see any selective significance in a particular variation does not licence the observer to 
proclaim that there is none. (ibid. p133)  
 
However, Cain recognises that not all characters selected are adaptive. Some characters are by-products of 
those that are selected for, and in themselves of no selective value or even somewhat deleterious. Moreover, 
genes being pleiotropic are ‘likely to produce all sorts of changes throughout the phenotype’ (p133). 
Dobzhansky (1937) had argued that the usefulness of a trait must be demonstrated, it cannot just be taken for 
granted. In a long career of laboratory research, he had noticed that many differences between Drosophila 
species have no claims to being directly useful. Moreover, some traits that one might consider important, 
such as orbital bristles, were missing in some individual flies but their absence did not cause the mutant flies 
any inconvenience. Dobzhansky concluded that the supposition that all or even most of them are directly 
useful to their possessors stretches one’s credulity too much. Here is Cain’s reply to and criticism of 
Dobzhansky: 
 
But equally, its uselessness cannot be taken for granted, and indirect evidence on the likelihood of its being 
selected for and actually adaptive cannot be ignored. In any case, the argument that flies in cultures do not 
seem to be affected by the loss of a bristle is inconclusive, a few per cent selection, enough to fix the 
character in a short time, would not have been noticed, or selection might be more stringent in the wild. 
(Cain 1997 p134) 
 
Evaluation of the arguments 
 
So what does one make of this debate between two eminent neo-Darwinists? Is it really the case that all traits, 
apart from those that piggyback, are the product of selection? Some of the arguments Cain put forward to 
establish what he sees as near ubiquitous selection will now be looked at a little more closely.  
 
 
123 
Is Cain arguing that all laboratory tests are inconclusive or that only the tests that do not support his 
preference for selection are inconclusive? For one could argue the converse: that laboratory tests that suggest 
a selective component may not transfer such a confirmation if tested in the wild. If there is doubt about the 
efficacy of laboratory work, then it could cut both ways, being inconclusive about drift and selection. Cain 
favours research in the wild over work in the lab, but does this overlook that fieldwork itself is not always 
without problems? A laboratory environment has more control than a fieldworker over factors that impinge 
on the studied organism. In the wild, there are many more variables – different and unforeseen predators, 
irregularities in food supply, changing climatic conditions etc. The results of a field study are therefore 
contingent on a changing environment and different field studies of the same subject can give quite different 
results. A classic example of this is the study of the peppered moth, which catalogues such contrary results 
(Sargent 1976 and Sargent et al. 1998). How the presence of melanism becomes established is still an open 
question and one of ongoing research (Majerus 1998). 
 
Another concern over Cain’s argument is that some researchers simply have not found evidence of selection 
at work in their studies. If one follows the submission of papers on this topic, then one appreciates that a 
steady stream of researchers have evidence of drift or other mechanisms independent of selection (Gherman 
et al. 2007, Lynch 2007, Venditti and Pagel 2010). Of course, there are also many papers that support an 
adaptive or selective interpretation, so one has to be careful not to seek out exclusively papers that favour 
one’s own hypothesis. It would also be disingenuous to claim that researchers had not completed their work, 
insisting, for example, that selective ‘forces’ were present but that those researchers had just not looked hard 
enough. What if the researchers were to go back, carry out further tests and still maintain there was no 
evidence of the presence of selection? Could one say, ‘Well, you still haven’t looked hard enough; if you 
look harder, then you’ll find it’? If one were to demand such strictures, then of course one could never 
demonstrate any evidence of drift. Under such circumstances, the selectionist will have built a fail-safe into 
the theory and one could never demonstrate there was no evidence of selection at work. Imagine a person 
who maintains there are custard pies floating around the universe; such things have never been witnessed but, 
by the logic above, that simply means that not all the corners of the cosmos have been searched and that one 
should continue looking until floating custard pies are found. 
 
The issue of adaptive traits is an old one70. Explanations that appealed to adaptationism have suffered from 
any clear criteria to distinguish ‘genuine causal’ explanation from ‘just so’ explanation. Elton, one of the 
founding fathers of ecology, appreciated the difficulties involved in identifying adaptive traits. For instance, 
it was common to assume that the dimorphic colour of the coats of arctic foxes (Alopex lagopus) was an 
adaptation. White coats conferred advantage in the snowbound environment and blue/grey coats an 
advantage in the warmer snow-free environments. However, upon closer inspection, Elton noticed several 
anomalies in the details: within these colour morphs, there is a wide range of colouration and, moreover, in 
the snowy environment of Iceland, blue/grey morphs exist frequently alongside the white morphs with no 
loss of fitness.  
 
Although the ordinary theory of natural selection appears at first sight to explain almost all the phenomena 
produced by evolution, the two greatest arguments in its favour being the existence of so many perfect 
adaptations in animals and the difficulty of imagining how any useful characters could spread in a 
                                                 
70 See Robson and Richards (1936) for an early, extensive but critical discussion of adaptive reasoning. 
 
124 
population; yet there are certain cases of colour dimorphism among animals which cannot be explained on 
the hypothesis of natural selection. Of these one of the most striking is the arctic fox, with its blue and 
white phases; another example is the white-eared cob of the Sudan. In fact it seems very likely that most so 
called adaptive colours in mammals are not actually adaptive at all. (Elton 1927, reprinted in 2001, p179) 
 
Contrary to Cain, Elton argued that one could not necessarily explain the existence of particular traits by 
means of adaptation through natural selection. Elton is not arguing that there are no cases of successful 
explanation by adaptive reasoning, the argument is against universal application.  Saunders (1994) has argued 
that not everything that is to one’s advantage is the product of selection. Instead, he argues, many things may 
just be the consequences of natural causes, coming directly from physics and chemistry. Saunders constructs 
a mathematical variation of Watson’s and Lovelock’s ‘Daisy World Parable’ (1983), a model that 
demonstrates how two species of daisy, distinct in colour only, on an isolated planet can have their respective 
reproductive fortunes determined mathematically by simple regulations in physics. Constructions can come 
together through complex interactions that are simply of the natural order. Perhaps, if one is unaware of these 
interactions, then one can be tempted to explain the phenomenon in question in terms of selection. Saunders 
is following the traditions of Thompson and Lima-de-Faria here (Ch.9). This discussion brings us back to the 
debate that raged at the beginning of the twentieth century. Are the facts of evolutionary biology attributable 
to selection processes or to the direct actions of the environment? Or to a mixture of both? A hundred years 
on and similar considerations have resurfaced; the appreciation of phenotypic plasticity has led to enquiries 
that seek to discover what triggers the expression of particular genes or networks of genes. Arguably, 
researchers have pushed back the boundaries to discover the causes of such expression; consideration is now 
given to the epigenetic, the epigenomic and the different types of interface with the external environment.71 
What is most important with the last point is that interfaces with the environment can, but do not necessarily 
always affect whole populations. Some examples might include temperatures that determine the sex of 
reptilian offspring (Georges et al 2010); diets that change the colour of flamingo plumage (above) or the 
colour of chicken eggshells (Gosler 2008), population density that can determine the length and colour of the 
locust wing (Lester et al.2005, Song 2005), and gravity that determines the density and overall size of the 
skeletal bone (Ch.10).  
 
Phenotypic Plasticity and Natural Selection 
 
It has been argued that without a singular and formal definition of natural selection confusion will ensue 
concerning the demarcation between evolutionary factors; those that can be assigned within the province of 
natural selection and those that are not. Phenotypic plasticity is an example of this confusion. On the one 
hand it is argued ‘To the best of our knowledge, no one has ever suggested that plasticity plays a role in 
evolution as a mechanism `on a par with' natural selection’ and concluding the paragraph, ‘….. selection acts 
on developmental plasticity, and the two simply cannot be considered alternatives from a logical standpoint’ 
(Pigliucci et al 2006). On the other hand, ‘Models of population divergence and speciation are often based on 
the assumption that differences between populations are due to genetic factors, and that phenotypic change is 
due to natural selection. It is equally plausible that some of the differences among populations are due to 
phenotypic plasticity’, and later, ‘Phenotypic plasticity is widespread in nature and may speed up, slow 
down, or have little effect on evolutionary change’.(Price et al 2003) Clearly, both assessments cannot be 
                                                 
71 See Hall, Pearson and Muller (2004) for a compendium of essays that seeks to link together the environment, development and 
evolution in a revised synthesis. 
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correct. What is odd about this is that both sets of researchers agree broadly over what phenotypic plasticity 
involves and that it is evolutionarily significant72. The difference in interpretation seemingly comes from the 
different senses of natural selection employed. Pigliucci et al see natural selection as evolutionarily important 
in a more narrow sense, alluding to natural selection as ‘an ultimate cause of adaptation’, whereas, Price at al 
seemingly have a wider perspective of evolutionary change where phenotypic plasticity is a source of 
variation for natural selection to act upon. One cannot say if either of these views is correct because there is 
no formal definition of natural selection, in fact the fluidity of the term allows contradictions to remain.  
 
In Chapter 10, consideration was given to the effects of micro gravity on the physiology and morphology of 
all organisms. If humans were to remain in space for prolonged periods and were able to reproduce – 
something unknown at the moment but hypothesised for the sake of this argument – after generations they 
would look very unlike the humans they had left behind on Earth. Osteopenia would result in highly reduced 
skeletal frames, the cardiovascular system would alter dramatically, the heart would be much smaller, muscle 
tissues (unless actively exercised) would diminish and so forth. These adaptations to life in space are the 
direct result of the combined effects of micro gravity and free – fall.  It would not be unreasonable to suggest 
that, in such circumstances, humans would look different, more akin perhaps to sea creatures, which exist 
where the effect of gravity is reduced by buoyancy. If one did not know the full history and came upon these 
later generations of humans, one might even conclude that they were of a different species and well adapted 
to their environment. The point of this illustration is not to suggest that this is a future scenario but to 
demonstrate how a changing environment would affect all the members of the spacebound population and in 
a directional manner. In such circumstances, differential reproduction does not enter the explanatory 
equation. This does not mean that differential reproduction is therefore redundant as an evolutionary 
explanation, but merely demonstrates that evolutionary explanations are pluralistic. One must not assume that 
every trait, adaptive or not, is the product of differential reproduction and differential survival.  
 
Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini – Selection is Nowhere 
 
Opinions of late have polarised once again over the extent of explanatory power natural selection is thought 
to possess. Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010) have argued antithetically to the pan-selectionism of those 
sympathetic to Cain’s views outlined above. In What Darwin Got Wrong, F&P develop several arguments 
against the principle of natural selection. The first argues by analogy that natural selection faces the same 
type of criticisms that Chomsky employed to refute Skinnerian behaviourism. Little consideration will be 
given here to this argument, as it is obscure and its validity rests upon a faithful analogy between the biology 
of natural selection on the one hand and the psychology of behaviourism on the other. The strength of the 
analogy is open to interpretation and the understanding of psychological behaviourism transcends the current 
work. In a review, Dupre (2010) argues that the analogy employed is difficult to justify.  
 
Overlooking the uncertainty of this particular argument, the second line of attack employed by F&P rested on 
an argument that is an extension of that famously put forward by Gould and Lewontin (1979) in ‘The 
spandrels of San Marco and the panglossian paradigm’. Essentially, this argument was an attempt to 
                                                 
72 See also Larsen (2004). 
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demarcate between genuine explanations attributable to natural selection on the one hand and to non-
scientific explanations or pejorative ‘just so’ stories on the other. F&P take this argument one step further by 
suggesting that there is no demarcation and natural selection is attributable only post hoc. If two novel traits 
are correlated – that is, x develops with y – then which is subject to natural selection? One would not know 
for many generations which, or even whether either, trait is selected, as all is contingent upon the 
environment. The problem is that the environment is changeable and therefore not easily predictable. F&P 
argue that natural selection cannot act counterfactually, meaning that if two correlated novel traits emerge, 
natural selection has no means of detecting at the point of emergence which is to be the fit.  
 
That summarises part of F&P’s argument but one could go further however. In fact, one could argue that it 
would be difficult to predict whether any novel trait, correlated or not, commands fitness. One could only 
wait and observe whether the trait, over time and generations, later proved to aid reproduction. It is only at 
that point that one can claim ‘selection’ has taken place. There is a further pragmatic problem for any 
researcher: how to determine which particular trait is advantageous for reproductive success or fitness. In any 
population of sexually reproducing organisms, all the individuals vary in characters and most of this variation 
is subtle. Among humans, characteristics are all slightly different: there are differences in weight, height, skin 
colour, hair colour and texture, not to mention the intrinsic differences in organs, tissues etc. Even a single 
character such as the human nose can vary slightly in numerous ways; De Rijke et al. (2000) have written a 
book on the variation in nose topology. The epistemic problem is obvious: no one could possibly identify 
which, and (more importantly) whether any, of these subtle differences between traits conferred reproductive 
success. Hull (1999) has argued that individuals possess an enormous collection of traits and it would be 
almost impossible for natural selection to single out and favour particular features. Moreover, an individual’s 
success in reproduction, if one wants to think in those terms, depends on the overall performance of all these 
traits combined, ‘useful’ and ‘non-useful’, functional and non-functional. Hull has a fair point, is it not the 
overall performance that matters? The individual does not even have to be the fittest; it only has to suffice, 
satisfying whatever are the conditions of existence. 
 
There is a further complication in identifying ‘advantageous traits’ and that concerns how organisms behave 
collectively. Take the differences between the lion and the hyena. The lion outstrips the hyena in almost 
every physical comparison – size, speed, strength and so forth – yet the hyena successfully competes against 
the lion, often in the same environment. What the hyena lacks in physical strengths, it makes up in 
collaborative group behaviour73. Taking ‘behaviour’ into consideration adds a whole new dimension when it 
comes to identifying what it is that leads to fitness, in the widest sense.  
 
Emergent and Preserved Properties 
 
It was argued earlier that it is essential to be clear about what the explanandum is before one proceeds with 
the explanans. Without such clarity, confusion could ensue. It is therefore important in evolutionary 
explanation to distinguish between properties that are newly emerged and properties that are preserved or 
sustained after their emergence. The issue was also discussed in Chapter 9 in relation to Thompson raising 
                                                 
73 A short video demonstrates the power of cooperative behaviour - 
http://museum.msu.edu/exhibitions/Virtual/hyena_kiosk/HyenaCooperation.html 
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the question of why are some eggs are spherical and other eggs elongated at one end. It was observed that 
two answers were forthcoming. To re-cap, the neo-Darwinist explained that elongated eggs were less likely 
than round eggs to run off the edge of a cliff. Birds that laid elongated eggs were thus more likely to see their 
offspring hatch and go on to reproduce in their own right. This would confer considerable advantage over the 
birds that laid round eggs in similarly precarious places. However, Thompson was sceptical of this type of 
explanation and observed that elongated eggs were also laid on flat ground where there was no likelihood of 
loss. This occurrence undermined the explanation put forward concerning the cliff edge, he argued. 
Moreover, he thought the neo-Darwinist counter-argument rather convenient. This held that, in the case of 
the elongated eggs laid on flat surfaces and not on a cliff edge, there was an advantage in that a clutch of such 
eggs arranged in a circle were easier for the hen to brood than rounded eggs. Thompson instead argued that 
the eggs were the shape they were because of the internal physical forces that impinged upon the formation 
of the shell from its beginning when it was most malleable to the egg’s exit from the oviduct when the shell 
arrived hardened. Which explanation is better, Thompson’s or the ones provided by the neo-Darwinist?  
 
With these types of questions, a distinction between preserved properties and emergent properties is 
invaluable. Clearly, the shape of the egg must be initially determined by physical forces, so Thompson is 
correct in that respect. It is doubtful that any modern neo-Darwinist would deny this, but they would 
nevertheless suggest that Thompson’s explanation is only an example of a proximate or immediate cause. 
Furthermore, the neo-Darwinist’s explanation is an example of an ‘ultimate’ or historical/functional cause 
and they would perhaps claim that this type of explanation is the important ‘underlying’ or ‘real’ cause.74 
One must recognise though that so-called ultimate causes cannot apply to novel emergent properties because 
these emergent properties lack, by definition, a historical precedent. Ultimate or historical causes can only 
attempt to explain why characters or behaviours are preserved and not why they originated. At best, one 
might be able to say that a bird’s continued practice of laying elongated eggs on precarious slopes is a 
behaviour that is more likely to sustain than the behaviour of any bird that attempts to lay spherical eggs in a 
similar position. However, one can never say that laying eggs in such a place caused them to be elongated. 
Chronologically, form arrives first and function follows. Croizat, the biogeographer, appreciates the order of 
such a causal chain, arguing that ‘the structure, or instrument precedes and determines its use: for without 
structure, or instrument, use cannot follow’ (Croizat 1981 p519). There is an underlying logic: selection, by 
definition, can only operate if there is already in place a variation of forms. Therefore the selective process 
(whatever that is) can only follow chronologically from form. The question then arises of how one accounts 
for the nature and emergence of such form or forms. Before addressing this question, one misconception 
needs to be dispelled. To say that certain characters are preserved by natural selection is not entirely 
unambiguous. One could ask ‘how does natural selection preserve properties?’ Which could be seen as 
similar to the question ‘how does one preserve jam?’. In the latter case, the answer could be something like 
‘jam is only preserved by boiling particular fruit with added pectin, sugar and so forth.’ But how does one 
explain how natural selection is said to preserve favourable traits? Or, for that matter, how does natural 
selection eliminate unfavourable traits? Moreover, how does natural selection distinguish between traits that 
would prove to be favourable and those that would prove to be unfavourable? These types of questions are 
                                                 
74 Biologists have looked for causal explanation, but what form do biological explanations take? Tinbergen (1963) suggested that 
biological explanation could be divided into four overlapping categories – the proximate, the ultimate, phylogeny and ontogeny. Rose 
(2004) offers an interesting modern discussion of these issues and, as a clear example, looks at the different ways a frog’s behaviour 
might be explained by physiologists, biochemists, developmental biologists, animal behaviourists and evolutionists. 
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the result of defining natural selection loosely, as if it were some form of anomalous force or filter. This 
reification fallacy can be avoided, however, if one recognises that natural selection is not a force or some 
form of agency. All that happens, at least if Darwinism is to be internally consistent, is that one can witness 
in nature that favourable forms are preserved with a statistical likelihood of being passed on and thus 
spreading into a population. It is this long process that Darwinists should arguably denote as natural 
selection. One must also remember that interactions such as jam preservation are quite specific about 
quantification and the particulars involved, as are the interactions of, say, the weak or strong ‘forces’ 
identified in physics. With natural selection, however, things are not specific; there can be many traits that 
are said to be preserved and their preservation can be for many different reasons. The process of natural 
selection is a generalised term that covers all of these. In a nutshell, natural selection is the term one might 
employ that reflects or denotes that traits are preserved or eliminated; it does not itself preserve or eliminate 
traits. 
 
From such an analysis, it can be appreciated why natural selection is thought to lack any predictive power. 
Favourable or unfavourable traits are only recognisable after they are established. A favourable trait may 
initially begin to spread through a population and, according to neo-Darwinism, this trait is statistically more 
likely to do so than other traits. However, this statistical advantage depends ceteris paribus upon the 
environment. Trait t in environment e may enjoy reproductive success, but generations later it may be that 
environment e becomes environment x. It may be the case that changes in climate, predator regimes, resource 
availability, viral infection and so forth make environment x no longer conducive to the success of trait t. 
Conversely, a trait that might be said to be neutral or even unfavourable in environment e may prove to be of 
advantage in environment x. Consider the inherited sickle cell, which can lead to anaemia, lung problems and 
strokes but can also confer increased immunity to malaria in areas where malaria is prevalent (Williams et al. 
2005). In other words a gradual accumulation of neutral mutations could eventually prove to be advantageous 
(or detrimental) in changing environments. If this is the case then accumulated neutral traits could also lead 
to adaptations. 
 
To summarise, the problems when trying to explain adaptive traits or adaptationism are quite formidable. A 
reasonably clear and uncontroversial definition of these terms must first be provided. For instance, do 
adaptive traits increase fitness or are they simply seen as sufficing – that is, sustaining the lineage? When 
considering whether a particular trait is adaptive, one has to demonstrate that it is that particular trait, and not 
a correlated trait or body of traits that counts. One is faced with the chronological problem: if adaptations are 
contingent to the particular environment of the time, then there is always a relativistic element that requires 
identification. One needs to be sure that the adaptive trait is genuinely adaptive, arising from differential 
sources and not simply as the direct effect of the environment or by drift; otherwise, one might be guilty of 
the construction of ‘just so’ stories. The crucial point of all the above is the distinction between the 
emergences of forms de novo on the one hand and the sustainability or fitness of such on the other. One 
cannot say that adaptive traits or organisms emerged because they were adaptive; one can only claim that 
such adaptations are identifiable because they sustained and/or demonstrated increased fitness. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, people such as Bateson and DeVries argued just over a hundred years ago that the salient point 
in evolutionary theory was to explain the source of variation. Moreover, whatever was providing the source 
or sources of variation was the driving mechanism/s behind evolution, at least in the sense that evolution 
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encapsulates transformations and novel biological features. Today, biology has advanced considerably and is 
in a much better position to elucidate the nature of variation. But what are the consequences for natural 
selection? Two contrary perspectives on this will now be examined. 
 
A New Model of Explanation? 
 
In the biological zeitgeist of the twenty-first century, one might perceive a growing consensus that 
evolutionary explanations cannot be addressed only by observing and calculating the changes in gene 
frequencies. This perspective of the ‘new’ synthesis is seen as a gross oversimplification, and an extended or 
new synthesis is required to embrace all of the recent discoveries and advances of this fast-moving science. 
Although there is a consensus over this point, two contrary views are emerging concerning natural selection. 
One of these still sees a place for natural selection, albeit with some modification, and the other sees natural 
selection as marginalised or even superfluous. The view that seeks to accommodate natural selection will be 
examined first. 
 
Accommodating natural selection 
 
In the literature of evolutionary developmental biology, there are calls for change. Carroll (2007) argues that 
a third revolution in biology is ensuing; the first was initiated by Darwin and the second by the members of 
the modern synthesis, while the third is the inclusion of developmental biology within evolutionary theory. 
Carroll (2009) believes natural selection has important explanatory powers but suggests that explanation 
should be considered as more a matter of the ‘making of the fittest’ than of the ‘survival of the fittest’. In a 
more detailed theoretical view, Gilbert and Epel (2009) develop a new model of explanation that includes a 
broader spectrum of evolutionary pluralism. This includes factors other than developmental biology and 
recognises symbiogenesis, epigenetics and so on. In an earlier work, Gilbert calls for a new evolutionary 
synthesis, to combine population genetics with developmental genetics: 
 
Population genetics is perceived as– 
 
a) variation within populations,  
b) genes in adults competing for reproductive success,  
c) survival of the fittest  
d) natural selection.  
 
Developmental genetics is perceived as– 
 
a) variation between populations,  
b) genes in embryonic and larval organisms building structures,  
c) arrival of the fittest and  
d) phylogeny.  
(Gilbert 2003 p779) 
 
It is noticeable that the defining points of population genetics, according to Gilbert, include ‘survival of the 
fittest’ and natural selection as distinct entities. There is nothing in the text to explain how or why these two 
phenomena are perceived differently. Nevertheless, the important point is the inclusion within developmental 
genetics of the ‘arrival of the fittest’. One assumes that the ‘arrival’ part of the term is equivalent to what 
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Carroll (2009) later called the ‘making’ in his term ‘making of the fittest’. Gilbert argues that population 
genetics and developmental genetics can be reconciled: 
 
The two approaches complement each other. While the population genetic approach focuses on the survival 
of the fittest, the developmental genetic approach to evolution is more concerned with the arrival of the 
fittest. (Gilbert 2003 p778) 
 
Gilbert and Epel (2009) endorse the difference Gilbert perceived between these two models of explanation: 
 
In other words, while the modern synthesis could explain the survival of the fittest, it could not explain the 
arrival of the fittest. For that, one needed a theory of body construction and its possible changes, a theory 
of developmental change. (Gilbert and Epel 2009 p324) 
 
What is meant by the ‘arrival’ or the ‘making’ of the fittest? Essentially, it is the discovery of what 
constitutes the material basis of variation and how variation came about. Developmental genetics, to 
paraphrase Carroll (2007), for instance, elucidates much detail concerning the embryo and the larva. It can 
explain: why and how a feather is constructed rather than a hair or a nipple; how changes in development can 
lead to changes in the phenotype; how the processes and interactions of genes, proteins, cells etc. can produce 
eyespots on butterfly wings or rippled patterns on a mammal’s skin; and so forth. The combination of 
development and epigenetics provides a rich source of detail that fulfils Bateson’s suggestion of focusing on 
the causes of variation.  
 
The interesting point for this work is the conclusion by Carroll, Gilbert and Epel that the recently discovered 
details can provide what they call the ‘arrival’ or ‘making’ of the fittest. Now, the details of variation may be 
empirically well established but, if this is so, it is very difficult to see why there is also a requirement for 
natural selection within their models. If, from the development process, they have identified the ‘fittest’, it 
must then be those same fittest organisms that persist and successfully reproduce. If these identified 
organisms were to fail in reproductive prowess, then they could not be rightly described as arriving or made 
as the fittest. One cannot claim to have provided an explanation of the advent of the fittest organisms and still 
require the services of natural selection. One of these considerations has to go. The argument is not a new 
one: Bateson, all those years ago, appreciated that if a science of variation could be elucidated, then natural 
selection is virtually redundant.75 
 
This is a messy affair and symptomatic of the anomalous selection problem. Yet more selective terminology 
is introduced, fuelling the charge of a biological phlogiston. To make matters worse, the authors persist in 
using the word ‘fittest’ when the term ‘fit enough’ is more appropriate. If it were only the fittest that arrived, 
then there would be many casualties and populations would soon plummet. These criticisms should not 
detract from the recognition that Carroll, Gilbert and Epel (and others) have produced some excellent 
empirical work; it is only their conclusions concerning natural selection that need address.  
 
                                                 
75 The term ‘arrival of the fittest’ was coined in 1904 by Arthur Harris, who was typical of his time in being sceptical of those who saw 
evolutionary explanation through the eyes of selection only. (Gilbert and Epel 2009 p324.) 
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Selection as conservative 
 
Reid (1985) argued that evolutionary theory was an incomplete affair. His last book, Biological Emergences: 
Evolution by Natural Experiment (2007), is of particular interest here. As the title suggests, Reid sees a rich 
vein of variation occurring in nature that goes far beyond Mendelian genetics, recombination and point 
mutations. Whereas evolutionary developmental biology has been largely confined to explanation within 
Animalia, Reid embraces all the biological kingdoms and presents a highly pluralistic account of how new 
forms emerge and are generated. Rather than taking the traditional view of natural selection as the causal or 
creative ‘force’, Reid sees natural selection as a more conservative phenomenon. It preserves the status quo 
and stultifies much of the naturally occurring biological experiments. Contrary to the interpretations of most 
neo-Darwinists, natural selection is seen as preventing evolution (Reid 2007 p371). Moreover, Reid is critical 
of ‘adaptationism’ as an explanation of evolutionary change; if there is such a phenomenon, then being 
adapted is also conservative, a foil to further evolution. Of the neo-Darwinist supporters of adaptationism, he 
says: 
 
But soon they retreat back through the mirror, proliferating more preposterous circularities such as ‘wings 
are adaptations to flight’ or ‘eyes are adaptations to sight’ – as if flight and sight were metaphysical 
absolutes that existed before the emergence of wings and eyes. (Reid 2007 p37) 
 
To Reid, then, it is the emergent properties that explain evolutionary change and it is natural selection and 
adaptationism that explain stasis. This perspective is consistent with those who argue that ‘lifted or relaxed’ 
selection facilitates rapid evolutionary changes, including speciation and novel characters (Janzen and 
Etienne 2012, Guze 2012). For instance, lifted or relaxed selection is said to apply to the evolutionary 
radiations when virgin territory is colonised. Deacon (2008) has employed relaxed selection in an attempt to 
explain the origins of the human language faculty. The important difference between Reid and those who 
think in a similar way to Deacon is that Reid sees natural selection as singularly conservative, whereas 
Deacon sees relaxed selection as one form of selection amongst many. In fact, Deacon may have contributed 
to anomalous selection by introducing the terms ‘intraorganismic’ and ‘axonal’ selection to neurobiology.  
 
Reid’s unusual perspective of natural selection is challenging, as it completely inverts what the term was 
initially conceived to explain – that is, speciation (transmutation), adaptation and evolutionary change. 
Nevertheless, there is an internal logical consistency to Reid’s perspective: adaptive traits are only 
adaptations if they can demonstrate persistence. Moreover, the fitness of a particular organism, such as the 
crocodile, is only considered as fitness if the crocodile remains relatively unchanged for many generations. In 
fact, thinking of the literal meaning of the ‘survival of the fittest’, it is a very conservative metaphor. If the 
fittest manage to survive then there is little room for evolutionary change. 
 
It is important to recognise that Reid is not simply invoking natural selection as a filter, nor does he ascribe 
natural selection as causal or as a force. Furthermore, he does not perceive natural selection as a Malthusian 
process or a process of accumulated beneficial mutations. Actually, Reid seems to think that balancing or 
normalising selection could be the most appropriate attribution of natural selection. He asks, ‘what if, without 
prejudging alternatives, natural selection were better understood as the hypostasis (or imposer) of dynamic 
stability?’ (Reid 2007 p407) On the other hand, he also considers the possibility that natural selection is 
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limited to the descriptive, ‘that selection theory is little more than a theory of demographics, or book-
keeping.’ (ibid. p67) This latter perception of natural selection as ‘book-keeper’ is consistent with the 
considerations earlier, when it was said that natural selection is a term that can be used to denote where some 
characters have proved favourable or unfavourable, but not neutral. Normalising and balancing selection, 
however, seem to claim more than just book-keeping; they represent the conservative, the antithesis of 
evolutionary change. This phenomenon might be seen as all the processes that ensure fidelity, which could 
include the intrinsic self-regulating and repairing that takes place to produce faithful replication or the 
external mimicry and learned behaviour that is passed down the generations unchanged or even the maternal 
protection of the young. The situation is more like ‘whatever has proved sufficient to survive and reproduce 
in the past is more likely to do so in the future’. One could draw an analogy with the past cultural situation of 
China, when Confucian ideology self-perpetuated for hundreds of years, stifling innovation or change. 
Analogies can be dangerous, however, and one should not suppose that normalising selection is a force per 
se. To consider normalising selection as an ‘imposer’ would be misleading and tantamount to hidden 
teleology. Reid, on several occasions, does taint his otherwise exceptional analysis with terminology 
suggestive of teleology. However, it may be that when he writes of agency in natural selection, for instance, 
he is merely paraphrasing the terminology of some neo-Darwinists. The term ‘natural experiment’ within the 
title of Reid’s last book could be construed as slightly teleological, as it sounds as if there is some body or 
thing called nature that is trying out novel biological experiments. For there to be an experiment implies an 
experimenter. ‘Evolution by Natural Processes’ might be a safer and preferable title. The problem of 
teleology is another long and vexed one, to be tackled in the next chapter.  
 
Defenders of the causal power of natural selection have attacked Reid. Pigliucci (2009) admires the boldness 
of Reid’s approach and accepts there are indeed many ways in which significant variation can arise 
independent of natural selection. Nevertheless, Pigliucci argues that natural selection is the only explanation 
there is for adaptation and moreover that Reid fails to provide an alternative explanation. One might question 
however whether Pigliucci has correctly or fully understood Reid’s take on adaptation. Whereas neo-
Darwinists such as Pigliucci see adaptationism to be of crucial importance in evolutionary explanation Reid 
sees it as unimportant, moreover, as non-evolutionary and as an effect of evolution, not its cause. The 
confusion here illustrates the contention in this thesis, that natural selection lacks a formal definition and 
leaves open uncertainty over natural selection’s proper explanandum.  In the next chapter we see Reiss argue 
further that attempts to answer the design problem by adaptationism is an unnecessary enterprise.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It was noted that any explanation of explanation was a difficult and live philosophical issue with little 
consensus. Nevertheless, it was suggested that the CM model of explanation may be the one best suited for 
explanation within evolutionary theory. The next step in this long argument suggested that it was extremely 
important to be clear what the explanandum is before attempting any explanation. The inherent danger, it was 
argued, was that natural selection was employed to explain more than it should. For instance, both 
evolutionary changes and long periods of stasis could be explained by some variation of selection. Moreover, 
to compound the spectre of anomalous selection, it was observed that evolutionary change could be explained 
also by the absence of natural selection (relaxed or lifted selection). The anomalous nature of present-day 
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selection theories has largely been caused by the empirical discoveries and advancement within biology. The 
scope of natural selection has been expanded to accommodate these advances, but this has created differences 
between biologists as to the exact explanatory power of natural selection. An important difference was 
identified in the type of explanandum being explored; one must be clear about what one is explaining: is it an 
emergent novel property and source of transformation or is it the preservation and ubiquity of traits that are 
said to facilitate fitness?  
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Chapter 12: Explanation, Teleology and Anthropomorphic Language 
 
It is the primary function of every organism to pass on to the next generation as many copies of its genes as 
possible. (Mogie 1992) 
 
Hearts are for pumping blood, eyes are for seeing, and so on. (Perlman 2010) 
 
Explanations in biology often appeal to form and function: what a thing is and what a thing does. Wings are 
made of hollow bone and feather and wings are for flying. Describing the form of a scientific object is 
relatively uncontroversial and can be settled largely by empirical investigation. However, describing the 
function of a scientific object in biology can be controversial. It is not that function itself is questioned; 
everyone agrees that organisms must function sufficiently to survive, before replication or reproduction is 
considered. The stronger claim is that biological entities are for something. For instance, hearts are for 
pumping blood and that is their purpose and the reason they exist, whereas the pulse produced by the heart is 
considered not to be for anything but just one of the consequences of the heart’s function that does not entail 
advantageousness. Cummins (2009) and Cummins and Roth (2010), in criticism, have labelled this 
interpretation as neo-teleology. This can be compared with the more modest claims that hearts pump blood 
and wings enable flight; there is no requirement for the word for. There is huge difference between the 
following two observations concerning the biological clocks of organisms: 
 
Clocks probably evolved several times to perform very similar functions, so they are an example of 
convergent evolution. 
 
Clocks probably evolved several times and perform very similar functions, so they are an example of 
convergent evolution. 
 
Although the only difference is the words to and and, the meanings are quite distinct. The latter is purely 
descriptive, but the former makes a stronger claim that entails some form of purposefulness. The controversy 
rests on whether the stronger claim can be justified. When one argues, for instance, that wings and feathers 
are for flight, is one arguing that wings and feathers are only for flight? If this is what is being proposed, then 
one runs into the difficulty of universal application – for example, penguins have both feathers and wings but 
neither are employed to facilitate flight. 
 
On the contrary Wright (1973) argues in favour of neo-teleology. For example, the heart functions to pump 
blood but it does not function to make a thumping noise or provide wiggly lines on an electrocardiogram. To 
support this argument Wright draws an analogy with the telephone. The function of a telephone is 
communication but it also does other things, such as take up space, absorb and reflect light. These latter 
points are not functions but accidents, at least according to Wright. However, there are problems over the 
analogy between the telephone and the heart in a historical context. One can argue that a telephone was 
purposely designed by humans to fulfil the function of communication but not designed to absorb and reflect 
light.  With the heart, however, there is no designer or purposeful intentions in nature to provide such a 
biological object. The analogy is a poor one because it overlooks that telephones were designed with a 
function in mind but the heart was not. Supporters of Wright might accept that hearts are not the product of 
any form of intentional design but nevertheless argue that with the heart there is an importance qualitative 
functional difference between pumping blood and producing a pulse. They may have a good point but how 
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does one categorise such differences? The problem may lay with the word “function”, Wright remarks that it 
has a spectrum of meanings. It is suggested below that there may be alternatives that might avoid 
controversy.  
 
Teleological complications are largely absent in the harder physical sciences: stars radiate energy but stars 
are not considered to be for the radiation of energy; electrons absorb photons but electrons are not considered 
to be for the absorption of photons. Historically, scientific explanation was keen to distance itself from divine 
explanation that considered teleological explanation universal: a star such as the Sun was held to be 
purposely in place for the benefit of human beings; thunder and lightning were expressions of divine 
dissatisfaction (Russell 1940). In the biological world and according to Abrahamic traditions, animals were 
created by God for the benefit of humans. Moreover, the wonderful adaptations one can witness between 
creatures and Mother Nature could only be explained by divine special design. Darwinists, and in particular 
neo-Darwinists, took up the challenge in an attempt to provide a naturalistic explanation of this apparent 
good design. To a large extent, natural selection was the key mechanism that underpinned the naturalistic 
alternative (Millikan 1984, Godfrey-Smith 2010, Perlman 2010). ‘Traits have evolved to function the way 
they do because of a past advantage’ (Perlman 2010 p53). In other words Perlman believes functions arose by 
means of natural selection. Contrary to the ‘selectionist’ perspective, Davies (2001) sees functionalism as 
explanatorily valuable but detaches the historical component. ‘Functions are contributions to systemic 
capacities and, while selection can preserve or eliminate those functions, selection is not the source. I also 
argue directly against the attempt to understand functions in terms of ancestral selective success’ (2001 
preface xiii).  Functionalism in this latter sense will be endorsed and expanded upon in this chapter and later 
John Reiss’s solution to the ‘design problem’ will be summarised. Before this ensues the ‘artifact model’ will 
be critically examined. 
 
The ‘Artifact Model’ 
 
Lewens argues in favour of an ‘artifact model’, but does not see ‘selection’ as a necessary condition for 
functional explanation (2005 p101-102). The ‘artifact model’ is in favour of teleological explanation and 
claims that the methods one might use to examine an artifact can be also a valuable heuristic for the 
investigation of organisms (Ibid., p42-43). This view however rests heavily on artifacts being analogous to 
organisms and one might question whether this holds. For instance, the molecular components and structure 
are different; artifacts are made of plastics, metals, fabrics etc but organisms are not. Organisms develop, 
grow and change over time, their cells suffer apoptosis, and eventually an organism will die. None of these 
characteristics applies to artifacts. Organisms can reproduce, exchange genetic material, self assemble, 
change their behaviour, solve problems; again there is no similarity with artifacts. Moreover, when artifacts 
are designed they are normally intended to be as optimal as possible but the current ‘received’ view for neo-
Darwinism is that organisms are far from optimised. Consider the case of the human eye; ‘no intelligent 
designer would put such a clumsy arrangement in a camcorder, and this is just one of hundreds of accidents 
frozen in evolutionary history that confirm the mindlessness of the historical process’ (Dennett 2005). Again 
concerning the eye and the difference between an engineer’s view of design and what is produced by nature, 
‘it is the principle of the thing that would offend any tidy-minded engineer!’ (Dawkins 1986, p. 93) There 
seemingly is another important incommensurable factor, artifacts are designed to meet a particular function 
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or number of functions, therefore it can be said that here form follows function. However, in nature new 
forms emerge without a designer and are the consequence of unintentional physical interactions. The change 
in form of an organism may alter the functions available to that organism. A simple example; with 
metamorphosis the caterpillar is able to alter its functions dramatically when its form changes to a butterfly. 
Therefore, it can be said that in nature functions follow form, the opposite of the artifact chronology.  It 
seems therefore, that there are serious problems with the ‘artifact model’, with too much dissimilarity for it to 
be considered a suitable model in the explanation of organisms. If anything, a converse model is more 
fruitful; we have seen how organisms function and note their form and then apply the principles to the design 
of artifacts. (Thompson 1942, Williams. C. 1995, Sachs 2007) 
 
Anthropomorphic language: Time for reform 
 
Teleology is also prevalent within anthropomorphic language: genes are said to be ‘selfish’, ‘competitive’, 
‘co-operative’. There are also ‘regulatory’ or ‘master’ genes (no ‘mistress genes’ as yet). There are also 
instances in the literature of gene ‘strategies’ or evolutionary ‘strategies’. Evolution is said to ‘invent’ or 
‘experiment’ and sometimes evolution is said to ‘select’ or ‘act’ upon biological characters (Rennie 2010). 
Under these circumstances, evolution and natural selection sound suspiciously synonymous. Putting this 
latter concern to one side for the moment, the question here is whether the appeal to teleology is legitimate or 
desirable within evolutionary biology. One can take any of several perspectives on this. For instance, one 
might think the employment of teleology is justified when considered naturalistically76. Alternatively, one 
might think the employment of teleology is undesirable but nevertheless inevitable77, a sort of necessary evil. 
At the other end of the spectrum, one might consider the employment of teleology both undesirable and 
unnecessary (Reiss 2009), ‘….it has been found that ‘purpose’ is not a useful concept when we are in search 
of scientific laws’ (Russell 1968 p17). There is little likelihood of any consensus between any proponents of 
the perspectives outlined above but there may be an area of agreement. For instance, following Ockham, 
there is a broad agreement that scientific theories are preferred in the simplest form possible, provided there 
is no loss of explanatory or predictive power and that agreement is found over what constitutes the simplest 
form possible. Furthermore, there could be agreement that it is better to use explanatory terminology that is 
less inclined to teleology, provided again nothing of value is lost.  
 
The reason for pursuing this course is that teleological and anthropomorphic language can be misleading. 
Take the example at the start of this chapter: It is the primary function of every organism to pass on to the 
next generation as many copies of its genes as possible. This quotation represents a popular view of 
evolutionary theory but it is unclear what exactly the word ‘primary’ entails. For instance, is it that primary 
functions shape or control psychological motivation or is it that psychological motivations can override these 
so-called primary functions?   There is the problem that it could be interpreted in a manner that was not 
intended. It could imply, for example, that organisms have a primary goal or motivation where the purpose is 
to reproduce or replicate. This interpretation contrasts with the interpretation that more modestly suggests 
that it is just that inherited favourable traits within a population are more likely in the long run to be present 
in future generations, ceteris paribus. This more modest claim does not entail intentionality. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
76 Lewens (2005) provides a good overview of what he calls the ‘received view’. 
77 Haldane’s (1932) famous quip: ‘Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he’s unwilling to be seen 
with her in public.’ 
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there is still an empirical problem. The claim is that passing on one’s genes is the primary function of every 
organism, but how can it be established that it is the primary function? Moreover, is it the case for every 
organism? The case could be made that the primary motive for organisms is to survive, or to avoid pain, or to 
seek pleasure. Perhaps there is no single primary function but a collection. It might come as a surprise to 
many humans that their primary function is to pass on as many genes as possible, especially a surprise to 
non-heterosexuals. Perchance the best case that can be made is something along the lines that the motive for 
eating may be that one is hungry but the evolutionary function of eating is surely staying alive. This may be 
the case in this instance but there are still problems with this view. What would be the underlying 
evolutionary function of an alcoholic, a drug addict or a bungee jumper? People can be strongly motivated in 
areas that do not conform to simply passing on genes or trying to survive. The danger here is to reduce 
complex human behaviour to simplistic explanations. One must also bear in mind that although it is 
necessary for an individual to survive before one can pass on genes the converse is not necessary. That is, 
that an individual does not need to pass on ones’ genes in order for that individual to survive.   It is 
sometimes the case in the animal kingdom that parents put their own welfare before that of their offspring; 
they may abandon all their young or even consume them (Dagg 2005). Animal sexual behaviour is also 
subject to surprising diversity (Bagemihl 1999). Moreover, animals sometimes care for the young if it is not 
their own and sometimes even adopt and help rear young of unrelated species. In the microbial world, it is 
not uncommon for bacteria to divest themselves of parts of their genome in order to survive (Kassen and 
Rainey 2004, Ponciano et al., 2009). On empirical grounds, the premise of passing on one’s genes where one 
can lacks the universality claimed. Furthermore, a gene is not a clearly individuated biological object with an 
unambiguous definition (Ch.2). 
 
It is not only that such premises are shaky but also that, when combined with anthropomorphic language and 
excess of metaphor, valid arguments are difficult to maintain. The concern is also that metaphors can have 
the habit of sliding into unestablished facts. Reiss (2009) has argued that two basic reforms are necessary for 
evolutionary biology. The first is to ‘retire Darwin’s watchmaker’. Summarising Reiss, this entails a sufficing 
account of evolutionary theory to replace an optimising account. Moreover, there is no necessity to take up 
the chalice of the creationist and try to answer the question of ‘perfect design’. Natural selection, according 
to Reiss, was the tool employed to replace the explanations of adaptedness by divine intervention. To Reiss 
however, such employment is flawed. 
 
Why do we need to ‘retire Darwin’s watchmaker?’ Because we don’t need him and we never did. If we 
accept a naturalistic world view, then we must accept that all organisms we see existing on the planet today 
are doing so only because they are satisfying the conditions for their existence. (Reiss 2009 p353) 
 
The second major reform, to Reiss, is to replace the teleological language that underpins the optimising 
account of evolutionary theory and recognise that, in order for an organism to exist, all it needs to do is fulfil 
the conditions for existence. The term ‘conditions for existence’ was taken from Cuvier’s ‘meeting the 
conditions of existence’ and is seen as a replacement for the term ‘natural selection’. Reiss demonstrates how 
the teleological overtures within selective terminology can be extricated and offers his alternatives. Perlman’s 
premise that traits have evolved to function the way they do because of a past advantage becomes an 
exaggerated and unnecessary claim under the auspices of Reiss. Traits function the way they do simply 
because they meet whatever the conditions of existence demand. Accepting this ‘sufficing’ account does 
have other advantages.  
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One could argue in favour of Reiss, that some traits, such as the regeneration of limbs or even the 
regeneration of two halves of a body once it had been severed, could be perceived as highly beneficial to the 
fitness of these particular organisms. Yet this advantageous trait was lost in many of the descendants that 
diverged from their ancestors (Bely and Nyberg 2010). This demonstrates that sometimes creatures can exist 
and reproduce by satisfying the conditions for existence even though they lost, over generations, what must 
be considered under Darwinism an extremely advantageous trait.  
 
The sufficing account of evolution is therefore better suited to help explain the ‘endless forms’ of biological 
life and avoids much of the philosophical quagmire of neo-teleology, paradox and adaptationism. Reiss has 
undoubtedly contributed some valuable clarification and reform of evolutionary theory, but it must be 
recognised that he was not the first advocate. It was observed that Butler (Ch.1) argued that the term ‘natural 
selection’ be replaced by the less teleological and more appropriate term ‘meeting the conditions of 
existence’.  
I have said that there is a practical identity of meaning between ‘natural selection’ and ‘the conditions of 
existence,’ when both expressions are fully extended. I say this, however, without prejudice to my right of 
maintaining that, of the two expressions, the one is accurate, lucid, and calculated to keep the thread of the 
argument well in sight of the reader, while the other is inaccurate, and always, if I may say so less 
‘convenient,’ as being always liable to lead the reader astray. (Butler 1882 p354) 
 
Butler’s observation rings true: anthropomorphic and teleological language, although intended to make 
difficult concepts clearer, often has the opposite effect and ‘leads the reader astray’. When constructing valid 
arguments in logic, there is a rule that stipulates that the premise must be as unequivocal as possible and 
without ambiguity; if a premise is ambiguous, it should be rewritten to remove the ambiguity. This approach 
should be applied to arguments employed within biology. For instance, when one says that the heart is for 
pumping blood, one is opening up a range of issues that are not there if one simply asserts that hearts pump 
blood when they function. One must recognise that a heart is still a heart even if it is no longer pumping 
blood. The function of the heart on the butcher’s cold slab, it could be said, is to provide the vendor with an 
income. A pack of wolves might see the purpose or function of the sheep’s heart as the provision of a healthy 
meal for the alpha wolf. One might argue however that function explains existence, i.e. that pumping blood 
explains why the heart is there. There should be some care here, more accurately one can say the heart is 
preserved as it plays the vital role of pumping blood but this gives little clue as to how the heart evolved or 
emerged. The importance of emergent and preserved causes is discussed in the following chapter. 
 
 When one thinks comprehensively of what an object does, there is rarely a singular function and usually the 
function is context sensitive. Rather than talk of the function of a biological object, it may be preferable to 
borrow some terminology from physics and refer to the dynamics of an object. This sidesteps the problem of 
teleology and respects the fact that an object’s dynamics might alter in different situations. Under such a 
recommendation, there is no need to describe genes as ‘selfish’ or ‘cooperative’; all one need do is describe 
the dynamics of genes or gene networks in the context of development stages or the relationship with the cell 
and its components. It may also be more desirable and accurate to talk of ‘interactions’ between biological 
items rather than to talk of ‘forces’. The term ‘natural selection’ also carries an element of teleology if taken 
literally. It might suggest to some that nature has a preference for certain biological qualities, which further 
implies that nature is some body or force with intention. This of course is nonsense: nature is not a force, 
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body or super-organism; nature does not have foresight, but then neither is it ‘blind’. Darwin’s ‘blind 
watchmaker’ is not simply a case of extravagant metaphorical language; it is an inaccurate and potentially 
misleading metaphor. Watchmakers blind or sighted still have intentions, whereas nature has none. The 
temptation is to reify processes as objects. All the interactions, reactions, combinations, dissolutions and 
processes that occur in the universe result in the formation of stars, planets, black holes etc. There is not any 
requirement to suggest these objects are of marvellous design or selected (although one may still wish to 
perceive such items as marvellous).  
 
It was noted in Chapter 5 that some people thought neo-Darwinism should be extended to other scientific 
disciplines. A danger with this move is that neo-teleology could also be exported to the physical sciences. 
One might then argue that it is not the case that the Sun radiates energy but that the Sun is for the radiation 
of energy. Or, as another example, black holes are for the absorption of matter rather than the description 
currently used, black holes absorb matter. One might be tempted to go further still and argue that the 
existence of the Sun can be explained by past advantages and that it was selected from a range of other 
possibilities. Someone might then ask, ‘Is it the Sun that is being selected or is it the atoms that compose it 
that are selected? Or does selection operate at all levels of cosmology?’ One might think this scenario absurd, 
but this type of reasoning is already being advocated and applied (Ch. 5). If this propagation of neo-
Darwinism is not checked, then science could be lumbered with the same confusions and lack of clarity that 
blight some of evolutionary biology today. All the philosophical problems that arise from neo-Darwinism, 
and in particular anomalous selection, would be transferred to physics et al. alternatively, this terminology, 
tinged with teleology, can be discarded by the neo-Darwinist without compromise to the theory. One could 
still argue that the series of advantageous genetic alterations eventually result in transformation. It would be 
less teleological to say the processes of advantage produced or gave rise to any such transformation than to 
say these results were selected. It is preferable therefore to talk of evolution by natural processes than 
evolution by natural selection.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In the last chapter, an important difference was identified in the type of explanandum being explored in 
evolutionary biology; one must be clear about what one is explaining: is it an emergent novel property and 
source of transformation or is it the preservation and ubiquity of traits that are said to facilitate fitness? Most 
of the discussion concerning teleology is only applicable to the latter explanandum and has little or nothing to 
say about the sources of variation. Some have called for reform and some have argued that natural selection 
should only be considered as an explanation for stasis, inverting its earlier raison d’être. Other reformers 
have considered the teleological problems inherent in neo-Darwinism, suggesting alternatives to the 
terminology of selection. It was argued here that much of the problem concerning teleology and anomalous 
selection could be avoided if one thought of evolutionary explanations in terms of different processes that 
‘suffice’ rather than optimise. Not only would this call for evolutionary pluralism be consistent with the CM 
model of explanation, but it would also open up areas of research that have previously been omitted from 
evolutionary theory. This idea is not new: Darwin had recognised that there were factors other than natural 
selection at play; Mivart (1871) had criticised Darwin for putting too much emphasis on natural selection. 
But Darwin and Mivart did not know what we know today. It is now time to observe how evolution by 
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different natural processes can resolve many of the philosophical and biological problems that stem from 
anomalous selection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 13: Evolutionary Pluralism 
 
So far, this work has surveyed many of the debates and problems that pervade evolutionary theory in relation 
to natural selection. The overall perspective has been rather critical and perhaps fairly negative. Now is the 
time to present something more positive and that is, hopefully, a more coherent account of evolutionary 
theory that avoids many of the philosophical problems encountered so far. It will be suggested that this can 
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best be achieved by extending a pluralistic approach. However, this will not be sufficient. On the one hand, it 
is recommended that the selective terminology is replaced with the less anomalous and demanding principle 
of ‘meeting the conditions of existence’. On the other hand, evolution and origins by means of natural 
selection is substituted by evolution and origins by means of natural processes.  
 
It should be acknowledged that evolutionary pluralism is not a new concept; Darwin was a pluralist who 
recognised factors other than natural selection to explain evolutionary changes. Today, one has the advantage 
over Darwin: biological science has progressed enormously, filling in many of the gaps that were groped at 
by the Victorian naturalists. There was very little understanding of the causes or sources of variation that 
natural selection requires. Anyone who is in the fortunate position of being able to read widely across all the 
fields that are embraced nowadays under the ‘life sciences’ can appreciate the many ways in which evolution 
can and does occur. Apart from the major transitions, what is also striking is the diverse methods of change 
that can be seen at the different taxonomic levels, sometimes exclusively at a particular level. For instance, 
the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster has been extensively examined and wider extrapolations have been 
made to explain how evolution occurs. However, one has to be careful for it is now known that the fruit fly 
does not methylate its DNA but that the honeybee, plants and placental mammals do (Carey 2012 p285).  
There is conjugation between prokaryotes only, meiosis is practised between eukaryotes but not by bacteria 
or Archaea (Madigan et al., 2011). Moreover, the form that initiates meiosis is different too: fungi produce 
spores but mammals produce sperm. Unexpectedly, female sharks and komodo dragons in captivity have 
produced viable offspring by parthenogenesis (Watts et al., 2006).  
 
Allopolyploidy occurs in eukaryotes and is particularly common in plants (Soltis et al 2010); hybridisation is 
more frequent in Animalia than previously thought (Ch.7). Further to this variety, there is symbiogenesis – 
special relationships between members of different kingdoms that produce new forms of life. Examples of 
this include Elysia viridis, the sea slug that is able to incorporate algae and effectively photosynthesise like a 
plant, and the diverse forms of lichen (Trench et al 1974). ‘Higher’ organisms are composites that share and 
carry other organisms, more akin to a micro ecosystem than strictly individual (Madigan et al., 2011).  
Finding a singular formula to embrace such a wide range of evolutionary variety is difficult. Attempts to 
embrace all have resulted in a principle so wide and general that it invites criticism of vacuity. The enigma of 
nature is the great diversity on the one hand and the converging patterns and pathways that provide this on 
the other. A possible solution is therefore to recognise a plurality of evolutionary processes amenable to 
empirical scrutiny and testing. What should be considered? Evolutionary pluralism could embrace the 
processes documented during the twentieth century – drift, allopatric, sympatric and parapatric speciation etc. 
– but also incorporate many other features that are beginning to be recognised and included within the 
‘extended evolutionary synthesis’. Additionally, it will be suggested that consideration should also be given 
to the inclusion of the structuralist agenda.  
 
The Cost of Extending Evolutionary Theory 
 
Recognising and adding these new processes to an extended synthesis is not without issue; it would arguably 
have its detractors and there are always conservatives who resist change. Moreover, there is a debate over 
which processes should be included and which should be excluded (Pigliucci 2007, Pigliucci and Muller 
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2010). This situation is to be expected; it was demonstrated earlier how many of the evolutionary processes 
or factors that were seen as being outside and even contrary to neo-Darwinism were eventually ‘Darwinised’ 
(Ch.2). Convergence, seen as a foil to natural selection by Mivart (1871) in the nineteenth century was 
embraced as an example of natural selection in the twentieth century. Mendelism and mutation theories were 
seen as non-Darwinian at first but were brought into the ‘modern synthesis’(Ch.2). Wagner and Dixon (Ch.1) 
saw evolution in segregated or island populations as examples of evolution without natural selection; Mayr 
embraced the phenomenon, calling it allopatric speciation and seeing it as an example of natural selection 
(Ch.2). Symbiosis and symbiogenesis were perceived outside and insignificant to the modern synthesis, but 
they were later embraced and seen as subsumed under natural selection by its modern-day protagonist, 
Margulis (Ch.7). Hybridisation was discussed by Darwin as an alternative mechanism to natural selection, 
although eventually rejected by both Darwin and the modern synthesis architects as unimportant. Latter-day 
proponents of hybridisation as an evolutionary mechanism (Arnold, Mallet) see it not as Darwin saw it as a 
separate process distinct from natural selection but as a process where the products are subject to natural 
selection (Ch.7). For almost a century, developmental biology was perceived by nearly all neo-Darwinists as 
having nothing to say about evolution, but now it is seen by all but the most conservative of Darwinists as 
important (Gilbert and Epel 2009). Today, the products of development are seen as subject to natural 
selection, but embryologists at the end of nineteenth century saw their discipline as having promising 
explanation for evolution but nevertheless being distinct from natural selection (Bateson 1894). 
 
There is something of a Kuhnian pattern here. In the last century, many novel processes of evolutionary 
significance were discovered or identified that were considered outside the paradigm. These were seen as 
anomalies and rejected, sometimes with outright hostility. McClintock, who discovered transposons, was 
treated with such severity, working alone and isolated from the Darwinian community (Comfort 1999). 
Eventually, she triumphed and won a Nobel Prize, and her work was absorbed into the paradigm as if it had 
always been there. This is not an atypical example; many have suffered rejection and not always with a 
consoling ending. Kammerer ended his life by suicide after being accused of fraudulently manipulating his 
experiments, which purported Lamarckian acquired characters. Today, his work is being re-evaluated more 
sympathetically and it is being asked whether he should be considered a founding figure of epigenetics 
(Vargas 2009). Waddington and Goldschmidt were two mid-twentieth-century figures who paid the price for 
stepping outside the perceived boundaries of evolutionary theory. Waddington found that he was not invited 
to major conferences and Goldschmidt78 was mocked and his work caricatured with the adage ‘hopeful 
monster’. Waddington today is recognised as an important figure in both the fields of evolutionary 
developmental biology and epigenetics (Gilbert 2000, 2003). Goldschmidt’s theory is undergoing re-
evaluation; it is now known that many mutations are not exclusively ‘single point’ and that chromosomes can 
be considerably rearranged without being maladaptive. The early Russian advocates of symbiosis received 
short shrift from the architects of the ‘modern’ synthesis (Khakhina 1993), and the latter-day champion, 
Margulis, found her attempts to reintroduce concepts of symbiosis and add symbiogenesis to evolutionary 
theory resisted with hostility. Today, these concepts feature in many evolutionary and ecology textbooks. 
Kimura’s (1983) neutral theory of evolution was ‘laughed out of court’ (Crow 1995 p4) when introduced as 
an alternative to neo-Darwinism. This has now been incorporated within the paradigm but there is still 
discussion over the full weight of its explanatory power. The underlying reason for such hostilities seemingly 
                                                 
78 See Nature News for an overview: http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100217/full/463864a.html 
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is that these new insights undermined the view that evolution was explained only in terms of natural selection 
‘acting’ upon small mutational changes. 79 As, Gould (2002) demonstrated there was a hardening within the 
modern synthesis around the middle of the 20th century, toward adaptationist explanation and against the 
evolutionary pluralism that was popular beforehand.  
 
There are also some people who have not been accepted into the ‘mainstream’ but who are nevertheless 
evolutionists. How often does one hear the disingenuous charges from critics – ‘they fail to truly understand 
evolutionary theory’ or ‘they should stick to physics’? Is it fair to apply this criticism to the following? Steele 
(1998), who has spent 25 years trying to convince everyone that the Weismann barrier is penetrable; 
Jablonka and Lamb (1989, 2005) who have also been advocates for Lamarckian behavioural inheritance; and 
the most intriguing omissions, the two evolutionists who have been examined in this work, Thompson and 
Lima-de-Faria (Ch.9). The neo-Darwinian response to these two has been quite different but in both cases 
quite disturbing. Thompson’s On Growth and Form has been heralded as a classic of evolutionary biology by 
a wide range of academics, including some neo-Darwinists, but has never been incorporated into the 
literature of the paradigm. Why is this so? Fox Keller (2002) has suggested that Thompson’s reluctance to 
engage in genetics is the main reason his work has been passed over. There could be however, another 
explanation. Comparing the first edition of On Growth and Form (1917) and the 1961 abridged edition, there 
are some serious but illuminating omissions in the latter; many of the references critical of neo-Darwinism 
and supporting direct adaptation have been removed (pages 86–87, 221–222, 537–541, 664, 888–889, 1022, 
1092–1094). Two representative examples of cuts should suffice: 
 
In short, nature proceeds from one type to another among organics as well as inorganic forms and these 
types vary according to their own parameters and are defined by physio-mathematical conditions of 
possibility. (p1094) 
 
Our geometrical analogies weigh heavily against Darwin’s conception of endless small continuous 
variations: they help to show that discontinuous variations are a natural thing that ‘mutations’ or sudden 
changes, greater or less – are bound to have taken place, and new ‘types’ to have arisen, now and then. 
(p1094) 
 
Why should Bonner edit On Growth and Form in such a manner that it misrepresents Thompson’s intentions 
and main arguments? One does not have to go far to discover the answer, for Bonner provides it within the 
editor’s introduction. To be fair to Bonner, he does acknowledge that Thompson is critical of natural 
selection, seeing it as a negative force, and that Thompson does prefer the alternative explanation of direct 
adaptation by means of physics. However, without blush, Bonner states how this can be rectified: ‘let me 
briefly show how the heterodoxies of D’Arcy Thompson can be easily transformed into orthodoxy’. Bonner 
then proceeds with an ‘orthodox’ account of neo-Darwinism that subsumes Thompson’s arguments under 
natural selection.  
 
The emasculation of Thompson’s critique of natural selection by Bonner is a different treatment from that 
received by the other major structuralist considered in this work, Lima-de-Faria. How is it that such an 
                                                 
79 It is not only those that are seen to undermine the explanatory power of natural selection that offended neo-Darwinists. Woese 
discovered the third kingdom of Archaea, which is now recognised and standard textbook material. However, this recognition was not 
without a struggle against the neo-Darwinian establishment. ‘The hostility’, Woese said, ‘was shocking’. ‘Others soon followed, 
crossing boundaries of common courtesy by making fun of Woese. He was called a crank and a crackpot, being neither a microbiologist 
nor an evolutionist.’ (Korthof 2009.) Woese’s background is in maths, physics and biophysics. 
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erudite and prolific geneticist, who has committed his life to his work, is virtually unheard of in Anglo-
American academia? Why is it that there are no scientific reviews of his books and no philosopher to date has 
conducted a critical evaluation? Scouring the internet, there is only one review of one of his books to be 
found, and that is negative (Korthof 2011). This ‘review’ is very concise and does not explicate the 
fundamental ideas involved in ‘autoevolution’. Curiously also, New Scientist declined to publish a paper 
Lima-de-Faria had written on natural selection. He has said, ‘when Evolution without Selection was 
published I expected a backlash because I had challenged neo-Darwinism but I was wrong, I never heard a 
thing, it was a stone wall of silence’ (2009, private conversations). 
 
What should one make of these treatments? Without equivocation, they are totally unacceptable. One of the 
worst things for a researcher is to spend his or her life in scientific enterprise, only to be humiliated by lack of 
recognition or to suffer personal innuendo. Moreover, this type of behaviour goes against the ethos of 
science. As Popper (2007) says, science must welcome new and bold conjectures that will be subject to 
critical scrutiny. One expects a degree of scepticism from the establishment towards new ideas – that is 
normal in any discipline – but one should not be party to the ostracisation of individuals or subject them to ad 
hominem attacks. There is also lurking the danger that genuine and valuable contributions are stifled or 
missed. This is another reason why evolutionary pluralism is preferable to evolutionary monism. Lima-de-
Faria’s early work (1983) anticipates many of the biological realisations of the late 1990s and the beginnings 
of this century. Briefly, for this has been covered earlier: he argued that many genes were homologous, rather 
than accepting the popular perception that evolution took analogous pathways; and that the gene and the 
chromosome were only the parts of a wider network, rather than taking the gene-centric and reductionist 
view. One might contend, this anticipated the core views of modern systems biology. Moreover, Lima-de-
Faria argued that development of the embryo or larva was of evolutionary significance, anticipating much of 
evo-devo. He also provided much discussion of a major topic today, canalisation – the relationship between 
order and plasticity. Hedging all this is caution: Lima-de-Faria (2003) advises that there is still much that is 
not understood about the chromosome, especially in relation to the centromere and the telomeres.  
 
One could argue that Lima-de-Faria is ahead of his time and this may be one of the reasons his work has 
never been embraced or ‘Darwinised’. Moreover, Lima-de-Faria sees his work as a direct challenge to neo-
Darwinism and not without some abrasion. Under such circumstances, neo-Darwinists, rightly or wrongly, 
are much less likely to be receptive to Lima-de-Faria’s novel hypothesis. Moreover, it may not be possible to 
incorporate these ideas into a selectionist framework. For whereas structuralists see a fundamental ordering 
in nature, with patterns and regularities the direct result of physical law, the neo-Darwinist postulates 
unpredictability80 behind the variation for natural selection to ‘work on’ (Mayr 1984, Gould 2002). 
Nevertheless, there may be scope for some form of reconciliation within a new concept of evolutionary 
pluralism. Mendelism, for instance, is an ordered system of inheritance that at first was seen as a challenge to 
Darwinism because of its deterministic nature81, only to be incorporated at a later date in the ‘modern’ 
synthesis. Evolutionary pluralism should recognise that many of the structures in the biological world are 
                                                 
80 Gould (2002) argues that if the ticker-tape of life was re-run then life would in all probability look very different because of 
randomness. He argued further that randomness thwarted prediction, a view challenged later by Conway Morris (Ch.4) 
81 See Wallace letters to Read 1909, reprinted in James Marchant, 1916. Letters and Reminiscences (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
p. 340. Wallace expresses his concerns over the ‘rigidity’ of Mendel’s mechanisms of inheritance.  
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founded directly from physics, chemistry, topology and even complexity theory without recourse to 
selectionist hegemony. Kelly (2010), a proponent of convergent evolution, illustrates this point: 
 
But a hundred, or thousand, cases of isolated significant convergent evolution suggest something else at 
work. Some other force pushes the self-organization of evolution towards recurring solutions. A different 
dynamic besides the lottery of natural selection steers the course of evolution so that it can reach a remote 
unlikely destination more than once. It is not a supernatural force, but a fundamental dynamic as simple in 
its core as evolution itself. Evolution is driven toward certain recurring and inevitable forms by two forces 
of convergence: 1) The negative constraints cast by the laws of geometry and physics, which limit the 
scope of life’s possibilities. And 2) The positive constraints produced by the complexity of interlinked 
genes and metabolic pathways, which generates a few repeating new possibilities. (Kelly 2010) 
 
A proponent of natural selection might retort that convergent evolution is actually a product of natural 
selection, where environments are similar one would expect similar features and this is best explained by 
natural selection at work. The difficulty with this reply however is that even if it were true it overlooks the 
fact, as demonstrated by Conway Morris, that convergence occurs also in environments that are quite 
dissimilar. Moreover, many convergent features of unrelated organisms are neutral as to fitness. What then is 
the casual factor in these instances? Again, another defender of natural selection accepting that convergent 
evolution is the product of physical law might say that natural selection is secondary, and acts on the 
products of convergent evolution. Of course without a formal definition of natural selection one does know if 
convergent evolution is caused by natural selection or if natural selection simply acts on the products of 
convergent evolution. Or perhaps natural selection is both the producer and the filter? 
 
The danger to be thwarted is that every biological phenomenon (and physical phenomenon) becomes 
subsumed under natural selection, which does not strengthen the explanatory power of natural selection but 
dilutes it. A theory that explains everything is likely to explain nothing. For example, what is to be avoided is 
that the explanations for the Bauplan, other symmetries, auto-assembly and autocatalytic processes become 
subsumed under natural selection. The ‘explanation’ for bilateral symmetry would then be that bilateral 
symmetry was selected because of advantage and therefore one could coin the term ‘symmetry selection’. 
When asymmetries arise, as in the case of the fiddler crab or the narwhal, one could coin the term 
‘asymmetry selection’ as the alternative explanation. This would be explanatorily vacuous and symptomatic 
of anomalous selection. One might think this practice of subsuming order under natural selection absurd, but 
it has already taken place. Orthogenesis was conceived as a direct intrinsically evolutionary process that was 
immune from natural selection, but this did not stop the coining and application of the term 
‘orthoselection’(Ch.4).  
 
Darwin divorced natural selection from other processes. Sexual selection accounted for the traits that could 
not be construed as advantageous; use, disuse and habit accounted for traits that materialised in the absence 
of Malthusian struggle; Lamarckian mechanisms could assist natural selection or work independently; and so 
forth. (Ch.1. Appendix 1) The important point here is that Darwin advocated a plurality of processes, each 
independent and not necessarily subsumed under natural selection. Today, there is knowledge of many more 
processes of modification, some through descent and some through reticulate evolution, not to forget 
speciation through various forms of symbiogenesis. There are many advantages to be had from recognising 
all of these documented processes as processes in their own right and not confusing them with natural 
selection.  
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Why Evolutionary Pluralism Could Be Desirable 
 
It is demonstrated here how the problems that have afflicted natural selection can all be avoided by some 
simple changes to terminology and our conceptual framework. 
 
Two key stages of evolutionary theory 
 
There is no tautology problem within pluralistic evolution. Research is firmly on empirical grounds or within 
competing hypotheses. Causal processes can be identified that lead to evolutionary changes. These changes 
then prove at later stages to be sustainable or not. To break the charge of tautology one must regard the points 
of address in two stages. The first explanandum is the cause or causal processes responsible for an 
evolutionary change to the status quo; the explanans for this can then be identified – for instance, it could be 
mutational change/s, an epigenetic effect or a hybridisation event. The second explanandum regards the 
sustainability of these new evolutionary changes; the explanans in this instance provides an account of why 
the change might improve or decrease fitness, or simply meet the conditions necessary for continued 
existence. Such an account might include considerations of predator–prey relationships, sexual selection, 
climatic conditions, resource availability and so forth. What is important here is that the explanantia are not 
conflated. The explanans that addresses the ‘second’ stage – that is, the ‘sustainable or not’ stage – should not 
be employed to explain the first stage, which is the origins of the emergent property or properties. As an 
example, sexual selection should not be addressing emergent properties. Sexual selection is a second-stage 
explanans that endorses (or perhaps sends to extinction) any first-stage emergences. A long-tailed bird, for 
instance, might appear attractive to members of the opposite sex and this may indeed lead to increased 
numbers of birds with long tails in subsequent populations. However, this does not and cannot explain how 
the long tail emerged originally, which thus cannot be explained by sexual selection.  
 
It is recommended, then, that this aspect of evolutionary theory recognises two important and distinct phases, 
first the question of origins and thereafter the question of sustainability. Both stages require their own 
particular and relevant explanans and they should not be misappropriated. To do so is to commit to the 
fallacy of correlation and to confuse the causal chain. Thus the charges of tautology and that evolutionary 
theory is not testable are easily refuted. This separation, it is suggested, can only be achieved by avoiding 
recourse to misleading catchphrases such as ‘survival of the fittest’ and resisting the temptation to reduce 
complicated evolutionary details to tautological statements, propounded by Sober (Ch.2) - Trait X is fitter 
than trait Y if and only if X has a higher probability of survival and/or a greater expectation of reproductive 
success than Y.  The tautological nature of this ‘principle of natural selection’ was discussed (Ch.2) but now 
one can hopefully see a resolution to the problem. It is that the principle as outlined above has nothing to 
contribute to the explanans for the first-stage explanandum of evolutionary theory. 
 
Levels of selection 
 
Structuralists such as Reid and Lima-de-Faria are not generally concerned with the problem of ‘which is the 
level or unit of selection?’ This problem is seen to be a consequence of incoherence within neo-Darwinism. 
 
147 
‘Selection’, strictly by its definition, is only causal in the sense of confirming or disconfirming. The real 
work, which is of explanatory interest, focuses upon the generation or emergence of de novo features that 
constitute the enormous diversity of life. With appreciation of this point, it is suggested that the ‘levels or 
units of selection’ debate need not apply to evolutionary pluralism. The debate over which level natural 
selection is said to apply or ‘act’ upon is voluminous and something of a philosophical quagmire that sucks 
one in. Once one enters or commits to it, it is extremely difficult to get out. Part of the problem is that the 
term ‘selection’ as it stands at the moment is anomalous; there are many ways of perceiving its attributes and 
application. It has never received a formal scientific definition. Natural selection could be construed as 
causal, non-causal, preserving, eliminative, descriptive, a universal law of nature, a filter or filtering process, 
a process, a mindless algorithm, a universal acid, honing or sculpting and so forth. Before entertaining 
participation in the ‘levels of selection’ debate, one should really be clear about what sense of natural 
selection is the appropriate sense. Unfortunately, this task is extremely difficult and, even if some clarity 
were achieved here, there is no guarantee it would meet with consensus. One would never be sure that one’s 
interlocutors were of the same mind and the validity of any argument could soon be lost. Philosophers and 
theoretical biologists have entered the discussion assuming that natural selection needs tweaking (Ch.2), but 
unfortunately this is not enough. 
 
Evolutionary pluralism has an advantage here, for it can bypass the quagmire without any loss of explanatory 
power. For instance, selection, by definition, must occur only when there are already in place pluralities of 
things that can then be selected. Selection therefore cannot apply to singularities; it requires differentials. 
Variation precedes selection. Therefore the first phase of evolutionary change identified earlier can be 
considered independent of natural selection. To illustrate this take, an uncomplicated example. The classic 
study of finches on the Galapagos has been pursued admirably by the Grants (2008). They have been 
fortunate to discover a speciation event, a new species of finch never in existence before. Closer examination 
morphologically and genetically has shown that the new species of finch is a hybrid of two other species. 
This speciation event by hybridisation is a clear example of a causal first-stage process that has no recourse 
to natural selection. In other words, identifying and verifying the hybridisation event explains the speciation. 
The situation with the second stage is somewhat different. For instance, it is not known how the newly 
arrived hybrid finches may fare. They may only survive for a few generations before becoming extinct. On 
the other hand, they may have some attribute of hybrid vigour that enables them to extend their numbers. 
Alternatively again, they might just exist alongside the other finches without significantly increasing or 
decreasing the strength of their population. They may even introgress with the parent population and slowly 
lose their identity. Who knows? No one can predict with certainty; a long period of drought or some other 
natural disaster might sweep them away forever. Where is it during the second stage that natural selection 
might act? Moreover, would it make sense to consider the issue of ‘which level’ selection is acting upon 
during the second stage? Natural selection, similar to any other theory, has no power to predict the fate of the 
finches. It seems therefore that natural selection can only look retrospectively, describing the events once 
they have happened. The problem here, though, is that natural selection does not seem to carry much 
explanatory power if all it is thought to be doing is mapping events. It seems a little superfluous to declare 
that if the finches increase their numbers then they are ‘selected for’, or if the numbers decline and they go 
extinct then the finches are ‘selected against’, or if the numbers barely move then the finches are subject to 
‘stabilising selection’. One is not much wiser, for if the finches were to increase or decrease numbers, what 
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one is really seeking is an explication of the causes. Once again, recognising plurality here, there could be a 
variety of reasons as to what determines the finches’ fate. One could argue that all the different reasons that 
determine the fate of the finch collectively constitute natural selection. However, the problem is that as the 
term ‘natural selection’ is so ambiguous and poorly defined then it is recommended that one refers directly to 
the cause or causal process.   
 
If one also observes that evolutionary events do not necessitate selective advantages and adopts the more 
sufficing account, then there is little requirement to pose the ‘at which level?’ question. Whatever the process 
of the emergent property is, it is not necessary to assume eventual advantage or disadvantage in all situations. 
To be of evolutionary interest, the change must entail that the affected population meets the conditions of 
existence.  
 
Evolutionary pluralism and heredity 
 
The importance of descent with modification in principle is uncontroversial; however, the details of the 
matter are not. Following the concerns of ‘which level of selection?’, there is another issue, which links and 
touches on too narrow a perspective. As observed, the early population geneticists sought explanation by 
examining changes in gene frequencies and then extrapolated to explain changes to the phenotype. This 
methodology was seen by some later neo-Darwinists to suggest that evolutionary problems could be resolved 
if the level of selection was fixed at that of the gene (Williams 1966, Dawkins 1976). The merits of adopting 
a gene-centric approach have already been discussed. What is important here is that, if one were to look 
solely at any changes to genomes during heredity, then this would preclude other areas of research that also 
have evolutionary implications. Arguably, organisms do not only inherit genetic material; they also inherit 
the cell and all its qualities and the bacteria that eventually occupy many parts of the body. The significance 
of the ‘maternal effect’ on future generations, which recognises the importance of the yolk during early 
development, has already been noted. There are also at least two other factors of significance but these have 
received little attention. The first is the qualitative nature of the cell and particularly the membrane one 
inherits. Crawford and Marsh have researched this perspective and argue: 
 
From the evidence we have presented, it is difficult to regard substrate-driven change or plastic heredity as 
a trivial force as it seems to have been behind many of the great evolutionary thrusts, including the origin 
of life, the nature of the first living forms, the emergence of oxygen breathing animals and the shaping of 
our own species. (Crawford and Marsh 1989 p247)  
 
In ‘substrate-driven’, the authors include all the conditions of the environment that impinge upon the 
organism that may directly affect how genetic material is expressed. Particular consideration is given to the 
importance of nutrition in shaping morphology.82 For instance, the evolution of vertebrates from soft-bodied 
ancestors included a mineralisation process that can only be fully understood if one examines the nature of 
the chemicals ingested or absorbed. Crawford and Marsh consider many similar examples and conclude that 
much of what is thought to be unpredictable by neo-Darwinism is actually determined directly by the 
environment and availability of resources and therefore offers the possibility of some predictive capability. 
There can be no evaluation here of whether the empirical observations are correct, but Crawford and Marsh 
                                                 
82 See also Blumberg (2009 pp182–187) for a modern endorsement of the ‘more than simply genes’ approach. 
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present a plausible and clear example of evolutionary pluralism that coheres with the main proposals of 
structuralism. 
 
The second factor that has been given little attention concerns recognition of molecular accretion in the 
evolution of complexity. Thims (2005) has drawn up a ‘Molecular Evolution Table’ (see Appendix 5), which 
illustrates a novel perspective of the earliest stages of cosmological evolution through to the evolution of 
humans. The table shows when new combinations of molecules have accrued and produced the complexities 
and diversities in nature. The lesson is that phenotypes are more than reflections of genotypes; molecular 
qualities are also acquired. The arguments presented by Thims and by Crawford and Marsh illustrate well the 
first stage of evolutionary processes that explains the major transitions and emergence of new forms. There is 
opportunity here for research programmes that could have great explanatory value for evolutionary theory.  
 
Drift versus natural selection 
 
There is a temptation to view and try to explain evolution in just two ways: either it is natural selection at 
work or it is some form of drift. Unfortunately, this narrowness precludes other interpretations and seems to 
focus solely upon the role of micro evolution.83 As witnessed, there are many other viable processes that can 
be considered; it is not necessary to recite these again. One does have to be careful, though, when talking of 
drift. Naegeli and Darwin84 were discussing the neutral traits of the phenotype, whereas the debate since 
Kimura’s Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution has addressed the importance of intrinsic changes to 
proteins and amino-acid sequences etc., which may not necessarily be observed in phenotypes. Both drift and 
selection recognise that the causal element in explanation is random small mutational changes, but they see 
the effects differently. It is said that drift describes the changes that arise from the mutations that do not alter 
fitness whereas selectionism describes the advantageous or disadvantageous changes to fitness. 
Advantageous changes could lead to adaptation but disadvantageous changes could lead to extinction. It can 
be appreciated that drift is a sufficing account of evolutionary change but selectionism demands more. For 
example, one could argue that if there is continuous drift within a population that has separated from its 
ancestral population, then the accumulation of changes to a phenotype could lead to creatures that no longer 
share similarity with the ancestral population. In other words, a sufficing account of allopatric drift could 
explain speciation without recourse to natural selection.  
 
Gradualism and natural selection 
 
Evolutionary theory that resides in gradualism has often been criticised on the grounds that there are gaps in 
the fossil record or a lack of evidence of intermediate stages between species. (Carroll.R 2000 p27, Eldredge 
& Tattersal 1984 p45-46, Gould 1982 p189) However, this criticism cannot be directed at evolutionary 
pluralism. It is only a problem for those neo-Darwinists who insist that evolutionary changes exclusively 
culminate gradually from a series of small mutations, shepherded by natural selection. This incompatibility 
with palaeontology requires a further hypothesis that argues that the fossil record is incomplete because 
fossils are rare and difficult to preserve and that otherwise gradualism would be demonstrated. The problem 
                                                 
83 See Amundson (2007) for a discussion of the importance of development in evolutionary explanation. 
84 See Chapter 7 of the sixth edition of the Origin. Darwin clarifies and admits to the existence of neutral traits. 
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with this reasoning is how can one be sure that gradualism would be demonstrated? Is it because the 
gradualist theory demands it? This would be circularity and one would be open to the accusation that the 
facts are being tailored to fit the theory. Fortunately, the situation for evolutionary pluralism is not 
problematic; under its auspices, one would expect a discontinuous or episodic fossil record. Evolutionary 
pluralism recognises that gradualism is not a universal phenomenon and that there are many evolutionary 
routes, some of which may be rapid and others slow. (Russell et al 2008, Janzen & Etienne 2012) Lateral 
gene transfer (Shapiro 2011), symbiogenesis (Margulis 2001) and hybridisation (Arnold 2006, Soltis et al 
2010) are examples of rapid evolution and may explain why the fossil record appears to be discontinuous.85 
Evolutionary pluralism does not deny that changes can also occur slowly through mutations, but it should 
recognise that, because of the extremely long time scales involved, empirical verification of causal chains is 
much more difficult to establish than the causal chain of, say, a polyploidy or hybridisation event. If one 
takes a strictly monist view of evolutionary change, then is not one likely to preclude other avenues of 
research that may resolve the criticisms directed at evolutionary theory? 
 
Non-synonymity of evolutionary pluralism and evolution 
 
In attempting to extend the explanatory powers of natural selection, one unwittingly creates anomalous 
selection, which has become difficult to distinguish from ‘evolution’. Without a null hypothesis, selection 
and evolution can become synonymous and, of course negate any explanatory influence. One reads on 
occasions that evolution ‘selects’ or has a ‘strategy’ or ‘favours’, which are terms normally applied to natural 
selection (Nichols 2011). Evolutionary pluralism, on the other hand, avoids this conflation. The objective is 
to identify the particular causal process that resulted in the evolutionary change. The process explains the 
evolutionary event. The principle of the matter is simple to comprehend; the details and the research will 
often not be. 
 
Evolutionary pluralism and the reification fallacy 
 
With evolutionary pluralism, there is no danger of some ‘thing’ – such as an indefinable material force, 
pressure or filter – appearing in any explanation. If the research is based upon the CM model of explanation, 
then one identifies the causal physical processes thought to be involved. Of course, one must be clear what 
the explanandum is that one is trying to explain. For example, is it a question of emergence or is it a question 
of demographic distribution once the character has emerged? 
 
Evolutionary pluralism and abiogenesis 
 
One important reason for incorporating the structuralist perspective within an evolutionary pluralistic account 
is that it provides continuity between abiogenesis and evolutionary theory which is currently missing. There 
is a persistent attack from outside the parameters of science to suggest that evolutionary theory fails to 
account for the origins of life in the primordial soup. However, this can be refuted by recognising that 
biological evolution is not divorced from general or cosmological evolution but is subsumed within it. The 
                                                 
85 See also Venditti, C., Meade, A. & Pagel, M. (2009.Nature advance online publication doi:10.1038/nature08630) whose research 
undermines the ‘Red Queen Hypothesis’. 
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order, regularities and symmetries observed in the physical and chemical evolution of the universe do not 
disappear when it comes to biological evolution on earth. To understand the structure of the basic molecules 
or building blocks of life, such as the cell, the proteins and DNA etc., one has to examine the topology in 
relation to tensegrity and chirality (Ch.8). Elucidation of these points can demonstrate the continuity that 
natural selection fails to provide. As Kauffman (1995) says, ‘order is for free’. 
 
Biologists have not entirely ignored the spontaneous emergence of order, the occurrence of self-
organization. We all know that oil droplets in water manage to be spherical without the benefit of natural 
selection and that snowflakes assume their evanescent sixfold symmetry for spare physiochemical reasons. 
But the sheer imponderable complexity of organisms overwhelms us as surely as it did Darwin in his time. 
We customarily turn to natural selection to render sensible the order we see, but I think the answer to our 
questions about the origins or [sic] order is broader. We already have some inkling of the kinds of 
spontaneous order which may bear on biological evolution, and I believe we must make the most profound 
assessment of such self-organization. We must look in any direction that seems profitable because 
whatever spontaneous may abound is available for evolution’s continuing uses. (Kauffman 2006) 
 
Evolutionary pluralism and teleology 
 
Evolutionary pluralism recognises that there are many documented pathways that illustrate evolution’s 
occurrence for both explananda, the emergent phase and the ‘sustainable or not’ stage. These are empirical 
observations that do not assume that biological characters or attributes are necessarily the product of 
advantage. The neo-teleologist seemingly assumes that natural selection is causal not only for the second-
stage explanandum but also for the first-stage explanandum. However, as argued earlier, the first stage of 
evolution, which provides an explanation of the variation or diversity, is independent of selection. 
Evolutionary pluralism, on the other hand, takes a more modest perspective, appreciating that characters, 
emerging or existing, need only meet the conditions of existence. There is therefore no requirement to open a 
philosophical can of worms that invites the type of teleological considerations already discussed. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Evolutionary theory can be more transparent and avoid many of the philosophical and empirical problems 
that have afflicted natural selection. Darwin divorced natural selection from other evolutionary processes, but 
this separation was not pursued by his followers. The trend is to subsume independent evolutionary processes 
under natural selection. This has overburdened the explanatory power of natural selection, stretching it to 
such a state that there is now anomalous selection with the word ‘selection’ now meaningless. Resulting from 
this, there are the problems of tautology and untestability, the confusion over where natural selection is said 
to act, the conflation of natural selection with evolution, and so forth. To avoid these problems, the adoption 
of a more pluralistic approach and less demanding terminology was suggested. This would recognise 
documented evolutionary processes in their own right but address the relevant evolutionary explanandum.  
For example, one must be clear whether issues of emergence or transformation on the one hand, or issues of 
sustainability on the other, are being addressed. To put it simply, explanation is where natural processes meet 
the prevailing conditions for existence. These considerations should open up areas of research that have to 
date been excluded and thus strengthen evolutionary theory.  
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Chapter 14: Conclusions 
 
 
How does one explain evolution and all that it entails in a coherent manner? The conclusion to this question 
demonstrates that there are two solutions available. The first is that if one is to continue with natural selection 
as an explanation then it must be reformed with a formal definition that is not given to ambiguity.  The 
second solution is a more radical one where the term ‘natural selection’ is replaced with the term ‘natural 
processes’. Guidelines are provided below in respect to reforming natural selection.  However, given the 
historical legacy, it is unlikely that a clear characterisation or definition of natural selection that commands a 
consensus will be achieved. It is recommended therefore that serious consideration and philosophical scrutiny 
is given to the radical alternative.  
 
 
The ambition has been to strengthen evolutionary theory and present a coherent account where the 
parameters of explanation are more easily recognised and the argumentation respects validity. Here the 
unwritten premise to date has been that evolutionary theory can resolve many of the controversies with some 
fairly simple revisions. To begin, this work sought to identify what natural selection is and, following this 
ontological question, determine its appropriate explanandum.  The historical analysis here has demonstrated 
that the early explanandum that natural selection sought to explain was unclear at its origins and moreover 
the explanandum gradually evolved arbitrarily, with an increasing explananda. The most serious problem 
identified is one of ambiguity. Without a clear definition and agreed parameters there arise from natural 
selection miscellaneous philosophical problems, which after 150 years or so are still unresolved. The current 
philosophical discussion has failed to appreciate the anomalous nature of natural selection and it’s associative 
terminology, seeking to tweak a more accurate characterisation of natural selection. This work concludes that 
the tweaking should stop and a more radical solution is required.  
 
(a) A clear definition of natural selection is drawn that commands universal respect and that clearly 
demarcates it from other evolutionary processes. Guide lines are provided below. 
Or 
(b) The term ‘natural processes’ replaces the term ‘natural selection’, as outlined in Chapter 13. 
 
The Disambiguation of Natural Selection 
 
Alternative recommendation (a) 
At the heart of evolutionary theory is the concept of natural selection, which has survived a chequered 
history, declining after Darwin’s death in the period now known as the ‘eclipse of Darwinism’ and being 
revived and prospering from the 1930s. Today, there is again a polarisation of opinion (Ch.s 2; 3; 4) Natural 
selection is seen by some as such a valuable explanatory model that it can be employed far beyond the 
biological fields into areas such as cosmology, mineralogy etc. (Ch.5). At the other end of the spectrum, there 
are those who wish not only to limit the extension of natural selection but also to restrict its application 
within evolutionary theory (Ch.11). Indeed, it is a curious state of affairs that what is considered by many to 
be the central premise of evolutionary biology has never received a formal scientific definition that has 
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achieved consensus. Without such, individuals maintain their own perceptions of what natural selection is 
deemed to be. Overall, this often results in contrary and even contradictory attributes. Furthermore, it was 
witnessed that the explanandum that natural selection is said to address can shift ground and gradually 
expand. Darwin and Wallace both saw natural selection as explaining speciation primarily (Ch.1), whereas 
their followers in the mid-twentieth century placed the main focus of natural selection on explaining 
adaptation (Ch.2). Historically, many of the alternatives to natural selection actually became subsumed under 
natural selection, inducing a new ontology for natural selection (Ch.s3; 13). Taking all these issues into 
consideration, the situation urgently requires address, if not, the charge of a new biological phlogiston looms 
ever more serious.  
 
One difficulty demonstrated here is that metaphors are not precise scientific tools and are open to many 
different interpretations. If one is to continue with the usage of natural selection then a clear definition must 
be sought avoiding the present incoherence. The historical study illustrated this ambiguity, demonstrating 
how natural selection itself has evolved and diversified into many concepts. Many of the controversies over 
the explanatory power were inherent in the earliest writings and have persisted, becoming more complex and 
unclear overtime. These can now be identified and evaluated, recognising the strengths and weaknesses. In 
doing so, one must be clear about what aspects of evolutionary theory one is addressing. For example, is the 
explanandum speciation, adaptation, stasis, demographic changes or extinction? With these qualifications in 
mind, the variants of natural selection can be observed and evaluated. The disambiguation falls into the six 
main groupings listed below. One must be cautious, however, as there are many variants or ‘sub-species’; 
one can only try to capture the principal themes as they occur in the literature. Namely- 
 
1. Proto or pre-Darwinian natural selection 
2. Malthusian natural selection  
3. Survival of the fittest – fitness  
4. Natural selection as a process 
5. Natural selection as a filter 
6. Anomalous selection 
 
Proto or Pre-Darwinian Natural Selection 
 
Proto or pre-Darwinian natural selection was conceived by such thinkers as Hutton, Wells, Matthew and  
Blyth, but without them coining the term (Ch.1). To Darwin’s credit, such antecedence was recognised. This 
early naturalistic perspective sought to explain the diversity of form one might observe within a species. 
Moreover, it recognised that favourable traits could spread through a population in a gradual manner and, in 
some instances, might lead to a species becoming better adapted. The factors behind such changes were 
perceived as ecological, and one can witness this expression of natural selection in the more contemporary 
accounts of Endler (1986) and Peter and Rosemary Grant (2008), all concerned with fieldwork. The serious 
limitations to this early perspective are that there is no account or consideration of speciation and little 
consideration of extinction. The studies by the Grants on the famous Galapagos Islands observed acts of 
hybridisation as the only cause of speciation amongst the finches. 
 
 
154 
Malthusian Natural Selection 
 
Malthusian natural selection was simultaneously conceived by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace, 
arguing that the competition for resources between individuals would result in the preservation of favourable 
traits on the one hand and elimination of unfavourable traits on the other hand. Thus natural selection and 
extinction go together ‘hand in hand’. This account, following the earlier account above, accepted that 
favourable traits would be naturally preserved, spread through a population gradually and result, in some 
instances, in adaptation. The boldness of this account was the postulation that, after many generations of 
slight variation and ‘advancement’, the present population would comprise characters so different from those 
of its ancestors that a new species had evolved. The great advantage of this account is that, being essentially 
an empirical claim, it escapes the charge of tautology. Further, the fierce competition between individuals is 
argued to result in physical attributes, thus providing a naturalistic explanation of adaptations. It was 
maintained that, without the struggle for existence, it is difficult to see how physical adaptations are 
explained. The weakness of this perspective, however, is that too much reliance is placed upon Malthusian 
competition, the Malthusian argument being itself fallacious (Fisher. A, 1988).  The ‘struggle for existence’ 
is not a universal phenomenon necessary for evolution to occur; some latter-day Darwinists argue that rapid 
evolution occurs under relaxed or lifted selection (Ch.11). Kropotkin reasoned that organisms may also 
struggle directly against the environment. Individuals that collaborated and forged mutuality were more 
likely to survive than those going it alone; group selection took its embryonic form. Moreover, Kropotkin 
suggested that continuous strife and struggle degraded a population rather than enhancing all its qualities 
(Ch.1). 
 
One further conclusion recognised some limitation on vertical lines of heredity. The emphasis on 
modification through descent overlooks important issues of genetic exchange / lateral gene transfer. The 
account also lacks an explanation of the initial ‘unity of type’ and the initial variation that precedes and is 
prerequisite to natural selection. William Bateson, perhaps anticipating evolutionary developmental biology, 
argued that an understanding of the causes of variation was the key that unlocked evolutionary theory and not 
the struggle for existence (Ch.1). 
 
Survival of the Fittest – Fitness 
 
Many of the concerns about Malthusian natural selection led to a reformulation of natural selection in terms 
of ‘fitness’, but this was not without a cost. ‘Survival of the fittest’ was the phrase coined by Herbert Spencer 
to encapsulate the ideas of Darwin and Wallace. However, this was thought too crude by the architects of the 
modern synthesis. As Gould (1982) commented later, ‘survival of the fittest’ is too demanding; ‘survival of 
the fit enough’ is more appropriate. If only the fittest survive, there would be few organisms remaining. 
Moreover, it was deemed that survival of the fittest, if taken literally, is a deeply conservative concept with 
no inkling to suggest how evolution might occur (Ch.2). The fitness concept was intended as a sophisticated 
replacement for ‘survival of the fittest’, recognising that an organism need not require physical attributes of 
strength in order to survive. All that was necessary for continuity was the ability to reproduce effectively. 
However, the drawbacks to such modifications of Malthusian natural selection include the charges of 
circularity and untestability (Ch.2). Further, fitness becomes essentially conservative and lacks any causal 
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explanation for the origin of both adaptation and speciation. Philosophers have attempted to provide some 
coherence, but little consensus has been achieved (Ch.2). Dawkins recognised some serious problems and 
urged that the term ‘fitness’ should be avoided wherever possible. His attempt to resolve the issues concerned 
with fitness rested heavily on a gene-centric foundation to ‘inclusive fitness’. This reliance, however, cannot 
be substantiated in the light of new discoveries. A new assessment appreciates that ‘genes’ are less 
particulate, much more pleiotropic and context-sensitive, than originally perceived. Could it not be argued 
that Biology has moved toward a more holistic account that includes recognition of factors espoused within 
Systems Biology? Appreciation of the cell, its contents and structure, together with its interface with the 
environment, is nowadays considered essential (Ch.2). ‘Genes’ can also be seen as intermediaries within a 
causal chain and not as causal ‘agents’ or as ‘mediators’. Moreover, it is recommended that one avoids 
anthropomorphic language in such circumstances.  
 
Natural Selection as a Process 
 
Natural selection perceived as a process is really an explanation that identifies a series of chronological steps 
that, after many generations, comes to fruition in adaptation or speciation or extinction (Ch.4). For speciation 
or adaptation, the causal element is a series of favourable point mutations that eventually affect gene 
frequencies; this constitutes the de novo aspect of evolution. The favourable changes are preserved and 
accumulate over generations and the unfavourable changes are quickly eliminated. The strength of this 
perspective is that there is good evidence for the variety of form observed within a population. Furthermore, 
the process identified is not essentially tautological and is not subject to the criticism levelled at the principle 
of fitness. The weakness of the theory is a lack of empirical evidence for speciation, which is very difficult to 
test. Further, the gradualist approach is difficult to reconcile with the episodic evidence of the fossil record. 
There are many examples of fairly rapid evolution, as considered earlier in the sections on lateral gene 
transfer, symbiogenesis and hybridisation. The idea that the accumulation of point mutations can explain all 
of evolution is overburdened and leaves many things unexplained. It should therefore be seen as only one 
explanatory process amongst many. Another challenge is to distinguish clearly the process from evolutionary 
drift. Drift, in the modern sense of the term, shares with this sense of natural selection that evolution is the 
result of small changes to gene sequences. One would therefore need a clear account of why the process of 
natural selection but not drift leads to adaptation, without looking arbitrary. 
 
Natural Selection as a Filter 
 
Natural selection as a filter or filtering process has largely emerged in recognition of the pluralism inherent in 
modern interpretations of evolutionary explanation. Natural selection under this construal can be seen as an 
arbiter or filter that acts not only upon changes induced by point mutation but upon any changes, however 
they originate. Under this formulation, natural selection can be seen to act upon changes such as 
symbiogenesis, hybridisation, macro-mutation, endogenous inheritance, sexual selection, and developmental 
plasticity. Moreover, there seems no logical reason why the filter analogy cannot be applied indiscriminately 
to other sciences, such as cosmology and mineralogy (Ch.5).    The advantages of this perspective are 
difficult to discern, other than it endorses fitness as essentially conservative. If natural selection is purely a 
filter then, by definition, it lacks any causal account for the emergence of novel features. Further, it was 
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demonstrated that the filter concept of natural selection would never allow evolutionary change to begin at 
the ancestral beginnings, preventing argogenesis and the great diversity of biological life (Ch.4). If natural 
selection is purely a filter, then ‘what’s making the coffee?’ seems to be the more important evolutionary 
question to be addressed. This issue has resurfaced within evo-devo and the importance of development, but 
the issue is not a new one. This same pertinent problem was raised by Mivart, Butler,  De Vries and Bateson 
(Ch.1) and led to the ‘eclipse of Darwinism’.  (A more accurate phrase was suggested: the eclipse of natural 
selection). It is not easy to see how the filter concept escapes the charge of superficiality, as the 
understanding of the sources of variation and orthogenesis is arguably the main challenge.  
 
There is equivocation over what it is that constitutes ‘variation’, that which natural selection is said to filter. 
The original concept saw natural selection sifting through variation of small genetic changes, where harmful 
changes are eliminated and beneficial changes accumulate gradually and eventually new species may result 
(Ch.4. Rosenberg & McShea). However, natural selection is also seen to act on larger biological entities such 
the products of symbiogenesis and hybridisation (Ch.7. Margulis, Arnold). Should one conclude therefore 
that the products of symbiogenesis and hybridisation also constitute variation? The original formulation of 
the relationship between variation and natural selection is seen to explain speciation, in the second 
formulation natural selection is seen to act upon speciation. Again, there is no formal definition of variation 
and it looks that natural selection not only acts on variation but also acts on diversity. Furthermore, if there is 
no formal definition of variation, then variation can be constituted by anything that has a plurality, such as 
variation in universes or minerals or elements. One could even extend the filtering concept of variation to 
‘explain’ why there is more matter in the earth than there is antimatter, obviously antimatter has been 
selected against and matter has been selected for. Without rules or defined parameters one could argue that 
the earth’s environment has filtered out all the helium and selected nitrogen.  
 
Is there still yet another modal sense of variation that includes hypothetical entities? In early Darwinian terms 
an actual physical trait could be contrasted or compared with another actual physical trait and research could 
then be conducted to discover if either trait actually produced reproduction advantage. However, there is 
another sense of variation when, for instance, a novel biological entity emerges and pertains no physical 
comparative. Instead, a hypothetical comparative is introduced to fulfil the selective necessity of variation. If 
this seems a little obscure then let’s consider an example, take the eukaryote: For the sake of argument it will 
be said that the first eukaryote came into existence by symbiogenesis. This first eukaryote is unique, having 
no comparative and therefore lacks the variation necessary for natural selection. However, although there is 
no physical comparative to this original in existence as yet, one might still want to say it was selected. The 
problem is however, what was the eukaryote selected in favour of? One might find a solution here, to the lack 
of actual variation for filtering, by positing hypothetical scenarios. One could argue for instance that there 
may have been many aborted acts of symbiogenesis but only the one sustained, and was therefore selected. 
Unfortunately, there is a problem here with the employment of hypothetical entities. One cannot conclude 
that selection has taken place, indeed it would be a logical fallacy to do so. The reason is simply that the 
symbiogenesis event that produced the first eukaryote may have been the only event, there may not have 
been other aborted acts of symbiogenesis. 
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There is a real problem here that concerns philosophers and logicians, ‘variation’ requires a definition that 
prevents the filter analogy being extended reductio ad absurdum. However, even if a suitable definition is 
forthcoming, the filter analogy seems consigned to explaining demographics and reductions in biological 
diversity and has nothing to say concerning the emergence of biological novelties or the major evolutionary 
transitions. In Chapter 3 it was also observed how the filter concept of natural selection is subject to the 
reification fallacy. 
 
Anomalous Selection 
 
As there has never been an accepted singular formal scientific definition of natural selection, anomalous 
selection has emerged. Anomalous selection is a description of the situation we find ourselves in today, with 
several definitions or concepts of natural selection in hand and a massive proliferation of selective 
terminology. For obvious reasons, this is not a desirable situation. The first concern is the underlying 
ambiguity. The danger is that, if there is not a single and precise definition of natural selection, one might 
unwittingly slide from one sense of natural selection to another. If natural selection is attacked for being 
circular, then the Malthusian brand of natural selection is brought forward to refute the attack. If Malthusian 
natural selection is attacked for its reliance upon competition, then the concept of fitness, which embraces 
any mechanism of reproductive success, is produced to defend the integrity of natural selection. If the filter 
concept of natural selection is attacked for being non-causal, then the attack can be countered by appeal to 
natural selection ‘as a process’ and by saying that genetic mutations are a source of evolutionary novelty. 
Then again, if one argues that natural selection as a process of mutational changes is insufficient to explain 
all of evolution, one is told that natural selection can act upon all manner of biological emergences. Of 
course, it is not only proponents who could slide from one meaning of natural selection to another; opponents 
could cherry-pick and attack the version of natural selection they find weakest but, if this tack is 
unsuccessful, they can switch attack to another meaning of natural selection. The ambiguity of the situation is 
the problem here, but it is not the only one. 
 
Unfortunately, selective terminology covers nowadays such a vast range of biological phenomena that it is 
difficult to find anything that has not been covered with a selective whitewash (Appendix 2). The charge here 
is that the term ‘selection’ has been stretched to such an extent that its explanatory currency is completely 
devalued. It is not simply the case that the term ‘natural selection’ is ambiguous; it is also the case that 
natural selection is anomalous. If one considers, for instance, relaxed or lifted selection, evolution is no 
longer here explained by natural selection but is explained by the absence of natural selection.  
 
Another concern, is ‘selection’ shorthand for the term ‘natural selection’ or does it hold its own separate 
identity? If it has its own identity then what distinguishes it from the term ‘natural selection’? If ‘selection’ is 
solely shorthand for the term ‘natural selection’ then does ‘natural selection’ also hold all the attributes that 
the word ‘selection’ holds, as identified in Appendix 4? When one says ‘there is selection of trait X’ or 
‘selection for trait X’, what sense of selection is one alluding to? Is it to ‘natural selection’ or is one alluding 
to one (or more) of the vast miscellaneous selective terminology available? Or does one hold some other 
definition of ‘selection’ in ones own mind? The conclusion is that under present circumstances the word 
‘selection’ is meaningless.  This undesirable situation is compounded further by the evolution of ‘natural 
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selection’ to ‘survival of the fittest’ to one of ‘fitness’ (Ch.2). The continuous debate since Victorian times, 
concerning any causal qualities (nowadays ‘negative selection’ versus ‘positive selection’) has not clarified 
the matter and there is no sign of any resolution. It is a messy affair. 
 
 
 
Natural selection, then, has itself evolved into several ‘species’ but none has become extinct; all are in play 
and supplemented by an enormous vocabulary of selective terminology. This ambiguity is undesirable and 
undermines any explanatory power natural selection may hold. As it stands, there seem to be five possible 
remedies (1–5 from above), but unfortunately each comes with some cost. If one were to accept the 
prevailing proliferation and generalise the principle of natural selection so widely, then one would have to 
accept that the generalised principle could equally apply to other domains, such as cosmology, mineralogy 
and evolutionary psychology. This in turn would invite the charges of vacuity, circularity and a new 
phlogiston. Moreover, natural selection under these circumstances looks suspiciously synonymous with 
evolution. Theories that claim to explain all, selectionist or non-selectionist, are often theories that explain 
nothing worthwhile. The explanation may even be true but becomes so generalised that nothing informative 
is gleaned.  
 
One hopefully can appreciate why it is not advisable to extend this messy affair to other sciences and 
disciplines (Ch.5). The idea that natural selection is some form of substrate that can be applied to all manner 
of studies cannot have any explanatory value until that substrate is clearly defined or characterised, with all 
the current ambiguities exorcised. As demonstrated, the anomalous nature of ‘selection’ makes it undesirable 
for export. 
 
Alternative conclusion (b) 
 
It was argued that rather than seek a single explanation for all of the diverse forms of evolution, it would be 
better to recognise that there are many natural processes that lead to evolutionary change. For the sake of 
explanatory clarity these mostly fall into two chronological stages. The first stage addresses emergent or de 
novo factors; for example, natural processes such as hybridisation or symbiogenesis explain the emergence of 
new forms of life. Once these new forms have emerged their sustainability is tested over time by factors in 
the environment: resource availability, the presence of predators, climatic conditions etc. It’s the ecological 
processes that explain any sustainability. Of course the details behind these causal changes could be 
extremely complex and no doubt open to debate, but then that is the role for the biologist to elucidate the 
empirical evidence. The role of the philosopher in this instance is to provide a structural framework for 
scientific theories that is not besieged with ambiguity, confusion and controversy. The advantage of the two 
stage structural framework recommended here is that it is simple to apprehend in principle, it is parsimonious 
and not contaminated by the historical legacy that afflicts natural selection. Moreover, it is clearer to see 
which explanandum is being alluded to and reduces the risk of applying an inappropriate explanation to the 
explanandum in question. As an example, sexual selection may explain why the unusual peacock train has 
been preserved over time but sexual selection cannot explain the origin or emergence of this novel feature. 
Again, predation may explain the numbers of melanic moths within an environment but predation does not 
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explain the origin of moth melanism.  Moreover, Kropotkin in Ch 1, anticipating ‘group selectionism’, gives 
not an example of emergent causes but an example of preserving causes. Mutualism, may protect individuals 
and explain why they reproduce effectively but that is all.    
 
Indeed, one may wish to think of all this in shorthand and as a question of causes. For instance, the first-stage 
processes are the initial or originating cause and the second-stage processes are the preserving or eliminating 
cause. This may also be a clearer ascription than the conventional ascription of proximate and ultimate 
causes. The term ‘ultimate cause’ has something of an emotive grandiosity, as if it were analogous to a trump 
card, and there is some confusion over what ultimate causes should explain. Attributes considered 
advantageous were employed not only as preserving causes but also as emerging causes. This was deemed 
fallacious (Ch.11). 
 
To establish these reforms fully, it is necessary to embrace an outlook of evolutionary pluralism that is not 
subsumed under natural selection. In other words it is strongly advised that one does not introduce extra 
vocabulary based on ‘selection’, and consigning these two recommended chronological stages as ‘first stage 
selection’ and ‘second stage selection’. As argued above, the reason for this preclusion is that it is very 
difficult to know exactly what the word ‘selection’ means.  
 
The question then arises: does one actually require selective terminology to explain evolution? Is it not a 
necessary condition? This answer is seemingly no, or at least the alternatives to natural selection are worthy 
of further philosophical investigation and scrutiny. To date the philosophical community has not addressed 
these possibilities. This work calls for a change in direction and has presented an unprecedented and concise 
outline of the ‘structuralist’ thinkers 86 (Ch.8 & 9).  D’Arcy Thompson and Lima-de-Faria are identified as 
the torch bearers for a wider multi-disciplinary approach toward evolutionary explanation that extends 
beyond a genetic/natural selection perspective. One can read the works of either thinker and observe they are 
free of selective terminology and the arguments presented are not lacking in coherence. One may not agree 
with the authors interpretations of the details but it does not follow that the arguments themselves are invalid. 
More recently Conway Morris has produced a comprehensive study of ‘convergence’ devoid of explanation 
in selectionist terminology and instead physical law provides most of the explanatory factors. Again, there 
seems to be no lack of coherence and the work is explanatory plausible. The challenges to neo-Darwinism are 
there for the uptake, they should not be dismissed out of hand without proper examination. Nevertheless, 
there are differences. Unlike Thompson, Lima-de-Faria and Conway Morris both recognise that genes play 
an important role within evolutionary explanation. Nevertheless, Lima-de-Faria maintains also the limitations 
of genetic reductionism, advocating the requirement of recourse to cosmological evolution and the physical 
principles that underpin it. 
 
The view that evolutionary explanation requires much more input from other disciplines, such as physics, 
chemistry, geometry, topology and tensegrity has also been embraced by such academics as Ball, Crawford, 
Ingber, Gardner, Marsh, Scarr and Stewart (Ch.8). This pluralistic approach is endorsed here in principle but 
under the banner of natural processes. The conclusion is that evolutionary theory requires a much stronger 
                                                 
86 These thinkers share a more eclectic interpretation of evolutionary than anything suggested by reformers, such as Jablonka and Lamb, 
Gilbert, Gould, Lewontin and Pigliucci or even ‘revolutionaries’ such as Carroll, B.S and Carroll, R.L.   
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measure of these disciplines than has been previously recognised and in contraposition to the view that 
physics et al requires a measure of natural selection.  
 
To recognise such evolutionary pluralism may prove difficult, as the case could be made that natural 
selection has been seen as ‘the only game in town’ and to give criticism is to supply the ‘opposition’ 
unnecessarily with ammunition. However, it could be said that the defensive attributes and desire for 
conformity have stifled alternative conjectures or missed opportunities for new research programmes. It is 
not the case that alternatives have not been developed. The brief historical survey demonstrated that 
evolutionary processes that seemed to run contrary to natural selection were resisted at first but then later 
subsumed under natural selection (Ch.2). Sometimes, new selective terminology was added. In other 
instances, alternative hypotheses were edited and rendered ineffectual (D’Arcy Thompson) or completely 
missed or passed over (Antonio Lima-de-Faria), (Ch.13). Despite its early origins going back to figures such 
as Mivart, structuralism is in its infancy and requires further articulation and development. Elucidation here 
could be exciting and prove to be a valuable research. Seeking to explain biological phenomena purely in 
terms of ‘advantage’ or ‘disadvantage’ overlooks the possibility that many phenomena are caused directly 
without the need to postulate selection pressures. This issue was widely debated during the ‘eclipse of 
Darwinism’ but then lost attraction. Recently, however, there has been an increasing interest in the interface 
of organism and environment. Mary Jane West-Eberhard (2003) has reflected that, “contrary to the notion 
that mutated novelties have superior evolutionary potential, there are strong arguments for the greater 
evolutionary potential of environmentally induced novelties”. The direct impact of such factors as gravity, 
temperature and nutrition, without recourse to selection pressures, has indeed been largely neglected (Ch.10). 
 
Another instance of missed opportunity – the importance of hybridisation within Animalia – has been for the 
most part underestimated, with too few researchers appreciating its full potential, it was concluded. (Ch.7). 
Hybridisation does not sit easily with gradualist neo-Darwinism and the traditional phylogenic tree of life. 
Nevertheless, hybridisation has excellent direct empirical evidence for speciation. The full impact and 
historical value of hybridisation events is far from known; it deserves its own field of enquiry and provides 
another excellent opportunity for a vibrant research programme.  
 
The controversy concerning neo-teleology was seen as deeply related to the advocacy of natural selection. 
The desire to explain the issues of design and adaptation led some to postulate a degree of purposefulness to 
some biological attributes, such as hearts not simply pumping blood but hearts being for the pumping of 
blood. It was argued that this further claim of teleology was difficult to substantiate but, moreover, that it was 
an unnecessary excursion. The problem of neo-teleology is pressing only if one insists on evolutionary 
explanation in terms of advantageous traits. One can avoid the problems here with a few simple alterations in 
terminology and expectation. Butler and Reiss have recommended that the term ‘meeting the conditions for 
existence’ is clearer to apprehend, less ambitious and preferable to the term ‘natural selection’.  It seems to be 
forgotten that Darwin correctly appreciated the ‘conditions for existence’ as the ‘higher law’ (p261 6th edition 
of the Origin). In modern terms this means that both natural selection and neutral evolution are covered by 
the term ‘meeting the conditions for existence’. It is not the case that natural selection is synonymous with 
‘meeting the conditions for existence’. Indeed, if one adopts a more modest and sufficing terminology to 
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explain evolutionary events, together with the perspective of natural processes suggested here, then many of 
the issues that have afflicted evolutionary theory are bypassed without any explanatory loss. (Ch.13). 
 
 
A Brief Summary of the Conclusions 
 
To achieve a more coherent evolutionary theory free of many of the persistent criticisms, problems and so-
called paradoxes that lack resolution to date, it was recommended that one examine and clarify natural 
selection. The challenge to neo-Darwinists and philosophers who support neo-Darwinism is to provide an 
unambiguous scientific definition of natural selection with the explanandum clearly identified.  This would 
enable the establishment of criteria that provide boundaries to the explanatory power of natural selection. 
However, this could be a futile task, as the best minds have failed over a very long period to provide a clear 
uncontroversial characterisation of natural selection and fitness. Natural selection is now so anomalous and 
the word ‘selection’ is employed in so many contrary ways it has become meaningless. The difficulty of 
formal definition is that if the definition is very general and wide-ranging, then the term invites criticism of 
vacuity, tautology and untestability, with natural selection looking synonymous with its intended 
explanandum, evolution. On the other hand, if the definition is very tight, then many evolutionary events 
remain outside its explanatory powers. To resolve this dilemma, it was suggested that there are indeed 
evolutionary processes present that should be recognised as independent natural processes and not subsumed 
under natural selection. The term ‘conditions of existence’ was deemed more appropriate when addressing 
evolutionary theory in general terms (Ch.13). Evolution by means of natural processes conforms well to the 
CM model of explanation. If the term is adopted, then many of the criticisms of tautology and untestability 
are diffused. Moreover, its adoption opens up the opportunity of new research programmes and consideration 
of those that have been passed over or ignored. It has been demonstrated that the study of form and structure 
is essential to a comprehensive evolutionary explanation, which in turn requires at least recourse to physics, 
chemistry, mathematics, tensegrity and topology.  In chapter 10 it was discovered that gravity and 
thermodynamics were fundamental to understanding form, and from this understanding biological scaling 
laws can be derived. For the sake of parsimony it is recommended that these explanatory powers are not 
perceived to be a product of some form of contrastive selection process. The explanatory models by West et 
al (Ch.10) are the explanatory icing on the cake, but there is little point or value in icing the cake twice with a 
further layer of selective terminology. This perspective of evolutionary pluralism in turn recognises that not 
all evolutionary change needs to be addressed in terms of accumulated advantage. Accretion of genetic and 
molecular substances explains the physical diversity of life but it is not necessary to assume that complexity 
is the result of a selective process. It is sufficient that these chemical properties combine together with some 
persistence. These novel chemical combinations do not necessarily have to be ‘better’ than those that already 
exist, but they do have to meet the prevailing conditions of existence.  Thus a more sufficing account than at 
present is less demanding and desirable. Moreover this sufficing account allows the employment of 
terminology that is less ambiguous, clearer to apprehend and potentially not inclined toward neo-teleology 
(Ch.12). One might argue that these natural processes, hybridisation, symbiogenesis, accumulative beneficial 
mutation, the direct effects of gravity and temperature, predator/ prey relationships, niche construction and so 
forth, can all be said to constitute natural selection. The reply to this argument is no, it is the actual natural 
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processes that constitute (and explain) evolution, they do not constitute natural selection. Natural processes 
constitute natural selection only if natural selection is synonymous with evolution and that is not desirable. 
 
Natural selection is characterised in many ways and is without a formal definition. Resulting from this is an 
array of philosophical problems that have to date proved seemingly irresolvable.  There is however a way to 
avoid such problems with simple revision of terminology and our conceptive framework. Darwin’s 
groundbreaking book is thus re-titled: On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Processes………. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Natural Selection before Darwin 
 
Hutton 
 
(1)If an organised body is not in the situation and circumstances best adapted to its sustenance and 
propagation, then, in conceiving an indefinite variety among the individuals of that species, we must be 
assured, that, on the one hand, those which depart most from the best adapted constitution, will be most 
liable to perish, while, on the other hand, those organised bodies, which most approach to the best 
constitution for the present circumstances, will be best adapted to continue, in preserving themselves and 
multiplying the individuals of their race. (Hutton 1794) 
 
Wells 
 
(2)[What was done for animals artificially] seems to be done with equal efficiency, though more slowly, by 
nature, in the formation of varieties of mankind, fitted for the country which they inhabit. Of the accidental 
varieties of man, which would occur among the first scattered inhabitants, some one would be better fitted 
than the others to bear the diseases of the country. This race would multiply while the others would 
decrease, and as the darkest would be the best fitted for the [African] climate, at length [they would] 
become the most prevalent, if not the only race. (Wells 1818 appendix) 
 
 
Matthew 
 
(3)There is a law universal in nature, tending to render every reproductive being the best possible suited to 
its condition that its kind, or organized matter, is susceptible of, which appears intended to model the 
physical and mental or instinctive powers to their highest perfection and to continue them so. This law 
sustains the lion in his strength, the hare in her swiftness, and the fox in his wiles. As nature, in all her 
modifications of life, has a power of increase far beyond what is needed to supply the place of what falls by 
Time’s decay, those individuals who possess not the requisite strength, swiftness, hardihood, or cunning, 
fall prematurely without reproducing—either a prey to their natural devourers, or sinking under disease, 
generally induced by want of nourishment, their place being occupied by the more perfect of their own 
kind, who are pressing on the means of subsistence … 
 
There is more beauty and unity of design in this continual balancing of life to circumstance, and greater 
conformity to those dispositions of nature which are manifest to us, than in total destruction and new 
creation … [The] progeny of the same parents, under great differences of circumstance, might, in several 
generations, even become distinct species, incapable of co-reproduction. (Matthew 1831 appendix p364) 
 
Blyth 
 
(4)How beautifully do we thus perceive, as in a thousand other instances, the balance of nature preserved: 
and even here we see another reason why sickly or degenerate animals (those, I mean, which are less able 
to maintain the necessary vigilance) must soon disappear; and why the slightest deviation from the natural 
hue must generally prove fatal to the animal. (Blyth 1835 p53) 
 
Breeds are my third class of varieties; and though these may possibly be sometimes formed by accidental 
isolation in a state of nature, yet they are, for the most part, artificially brought about by the direct agency 
of man. It is a general law of nature for all creatures to propagate the like of themselves: and this extends 
even to the most trivial minutiæ, to the slightest individual peculiarities; and thus, among ourselves, we see 
a family likeness transmitted from generation to generation. When two animals are matched together, each 
remarkable for a certain given peculiarity, no matter how trivial, there is also a decided tendency in nature 
for that peculiarity to increase; and if the produce of these animals be set apart, and only those in which the 
same peculiarity is most apparent, be selected to breed from, the next generation will possess it in a still 
more remarkable degree; and so on, till at length the variety I designate a breed, is formed, which may be 
very unlike the original type. (Blyth 1835 p46) 
 
Darwin 
 
(5)If during the long course of ages and under varying conditions of life, organic beings vary at all in the 
several parts of their organisation, and I think this cannot be disputed; if there be, owing to the high 
geometrical powers of increase of each species, at some age, season, or year, a severe struggle for life, and 
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this certainly cannot be disputed; then, considering the infinite complexity of the relations of all organic 
beings to each other and to their conditions of existence, causing an infinite diversity in structure, 
constitution, and habits, to be advantageous to them, I think it would be a most extraordinary fact if no 
variation ever had occurred useful to each being’s own welfare, in the same way as so many variations 
have occurred useful to man. But if variations useful to any organic being do occur, assuredly individuals 
thus characterised will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong 
principle of inheritance they will tend to produce offspring similarly characterised. This principle of 
preservation, I have called, for the sake of brevity, Natural Selection. (Darwin 1859 p154) 
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Appendix 2 
 
Darwin and pluralism: Factors that shape evolution other than natural selection 
 
Use and disuse 
 
(1)It is well known that several animals, belonging to the most different classes, which inhabit the caves of 
Styria and of Kentucky, are blind. In some of the crabs the foot-stalk for the eye remains, though the eye is 
gone; the stand for the telescope is there, though the telescope with its glasses has been lost. As it is 
difficult to imagine that eyes, though useless, could be in any way injurious to animals living in darkness, I 
attribute their loss wholly to disuse. 
 
In the same manner as in Madeira the wings of some of the insects have been enlarged, and the wings of 
others have been reduced by natural selection aided by use and disuse, so in the case of the cave-rat natural 
selection seems to have struggled with the loss of light and to have increased the size of the eyes; whereas 
with all the other inhabitants of the caves, disuse by itself seems to have done its work. (Darwin 1859 
p155) 
 
 
 
Habit 
 
(2)How much of the acclimatisation of species to any peculiar climate is due to mere habit, and how much 
to the natural selection of varieties having different innate constitutions, and how much to means 
combined, is a very obscure question. That habit or custom has some influence I must believe, both from 
analogy, and from the incessant advice given in agricultural works, even in the ancient Encyclopaedias of 
China, to be very cautious in transposing animals from one district to another; for it is not likely that man 
should have succeeded in selecting so many breeds and sub-breeds with constitutions specially fitted for 
their own districts: the result must, I think, be due to habit. On the other hand, I can see no reason to doubt 
that natural selection will continually tend to preserve those individuals which are born with constitutions 
best adapted to their native countries. (Darwin 1859 p159) 
 
 
 
Correlation of Growth 
 
(3)Correlation of Growth.—By this term I mean that the whole organisation is so connected, that when one 
part varies, other parts vary; but which of two correlated variations ought to be looked at as the cause and 
which as the effect, or whether both result from some common cause, we can seldom or never tell. The 
point of interest for us is that, when fanciers, by the continued selection of slight variations, have largely 
modified one part, they often unintentionally produce other modifications. (Darwin 1868 p182) 
 
Correlation is an important subject; for with species, and in a lesser degree with domestic races, we 
continually find that certain parts have been greatly modified to serve some useful purpose; but we almost 
invariably find that other parts have likewise been more or less modified, without our being able to 
discover any advantage in the change. No doubt great caution is necessary with respect to this latter point, 
for it is difficult to overrate our ignorance on the use of various parts of the organisation; but from what we 
have seen, we may believe that many modifications are of no direct service, having arisen in correlation 
with other and useful changes. (Darwin 1868 p365) 
 
 
Diet 
 
(4)With respect to the causes of the modifications which horses have undergone, the conditions of life 
seem to produce a considerable direct effect. Mr. D. Forbes, who has had excellent opportunities of 
comparing the horses of Spain with those of South America, informs me that the horses of Chile, which 
have lived under nearly the same conditions as their progenitors in Andalusia, remain unaltered, whilst the 
Pampas horses and the Puno horses are considerably modified. There can be no doubt that horses become 
greatly reduced in size and altered in appearance by living on mountains and islands; and this apparently is 
due to want of nutritious or varied food. (Darwin 1868 p67) 
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Direct impact of the climate 
 
(5)Dr. Falconer informs me that bulldogs, which have been known, when first brought into the country, to 
pin down even an elephant by its trunk, not only fall off after two or three generations in pluck and 
ferocity, but lose the under-hung character of their lower jaws; their muzzles become finer and their bodies 
lighter. English dogs imported into India are so valuable that probably due care has been taken to prevent 
their crossing with native dogs; so that the deterioration cannot be thus accounted for. The Rev. R. Everest 
informs me that he obtained a pair of setters, born in India, which perfectly resembled their Scotch parents: 
he raised several litters from them in Delhi, taking the most stringent precautions to prevent a cross, but he 
never succeeded, though this was only the second generation in India, in obtaining a single young dog like 
its parents in size or make; their nostrils were more contracted, their noses more pointed, their size inferior, 
and their limbs more slender. (Darwin 1868 p53) 
 
 
The ‘laws of variation or growth’ 
 
(6)In many cases we are far too ignorant to be enabled to assert that a part or organ is so unimportant for 
the welfare of a species, that modifications in its structure could not have been slowly accumulated by 
means of natural selection. In many cases, modifications are the probably direct result of the laws of 
variation or growth, independently of any good having thus gained. But even such structures have often, as 
we feel assured, been subsequently taken advantage of, and still further modified, for the good of the 
species under new conditions of life. (Darwin 1900 p259)  
 
 
Darwin confirms his pluralism 
 
(7(Thus a large yet undefined extension may safely be given to the direct and indirect results of natural 
selection; but I now admit, after reading the essay by Nageli on plants, and the remarks by various authors 
with respect to animals, more especially those recently made by Professor Broca, that in the earlier editions 
of my ‘Origin of Species’ I perhaps attributed too much to the action of natural selection or the survival of 
the fittest. I have altered the fifth edition of the ‘Origin’ so as to confine my remarks to adaptive changes of 
structure; but I am convinced, from the light gained during even the last few years, that very many 
structures which now appear to us useless, will hereafter be proved to be useful, and will therefore come 
within the range of natural selection. Nevertheless, I did not formerly consider sufficiently the existence of 
structures, which, as far as we can at present judge, are neither beneficial nor injurious; and this I believe to 
be one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my work. I may be permitted to say, as some excuse, 
that I had two distinct objects in view; firstly, to shew that species had not been separately created, and 
secondly, that natural selection had been the chief agent of change, though largely aided by the inherited 
effects of habit, and slightly by the direct action of the surrounding conditions. (Darwin 1871 p152) 
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Appendix 3 
 
Quotations critical of Natural Selection 
 
Mivart  
 
   (1)Convergence: 
Thus it is here contended that the similar and complex structures of both the highest organs of sense, as 
developed in the vertebrates on the one hand, and in the mollusks on the other, present us with residuary 
phenomena for which ‘Natural Selection’ alone is quite incompetent to account : and that these same 
phenomena must therefore be considered as conclusive evidence for the action of some other natural law or 
laws conditioning the simultaneous and independent evolution of these harmonious and concordant 
adaptations. (Mivart 1871 p88) 
 
   (2)Incipient organs 
‘Natural Selection’, simply and by itself, is potent to explain the maintenance or the further extension and 
development of favourable variations, which are at once sufficiently considerable to be useful from the first 
to the individual possessing them. But Natural Selection utterly fails to account for the conservation and 
development of the minute and rudimentary beginnings, the slight and infinitesimal commencements of 
structures, however useful those structures may afterwards become. (ibid. p35) 
 
 
(3)The Incomplete Fossil Record 
The mass of palaeontological evidence is indeed overwhelmingly against minute and gradual modification. 
It is true that when once an animal has obtained powers of flight its means of diffusion are indefinitely 
increased, and we might expect to find many relics of an aerial form and few of its antecedent state with 
nascent wings just commencing their suspensory power. Yet had such a slow mode of origin, as 
Darwinians contend for, operated exclusively in all cases, it is absolutely incredible that birds, bats, and 
pterodactyles should have left the remains they have, and yet not a single relic be preserved in any one 
instance of any of these different forms of wing in their incipient and relatively imperfect functional 
condition! Whenever the remains of bats have been found they have presented the exact type of existing 
forms, and there is as yet no indication of the conditions of an incipient elevation from the ground. (Mivart 
1871 p143) 
 
 
 
Kropotkin 
    
   (4)Animal struggle 
I failed to find – although I was eagerly looking for it – that bitter struggle for the means of existence, 
among animals belonging to the same species, which was considered by most Darwinists (though not 
always by Darwin himself) as the dominant characteristic of struggle for life, and the main factor of 
evolution. (Kropotkin 1902 p1) 
 
(5)Narrow sense of struggle 
It may be that at the outset, Darwin himself was not fully aware of the generality of the factor which he first 
invoked for explaining one series only of facts relative to the accumulation of individual variations in 
incipient species. But he foresaw that the term which he was introducing into science would lose its 
philosophical and its only true meaning if it were to be used in its narrow sense only – that of a struggle 
between separate individuals for the sheer means of existence. (ibid. p10)  
 
  (6)Wider sense of struggle 
He (Darwin) pointed out how, in numberless animal societies, the struggle between separate individuals for 
the means of existence disappears, how struggle is replaced by co-operation and how that substitution 
results in the development of intellectual and moral faculties which secure to the species the best conditions 
for survival. (ibid. p11) 
 
 
(7)Mutual aid is a strong factor of evolution 
Sociability is as much a law of nature as mutual struggle. Of course it would be extremely difficult to 
estimate, however roughly, the relative numerical importance of both these series of facts. But if we resort 
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to an indirect test, and ask nature: ‘who are the fittest: those who are continually at war with each other, or 
those who support one another?’ we at once see that those animals which acquire habits of mutual aid are 
undoubtedly the fittest. They have more chances to survive, and they attain, in their respective classes, the 
highest development of intelligence and bodily organisation. (ibid. p13) 
 
 
   (8)Lack of evidence 
We were both under the fresh impression of the Origin of Species, but we vainly looked for the keen 
competition between animals of the same species which the reading of Darwin’s work had prepared us to 
expect, even after taking into account the remarks of the third chapter (p.54). We saw plenty of adaptations 
for struggling, very often common, against the adverse circumstances of climate, or against various 
enemies, and Polyakoff wrote many a good page upon the mutual dependency of carnivores, ruminants, and 
rodents in their geographical distribution; we witnessed numbers of facts of mutual support, especially 
during the migration of birds and ruminants, but even in the Amur and Usuri regions, where animal life 
swarms in abundance, facts of real competition and struggle between higher animals of the same species 
came very seldom under my notice, though I eagerly searched for them. (ibid. p16) 
 
 
Butler 
 
  (9)Causality 
It is plain that natural selection cannot be considered a cause of variation, for the variations must make their 
appearance before they can be selected. (Butler 1882 p346) 
 
Suppose that it is an advantage to a horse to have an especially hard and broad hoof, then a horse born with 
such a hoof will indeed probably survive in the struggle for existence, but he was not born with the larger 
and harder hoof because of his subsequent surviving. He survived because he was born fit, not he was born 
fit because he survived. The variation must arise first and be preserved afterwards. (ibid. p346) 
 
(10) Conditions of existence 
I think I can show moreover that Mr Darwin himself holds natural selection and the conditions of existence 
to be one and the same thing. For he writes ‘in one sense’ and it is hard to see any sense but one in what 
follows, ‘the conditions of life may be said not only to cause variability’ – so that here Mr Darwin appears 
to support Lamarck’s main thesis – ‘either directly or indirectly, but likewise, to include natural selection; 
for the conditions determine whether this or that variety shall survive.’ But later on we find that ‘the 
expression of conditions of existence, so often insisted upon by the illustrious Cuvier’ (and surely also by 
the illustrious Lamarck, though he calls them circumstances) ‘is fully embraced by the principle of natural 
selection.’ So we see that the conditions of life include natural selection and yet the conditions of existence 
are fully embraced by natural selection, which I take it is an enigmatic way of saying they are one and the 
same thing. (ibid. p20) 
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Appendix 4 
Collecting Selection Terminology (in reverse alphabetical order) 
 
Weak selection 
 
Nearly neutral evolution. (Lawson and Jensen 2009) 
www3.imperial.ac.uk/portal/page?_pageid=61 
 
Unnatural selection 
 
The effects of human activity upon evolution. 
(http://people.ucsc.edu/~cwilmers/publications/Stenseth2009
%20human%20predators.pdf) 
Sweeping selection 
 
Reduction or elimination of variation among the nucleotides 
in neighbouring DNA of a mutation as the result of recent and 
strong natural selection. 
(www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/Negative-Selection) 
 
Strong natural selection 
 
Speciation. www.ithaca.edu/biology/pres_bssmr03.pdf 
 
Stabilising selection 
Also called: 
Normalising or Purifying selection 
 
This type of selection acts to prevent divergence of form and 
function. (Bell 2008) 
 
Stabilising frequency-dependent selection 
 
Selection will favour rare genotypes and result in the 
maintenance of genetic variability. (Bell 2008) 
 
Species selection and multi-species 
selection 
 
In ecology, species under environmental threat. 
(www.cell.com/trends/ecology.../S0169-5347(09)00232-8. 
2008) 
 
Social selection 
 
Social competition can drive convergence or parallelism. 
(Tobias and Seddon 
http://www.zoo.ox.ac.uk/egi/Tobias&SeddonEvol_2009.pdf) 
 
Sexually antagonistic selection 
 
Solves the Darwinian puzzle of homosexuality. (Cox, 2013 
www.dartmouth.edu/.../Cox%20%26%20Calsbeek%202009%
20Am%20) 
 
Sexual selection 
 
The frequency of traits can increase or decrease depending on 
the attractiveness of the bearer. (Darwin. E  1792) 
 
Selective pressure 
 
Unknown definition.  
 
Runaway sexual selection 
 
Sexual selection that leads to the rapid evolution of 
exaggerated traits. (Bell 2008) 
 
Reversed sexual selection 
 
The male selects the female for reproduction. See Darwin’s 
reply to Mivart; (Darwin 1900 6th edition) 
 
Reverse selection 
 
Characters or traits unaffected by ‘selection processes’. (J. S. 
Allan 2009 journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjo) 
 
Relaxed selection 
Also called: 
Lifted selection 
 
Traits that were advantageous in one time and place become 
obsolete in another. Traits that aren’t actively maintained by 
natural selection tend to become smaller or less functional 
over time. (D. C. Lahti, N. A. Johnson et al. 2012). 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19500875 
 
Purifying selection 
 
Removes deleterious mutations from a population; in other 
words, it is directional selection in favour of the advantageous 
heterozygote. (Bell 2008) 
 
Progressive selection See: Directional selection 
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Positive selection 
 
Opposite to negative selection. Example – where a duplicated 
gene is under pressure to evolve new functions. Pevsner, 
2012. faculty.clayton.edu/Portals/367/Content/Biol4900/Biol-
4900-Ch-07.ppt 
Positive frequency-dependent selection 
 
The fitness of a phenotype increases as it becomes more 
common.( 2009.www.dorak.info/evolution/fselect) 
 
Paradoxical intrathymic positive selection 
 
Cells are not subjected to negative selection but, 
paradoxically, undergo positive selection in vivo. (Viret, He 
and Janeway.2001.www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11470911) 
 
Overdominant selection 
 
See: Balancing selection 
 
Oscillating directional selection 
 
Selection can favour one phenotype at one time and another 
phenotype at another time. (2009) 
www.nature.com/nature/journal/v327/n6122/abs/327511a0 
 
Orthoselection 
 
Chromosomes show a very ordered organisation and 
evolution. An oxymoron?  (White 1973) 
 
Normalising selection 
 
See: Stabilising selection 
 
Neutral selection 
 
Maximum fitness attained during the adaptive walk of a 
population evolving on such a fitness landscape increases with 
an increasing degree of neutrality. (Newman 2009, 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wop/safiwp/98-01-001.html) 
 
Negative selection 
 
The selective removal of rare alleles that are deleterious. See 
also purifying and background selection. 2009. 
(www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/Negative-Selection) 
 
Negative frequency dependent selection 
 
The fitness of a phenotype increases as it becomes less 
common. (2009.www.dorak.info/evolution/fselect.) 
 
Mineral selection 
 
Some minerals are more likely to survive than other minerals 
through ‘competition’. Hazen (2010) The evolution of 
minerals. Scientific American 303, #3, 58-65 
 
Linear selection 
 
See: Directional selection 
 
Lineage selection 
 
A process by which traits that are not directly assessed by the 
fitness function can evolve. G. W. Braught (2005) 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/4140633 
 
Lifted selection 
 
See: Relaxed selection 
 
Koinophilia selection 
 
When sexual creatures seek a mate, they prefer that mate not 
to have any unusual or deviant features Koeslag (1994). 
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S00225193847104
96 
 
Kin selection 
 
Evolution of characters that favour the survival of close 
relatives of the affected individual, by processes that do not 
require any discontinuities in the population breeding 
structure. (Haldane 1932). 
 
Intrasexual selection 
 
Members of the less limited sex (typically males) compete 
aggressively among themselves for access to the limiting sex. 
T. H. Clutton-Brock, S. J. Hodge, G. Spong, A. F. Russell and 
N. R. Jordan. (2007). 
www.zoo.cam.ac.uk/zoostaff/larg/pages/tim.htm 
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Intersexual selection 
 
In which males compete with each other to be chosen by 
females. (2009).www.associatedcontent.com/article/42665/ 
 
Group selection 
 
Alleles can become fixed or spread in a population because of 
the benefits they bestow on groups, regardless of the alleles’ 
effect on the fitness of individuals within that group. (Wynne 
–Edwards 1962) 
 
Frequency-dependent selection 
 
The term given to an evolutionary process where the fitness of 
a phenotype is dependent on its frequency relative to other 
phenotypes in a given population. (Bell 2008) 
 
Fluctuating directional selection 
 
See: Directional selection 
 
Fierce selection 
 
Natural selection with fierce competition when the climate is 
harsh and the food is sparse. Under these conditions only the 
best, well-adapted individuals survive. 
(2009).www.mail-archive.com/friam@redfish.com 
 
Environmental selection 
 
Ambiguous artificial-plus-ecological factors. (2009. 
www.natur.cuni.cz/flegr/pdf/FL12-environmental.pdf 
 
Ecological selection 
 
Where inheritance of specific traits is determined by ecology 
alone without direct sexual competition (2009). 
www.pnas.org/content/97/23/12398.full 
 
Dynamic selection 
 
See: Directional selection 
 
Disruptive selection 
 
A descriptive term used to describe changes in population 
genetics that simultaneously favour individuals at both 
extremes of the distribution. (Bell 2008) 
 
Disruptive frequency-dependent selection 
 
Rare types cannot invade and genetic variability will not be 
maintained. (Bell 2008) 
 
Disassortative sexual selection 
 
Sexual selection in which one sex chooses the other, in such a 
way that the offspring benefits from the diversity of the 
parental genotypes. (Penn. 1996) 
stormy.biology.utah.edu/publications/X_fostering.pdf 
 
Directional selection 
Also called: 
Dynamic selection 
Fluctuating directional selection 
Linear selection 
Progressive selection 
 
When natural selection favours a single phenotype and 
therefore allele frequency continuously shifts in one direction. 
Under directional selection, the advantageous allele will 
increase in frequency independently of its dominance relative 
to other alleles (i.e. even if the advantageous allele is 
recessive, it will eventually become fixed). (Bell 2008). 
 
Cosmological natural selection 
 
Universes selected with the highest number of black holes.  
(Smolin 1998) 
 
Correlational sexual selection frequency 
 
May be an important mechanism for maintaining the honesty 
of sexual signals. (Sinerco 2002). 
behav.zoology.unibe.ch/sysuif/uploads/Sinervo_Heredity.pdf 
Correlated selection 
 
May lead to the integration of functionally related traits. 
(Sinerco 2002). 
behav.zoology.unibe.ch/sysuif/uploads/Sinervo_Heredity.pdf 
 
Contradictory selection 
 
Different selection pressures at work. (Spieth 1979) 
www.jstor.org/stable/2460203 
 
Conflicting selection 
 
Selection may be different at different stages of an organism’s 
life. (Schluter 1991) 
adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1991RSPSB.246...11S 
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Canalising selection 
 
Reduces phenotypic variation. (Waddington 1942) 
 
Balancing selection 
Also called: 
Overdominant selection 
 
Balancing selection within a population is able to maintain 
stable frequencies of  phenotypic forms. (Bell 2008) 
 
Background selection 
 
Opposite of a selective sweep. If a specific site experiences 
strong and persistent purifying selection, linked variation will 
tend to be weeded out along with it, producing a region in the 
genome of low overall variability. (2008). 
www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/Negative-Selection 
 
Asexual selection 
 
‘Selective’ forces working against nuclear types in a 
population of N. crassa. (Davis 1959) www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
› Journal List › Genetics › v.44(6) 
 
Artificial selection 
 
Intentional breeding of certain traits, or combinations of traits, 
over others.  (Darwin 1859) 
 
Anomalous selection 
 
Any biological event, evolutionary or non-evolutionary (but 
can also apply to other sciences). Colin Beckley 2008 
 
 
See also: Graham Bell Selection: The Mechanism of Evolution OUP 2008 
Autoselection 
Death selection 
Leapfrog selection 
Marker-assisted selection 
Mass selection 
Part-record selection 
Periodic selection 
Phototaxis selection 
Pollen selection 
r-K selection 
Roundabout selection 
Speed limit selection 
Synclinal selection 
Threshold selection 
Truncation selection 
Visual selection 
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Appendix 5 Molecular Evolution Table 
 
 
Source: http://www.humanthermodynamics.com/evolution-table.html 
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